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ABSTRACT
This program of research was designed to examine the role of thought
suppression in the retrieval of autobiographical memories (ABMs). The
principal theory proposed here is that thought suppression is an important
mechanism in explaining certain ABM retrieval patterns relevant to trauma
and self-harm. Study 1 examined the role of thought suppression as a
correlate of ABM retrieval in a nonclinical student sample, and showed that
higher levels of thought suppression were significantly correlated with the
faster recall of negative episodic ABMs as well as the recall of fewer personal
semantic memories. Study 2 used a suppression manipulation procedure
designed to examine whether this was a causal relationship, and revealed that
induced thought suppression directly led to a significant enhancement in the
retrieval of negative episodic ABMs as well as significantly fewer overgeneral
first responses to negative cues. Furthermore, the induced thought
suppression also resulted in the recall of significantly fewer personal semantic
memories. Together these results support the theory that thought suppression
is an important factor in ABM recall. The enhanced recall of negative
memories could be particularly important in individuals who are self-harming,
suicidal and/or suffering from PTSD, as enhanced negative recall has
previously been observed in these populations. In order to further examine
how thought suppression affects ABM retrieval and whether the enhanced
negative recall observed in Study 2 was a result of mood-congruent recall,
Study 3 used a similar suppression manipulation paradigm to examine the
effects of induced thought suppression on mood. The results suggested that
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the enhanced negative ABM recall was unlikely to have been a by-product of
the suppression manipulation resulting in a more negative mood state. Finally,
Study 4 examined the role of thought suppression and ABM recall in a clinical
sample of self-harming adolescents (who also reported high levels of post-
traumatic stress symptoms). The results showed that levels of thought
suppression were significantly higher in the self-harmers than the control
group, indicating that thought suppression is an important coping mechanism
in self-harmers. Furthermore, in terms of the autobiographical memory
retrieval, it was found that the self-harmers were significantly faster in their
retrieval of negative episodic ABMs and recalled fewer personal semantic
memories than the control group. Multiple regression analysis of the data
revealed that thought suppression remained as the most important predictor
of variability in negative episodic ABM retrieval and personal semantic
memory retrieval, even when variability explained by symptoms of depression
and PTSD was considered. This program of research extends current theories
of ABM retrieval by identifying thought suppression as a cognitive
mechanism that directly affects the retrieval of both episodic as well as
personal semantic ABMs. The theoretical importance and clinical relevance of
this program of research are discussed.
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C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
“Nothing fixes a thing so intensely in memory as the wish to forget it”
- Michel de Montaigne (1533 – 1592)
1.1 Introduction
Autobiographical Memories (ABMs) are memories that individuals
have of their own past. A person’s ABM can be conceptualized as a record of
the experiences of a lifetime, which go together to give the person a sense of
self (Baddeley, 1997). Therefore, the study of ABM is of particular interest
because of its strong link with the concept of the self (e.g. Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). Furthermore, ABM retrieval is often studied with respect to
clinical psychology. The ability to recall ABMs is known to be affected in
numerous psychological disorders, including depression, post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), as well as in self harming and suicidal individuals. However,
while the fact that ABM recall is affected in these clinical conditions is well
documented (for a review see Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, Hermans, Raes,
Watkins & Dalgleish, 2007), the empirical research that investigates why this is
the case is limited. The aim of the current research program is to examine the
potential role of one particular cognitive mechanism that may underlie and
affect ABM retrieval, namely conscious thought suppression.
This introductory chapter reviews previous theoretical and empirical
work that has examined ABM recall. It starts by defining the nature and
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structure of ABM and presents the Self-Memory System (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) as a predominant model of ABM retrieval as well as highlighting
the emphasis in this model on the relationship between ABM and an
individual’s sense of self. Specific motivations for studying ABM retrieval are
presented, with particular emphasis on the clinical relevance, which leads to a
review of ABM recall patterns and deficits in the emotional disorders relevant
to this program of research. The chapter then turns to examine possible
reasons for these differences in ABM recall in clinical samples versus controls,
and identifies conscious thought suppression as a theoretically important
mechanism that could be related to ABM recall. Finally, the chapter gives an
overview of this program of research and specifies the main issues that are
investigated in this thesis in order to examine the role of thought suppression
in the retrieval of ABMs.
1.2 What is Autobiographical Memory?
In the widest sense, autobiographical memories are representations of
information relating to the self. These are often emotional memories that are
fundamental to the sense of self and personal goals (Conway & Pleydell
Pearce, 2000). As such, ABM is central to an individuals’ ability to function, to
create a self-identity and to process emotion (Williams et al., 2007).
In the broadest sense, ABMs can be episodic (i.e. memories for events
of ones past, e.g. remembering a certain holiday) or personal semantic (i.e.
memory for facts from ones past, e.g. remembering the name of a primary
school teacher) in nature (Conway, 1987).
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1.2.1 Episodic Autobiographical Memory
Episodic memory is memory of unique, concrete and temporally
dated events that are time and place specific (Tulving, 1972). Episodic ABMs,
therefore, are personal experiences that can be placed at some point in the
past (Baddeley, 2001). A key aspect of episodic ABMs that is relevant to the
present program of research is that they can be recalled at different levels of
specificity. For the purpose of research employing a widely used cue word
paradigm to elicit emotional episodic autobiographical memories (see section
2.2.1), specific episodic memories have been defined as memories for an
event that lasted less than one day and occurred at a specific time, e.g. “the
moment when my partner proposed to me” (Williams & Broadbent, 1986).
Elicited autobiographical memories that are not specific usually take the form
of either extended memories (i.e. referring to a time that lasted longer than a
day) or categoric memories (i.e. generic summary of a type of event) (Williams
& Dritschel, 1992). An example of an extended memory would be “my
holiday in Australia” and a categoric memory would be “the piano lessons
that I had as a child”. Together, extended and categoric memories are referred
to under the umbrella term of overgeneral memory, meaning any type of
memory that does not refer to a specific event. Williams and Dritschel (1992)
found that these two types of overgeneral memories are independent of each
other, primarily because overgeneral memory retrieval in emotional
disturbance is associated only with the increased recall of categoric memories,
but not with the recall of extended memories.
- 4 -
1.2.2 Personal Semantic Memory
Semantic memory is memory for facts that are culturally shared and
not temporally specific and includes knowledge of facts, objects, concepts, as
well as words and their meanings (Tulving, 1972). Personal semantic memory
is factual knowledge of one’s past, such as one’s home addresses, names of
teachers, places of work, etc. (Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 1989). It is
different from episodic autobiographical memory in that it does not require
the recall of information relating to when or where it was first learned
(Williams et al., 1999); therefore the validity of personal semantic memory is
not dependent upon a certain event. Furthermore, it has also been argued that
personal semantic memory differs from episodic memory in that it is not
perceptual in nature (Brewer, 1986), and that personal semantic information
that is frequently rehearsed is not thought to be indexed by event related
information (Conway, 1987).
It has been argued that there is a certain amount of overlap between
personal semantic and episodic ABM, especially in the sense that the retrieval
of certain personal semantic information may involve the activation of
episodic memories (Conway, 1987). For instance, if asked for the personal
semantic information “have you ever been to France?” the search for an
answer may well involve recalling episodic memories from a recent holiday in
France. However, because there are sufficient characteristics that differ
between personal semantic and episodic ABM, they will be assessed separately
in the present program of research, which is consistent with previous research
(e.g. Hunter & Andrews, 2002, Stokes et al., 2004).
1.2.3 The Structure of Autobiographical Memory
Autobiographical Memories are not thought to be stored as an infinite
number of separate memory units. Instead, the retrieval of ABMs is
conceptualized as a reconstructive process. The autobiographical information
from which ABMs are constructed is thought to be stored in an
autobiographical memory knowledge base (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
According to this predominant model or ABM, autobiographical knowledge is
hierarchically organized in an interlinked network consisting of different levels
of specificity. These levels range from “lifetime periods” at the most general
level and “general events” at an intermediate level to “event specific
knowledge” (ESK) at the most specific level (see Figure 1.1). Numerous
empirical studies have found evidence to support this hierarchical
organization of autobiographical memories (Barsalou, 1988; Conway &
Bekerian, 1987; Conway & Rubin, 1993).
Figure 1.1: The structure of ABM (adapted from Conway & Rubin, 1993)
When ILifetime Periods
General Events
Event Specific Knowledge
General worked at X When I was
living with Y
Going to the
pub on Fridays
Walking the dog
on the beach
One specific
R
etrieval(top-dow
n)- 5 -
Specific
conversation
with partner Y One afternoon
on the fishing
boat
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Representations stored at the most general level are thought to be
predominantly abstract and semantic in nature. Information stored at this
level takes the form of memories for lifetime periods. Lifetime periods are
prolonged and themed periods of an individual’s life and generally have
distinct start and end points (e.g. living with a certain partner).
Representations at the intermediate level, i.e. “general events”, can either be in
the form of repeated events (e.g. “going to the pub on Friday nights”) or
extended events (e.g. “the holiday in Spain”). These two types of “general
events” represent the two distinct types of overgeneral ABM mentioned
above in Section 1.2.2; that is, categoric and extended memory. Taken
together, the information stored at the “lifetime periods” and “general
events” levels forms the conceptual self, where information regarding an
individuals’ attitudes and beliefs are stored. Specific episodic memories are
stored as “event specific knowledge” at the lowest point in the hierarchy.
ESK consists of highly specific, sensory/perceptual information.
When the information is stored within the autobiographical memory
knowledge base, a memory can be generated as a result of two different
processes: generative retrieval or spontaneous/direct retrieval (Conway &
Pleydell Pearce, 2000). Generative retrieval starts by initially accessing
verbal/abstract information in the form of either “lifetime period” or “general
event” knowledge, which then activates interconnected representations
further down in the hierarchy (top-down retrieval) until the relevant ESK is
accessed. For example, when a person tries to remember a time when they felt
happy, they might begin the search at the level of lifetime periods and think
about the time when they were living with a specific partner. From there the
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search for a specific memory might continue by accessing a category of
general events, for instance holidays with this partner. This process, in turn,
could lead to the activation of event specific knowledge within that category,
for instance a specific night when the couple had dinner in a special romantic
restaurant. This search is conscious and is thought to be controlled by
supervisory executive processes which continuously monitor the search in
order to determine if it is successful. If it is not, these processes refine the
pattern of activation of representation within the autobiographical memory
knowledge base. Therefore, an important role of these supervisory executive
processes is the demanding task of inhibiting the activation of representations
that are irrelevant to the present search. For instance, in the above example,
the activation of any representation that would not lead to the activation of a
happy ESK needs to be inhibited in order for the search to be successful.
Spontaneous or direct retrieval, on the other hand, is automatic. This
type of retrieval occurs when ESK is directly activated by strong cues, which
can be either internal or environmental. The activation of a specific memory
(ESK) by direct retrieval is faster and less resource demanding than generative
retrieval. To illustrate this, a person might be walking down the street and see
a person they remember, and a memory about a specific event with that
person might come to mind immediately, without any form of generative
retrieval. It is important to note that most memories that can be activated by
direct retrieval are linked to representations higher up in the hierarchy of
organisation (e.g. a certain lifetime period) and are therefore also available for
generative retrieval. However, in certain cases, such as traumatic intrusions,
this may not always be the case. In this case a memory might be suddenly
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recollected as a result of an external stimulus, whereas it was not previously
available for recollection by generative retrieval.
Central to the above model of ABM is the relationship between the
autobiographical memory knowledge base and an individual’s sense of self, as
it contains the information a person has about him or herself. The self, and
more specifically the goals of the self, function as control processes that
modulate the formation of autobiographical memories. This complex process
is described as the Self-Memory System (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
The purpose of the system is to continuously create and maintain a record of
experience that is to be used to guide the pursuit of personal goals, as well as
forming an integrated representation of one’s self that is consistent with
personal goals. Therefore, the Self-Memory System is conceptualized as being
composed of the autobiographical memory knowledge base and the “working
self”. The working self operates numerous working-memory control
processes within the system that ensure that the self-memory system and its
components remain consistent with desired self-schemas and possible selves
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
According to the Self-Memory System, the goal structure of the
working self determines both how autobiographical information is encoded
and plays an important role in the construction of autobiographical memories
during generative retrieval. The valence of an experience is determined by the
degree of discrepancy between the autobiographical information and the goals
of the working self. If the information is consistent with the goals of the
working self and affirms them, it is experienced as positive. In contrast, the
greater the discrepancy between the experience and the goals of the working
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self, the more negative the information is perceived to be (Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). For instance, if an individual has “being an intelligent
person” as an active goal of the working self, then autobiographical
information relating to receiving an academic award will be perceived as
positive, because it affirms the goal of “being intelligent”. However, another
incident where the person receives a poor grade on an exam will be seen as a
negative event, because it contradicts this particular goal of the working self.
Depending on the context of the current goals of the working self, the
recollection of the same episodic memory can be experienced as both positive
and negative at different times. For instance, an overweight person might
remember an ESK of visiting a swimming pool as positive if it is within the
goal-context of “being an active and outgoing person”, as this particular goal
is affirmed by the recollection. If, on the other hand, the same memory is
activated within the context of the goal of “being an attractive and slim
person”, then the memory can be seen as negative as it contradicts the goal.
A large role of the control processes of the working self is the
reduction of discrepancies between the information in the autobiographical
memory knowledge base and the goals of the working self (Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). If a specific episodic memory (i.e. ESK) is consistent
with the current goals of the working self (i.e. positive) it readily becomes
linked to general representations higher up in the hierarchy (i.e. lifetime
periods and general events), and is then available to be activated by generative
retrieval.
If, on the other hand, an ESK is not relevant to or in extreme cases
even inconsistent with the goals of the working self, this knowledge cannot be
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readily integrated into the Self-Memory System and linked to higher level
representations. In order to assimilate the autobiographical information the
goals for the working self can sometimes be adjusted in such a way that
consistency between the information in the autobiographical memory
knowledge base and the goals for the working self is achieved. If this is the
case, the memory can subsequently be assimilated. However, in more extreme
cases, when the information poses a large inconsistency with the goals of the
working self, the only way of controlling the discrepancy is for the ESK not
to be linked to higher level representations, which in turn means that it will
not become an integrated part of the Self-Memory System. Memories of
traumatic events in particular generally contradict the goals of the working
self, and therefore cannot be readily assimilated into the Self-Memory System.
For instance, if a person has the goal of “being a safe person”, a memory of
an incident of abuse would be highly discrepant with that goal. The memory
itself is therefore unlikely to be integrated into the Self-Memory System, and
is then often not available for cued recall, while intrusions of the material (i.e.
direct retrieval) are still possible. According to the Self-Memory System, the
aim of therapy in such cases should be to achieve the successful assimilation
of the traumatic memories into the autobiographical memory knowledge base
by reducing the discrepancy between the autobiographical information and
the current goals of the working self.
Though widely employed, the empirical evidence for the Self-Memory
System remains very limited. One study has directly investigated the
relationship between autobiographical memory retrieval and personal goals
(Sutherland & Bryant, 2005). In a small mixed sample of adult survivors of
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motor vehicle accidents and assaults, participants were asked to report five
episodic memories that they considered to be self-defining, as well as
complete a short questionnaire that identified current goals. Participants with
PTSD reported more self-defining memories that were trauma-related than
those without a diagnosis of PTSD (but who had nevertheless survived a
traumatic event) and non-trauma exposed controls. These results indicated
that sufferers of PTSD are more pre-occupied with the traumatic event than
those who do not have the disorder. Furthermore, the retrieval of trauma
related self-defining memories was significantly correlated with reporting
personal goals that were related to overcoming the traumatic experience.
These findings are consistent with the predictions of the Self-Memory System,
as in the case of PTSD, the content of the memory recall matched the current
goals of the individuals. However, although this evidence is consistent with
the theory proposed by the Self-Memory System, it only addresses one aspect
of the model and deals with a very limited population of adult survivors of
civilian trauma.
1.3 Why study Autobiographical Memory Recall?
A key motivation for studying ABM retrieval in the present program
of research is the potential for it to aid our understanding of the cognitive
processing biases associated with psychopathology. Insights into these
cognitive biases can lead to the developments of therapeutic interventions.
ABM recall is important in clinical settings, as virtually all “talk-based”
psychotherapies require the patient to recall events or experiences from their
past (e.g. Rubin, 1996) as a step towards processing and re-evaluating this
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information. The ability to recall ABMs is therefore important for many
therapeutic settings.
Furthermore, certain ABM retrieval patterns have been directly linked
to certain emotional states (e.g. Williams, 1996) and numerous psychological
disorders (see Section 1.4). For instance, in the case of depression, the
inability to retrieve specific ABMs (i.e. overgeneral episodic recall) has been
empirically linked to other problems, such as problems with imagining future
events (Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose & MacLeod, 1996) and poor social
problem solving skills (Evans, Williams, O’Loughlin & Howells, 1992;
Goddard, Dritschel & Burton, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001; Raes, Hermans,
Williams, Demyttenaere, Sabbe, Pieters & Eelen, 2005; Scott, Stanton,
Garland & Ferrier, 2000; Williams, Barnhofer, Crane & Beck, 2005).
Consistent with this research, the ability to solve social problems has been
shown to be dependent on the ability to recall specific ABMs (e.g. Pollock &
Williams, 2001).
1.4 Autobiographical Memory Recall and Emotional Disorders
As would be expected, autobiographical memory retrieval is naturally
affected in degenerative amnesias, such as age-related dementia and
Alzheimer’s Disease (e.g. Baddeley, 1997). However, while this is
acknowledged here, the focus of this present program of research is on the
cognitive mechanisms that may underlie autobiographical memory retrieval
patterns in emotional disorders.
Initially, early research in the area of memory and emotion has
revolved around mood-congruent memory retrieval, and several studies found
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support for a mood-congruent memory bias in dysphoria (Clark & Teasdale,
1982; Lloyd & Lishman, 1975; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). In these studies,
participants who were in a dysphoric mood state were shown to retrieve
negative autobiographical memories relatively faster than positive memories.
However, a seminal study by Williams and Broadbent (1986) revealed
that a sample of suicidal patients were not only slower to produce memories
in response to positive cues than controls, but additionally were more likely
than controls to fail in the retrieval of a specific memory in response to both
positive and negative cue words by producing overgeneral memories instead.
Furthermore, these differences could not be explained by general deficits in
cognitive functioning, as participants across all groups showed no difference
in their performance on a semantic memory task.
Following this serendipitous finding by Williams and Broadbent
(1986), many subsequent studies have focused on examining this overgeneral
memory recall phenomenon. In terms of psychopathology, the tendency to
recall overgeneral memories (or problems with specific episodic ABM recall)
has been extensively documented to be related to depression (see Williams et
al., 2007 for a review), suicidal and parasuicidal thoughts and behaviours
(Evans, Williams, O’Loughlin & Howells, 1992; Pollock & Williams, 2001;
Sidley, Whitaker, Calam & Wells, 1997; Sinclair, Crane, Hawton & Williams,
2007; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose &
MacLeod, 1996), as well as post-traumatic stress disorder (de Decker,
Hermans, Raes & Eelen, 2003; Henderson, Hargreaves, Gregory & Willaims,
2002; Hermans, Van den Broeck, Belis, Raes, Pieters & Eelen, 2004; Kuyken
& Brewin, 1995; McNally, Lasko, Macklin & Pitman, 1995; McNally, Litz,
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Prassas, Shin & Weathers, 1994; Raes, Hermans, Williams & Eelen, 2005;
Stokes, Dritschel & Bekerian, 2004; Wessel, Merckelbach & Dekkers, 2002).
However, a recent review paper of the literature on overgeneral memory
retrieval and trauma has concluded that overgeneral episodic ABM retrieval is
unlikely to be a result of mere exposure to a traumatic event, but instead is
more consistently associated with psychopathological conditions such as
depression and PTSD (Moore & Zoellner, 2007). Furthermore, the tendency
to retrieve overgeneral ABMs has also been documented in schizophrenia
(Harrison & Fowler, 2004; Iqbal, Birchwood, Hemsley, Jackson & Morris,
2004; Neuman, Blairy, Lecompte & Philippot, 2007; Riutort, Cuervo, Danion,
Peretti & Salame, 2003). A single study has also demonstrated overgeneral
memory retrieval in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) (Jones, Heard,
Startup, Swales, Williams & Jones, 1999), however, subsequent research has
failed to replicated these results (Arntz, Meeren & Wessel, 2002; Kremers,
Spinhoven & Van der Does, 2004). A further study assessing ABM recall
latencies also found no difference was found between BPD sufferers and
controls in the latency to retrieve a specific ABM (Renneberg, Theobald,
Nobs & Weisbrod, 2005).
While the predominant focus in the literature has been on overgeneral
ABM retrieval, a number of studies have hinted at a different pattern, namely
that of a negative facilitation effect. In 1988, Williams and Dritschel found
that a group of overdose patients produced significantly more specific first
responses to negative cues than positive cues, a pattern which was reversed
for the control group. In another study using a group of depressed individuals
as participants, high levels of childhood trauma were found to be significantly
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correlated with more specific recall to negative but not to positive cue words
(Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach & Boon-Vermeeren, 2002). Burnside, Startup,
Byatt, Rollinson and Hill (2004) found that childhood sexual abuse survivors
who had a history of previous major depression produced significantly fewer
categoric responses to negative cue words than those abuse survivors without
a history of major depression. Finally, in a sample of mood disturbed
adolescents, Swales, Williams and Wood (2001) observed a positive
correlation between hopelessness and the number of specific memories
recalled in response to negative cue words. However, in retrospect the authors
speculated that this correlation was a result of a number of the parasuicidal
adolescents recalling the same traumatic memory in response to multiple
negative cue words. Taken together, these studies indicate that in certain
cases, particularly when there is a history of trauma and/or self-harming
behaviour, negative memories can actually be more accessible than positive
memories.
The critical question here is to ask why memory recall is affected in
such a way and what could underlie the discrepancy in ABM recall patterns in
sufferers of PTSD and/or individuals who self-harm, where recall is either
unselectively overgeneral or a negative facilitation effect is observed. This
question is central to the motivation behind the present program of research
and is considered in more detail in the following section (section 1.5).
Finally, a number of studies have also demonstrated that as well as
episodic ABM recall, personal semantic memory recall may also be linked to
psychopathology. Interestingly, while overgeneral ABM recall is observed in
numerous emotional disorders, personal semantic memory deficits have so far
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only been observed in PTSD (Hunter & Andrews, 2002; Meesters,
Merckelbach, Muris & Wessel, 2000; Stokes, Dritschel & Bekerian, 2004). It
should be noted here that the trauma in these studies occurred in childhood,
and the consensus is that the personal semantic information has either not
been encoded properly, or has been forgotten as a by-product of traumatic
amnesia affecting the period of time that surrounds the trauma, possibly due
to hippocampal dysfunction in trauma survivors (Hunter & Andrews, 2002).
However, research investigating personal semantic memory retrieval in
emotional disorders is limited, and the present program of research aims to
expand on this literature.
1.5 Underlying Cognitive Mechanisms
In the past, research revolving around ABM recall in the emotional
disorders has focused primarily on identifying clinical populations in which
the ability to recall ABMs is different from controls, and to describe these
different ABM recall patterns (see Section 1.4). With this established, the
direction in research is turning towards attempting to understand why ABM
recall is affected, and this research is described in the present section.
A recent review paper (Williams et al., 2007) summarises the
predominant theories that explain the phenomenon of overgeneral
autobiographical memory retrieval, namely functional avoidance, ruminative
thinking, and reduced executive resources. The functional avoidance
explanation holds that the function of overgeneral memory recall is to protect
the individual from the experience of negative emotions activated by certain
ESKs (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000, see also Affect Regulation
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Hypothesis: Williams, Stiles & Shapiro, 1999). The search during generative
retrieval is thought to be truncated before such negative ESKs are activated.
Because ESKs are sensory and perceptual in nature, the activation of an ESK
is believed to be reminiscent of the actual event. Specific ABM retrieval can
therefore activate the same emotions experienced at the time of the event. If
the ESK contradicts the goals of the working self and is negative in nature,
then the activation would be a negative experience in itself. Therefore,
overgeneral ABM is thought to be a type of functional avoidance, and occurs
primarily to protect the individual from the negative affect associated with
negative, or goal-contradicting, specific memories (ESK). According to this
theory, however, only negative ABM recall should be affected and positive
memory recall should remain intact; a pattern which is not confirmed by
empirical data, which has consistently demonstrated overgeneral ABM recall
for both positive and negative memories. Even more contradictory to this
theory are the cases of trauma and self harm where a negative facilitation
effect is observed (section 1.4). The enhanced retrieval of negative ABMs
cannot be explained by the functional avoidance model of overgeneral ABM
retrieval, as negative memories should, if anything, be less accessible. In one
study using an undergraduate student sample, an avoidant coping style was
found to be significantly correlated with reduced ABM specificity (Hermans,
Defranc, Raes, Williams & Eelen, 2005). However, a major shortcoming of
this study is that the role of avoidance was not considered separately for
positive and negative memories (see Chapter 3). Rather than selectively
affecting only negative memories, it is thought that this retrieval inhibition,
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once it has developed, unselectively affects the retrieval of both positive and
negative memories (e.g. Williams, 1996).
A further cognitive mechanism that is likely to be related to
overgeneral ABM retrieval is rumination. This explanation of overgeneral
ABM retrieval is supported by empirical evidence which has demonstrated
that the cognitive coping mechanism of rumination is associated with
overgeneral autobiographical memory retrieval in depression. A series of
experiments were conducted using experimental manipulation paradigms in
which participants were either instructed to ruminate by engaging in self-
focused analytic thinking (e.g. “think about how they feel and why they feel
this way”), or to distract themselves by thinking about perceptual information
that does not relate to the self (e.g. “think about the sound of a raindrop
falling down a window pane”) (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995;
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Watkins, Teasdale & Williams, 2000). The
results of these studies showed that in the presence of depressed mood,
rumination results in significantly more overgeneral ABM recall to both
positive and negative cue words, while distraction leads to more specific ABM
retrieval. Watkins and Teasdale (2001) further examined whether the self-
focused or the analytical thinking component of rumination was responsible
for leading to the subsequent overgeneral ABM retrieval. In a study
conducted with adults suffering from major depression, Watkins and Teasdale
(2001) found that while self-focused thinking influenced the degree of the
depressed mood, it alone did not lead to overgeneral ABM retrieval. The
analytical thinking component, however, directly resulted in overgeneral ABM
retrieval in response to both positive and negative cue words. While the
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effects of rumination on ABM retrieval are only observed in the presence of
dysphoric mood (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), these studies
nevertheless demonstrate that cognitive coping mechanisms can be directly
related to, and may even be the direct cause of, certain ABM retrieval
patterns.
The final explanation that has been offered to account for overgeneral
ABM retrieval is that of reduced executive resources. According to Conway
and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), generative retrieval of specific ABMs (ESK) is an
effortful process that requires executive resources (see Section 1.2.3). The
model suggests that when resources are limited the generative retrieval
process can be affected at numerous stages. Empirical evidence for this theory
comes from studies where significant correlations were observed between
reduced working memory capacity and overgeneral ABM retrieval in elderly
participants (Winthorpe & Rabbitt, 1988) as well as poorer performance on a
word fluency task and overgeneral ABM retrieval in normal controls (Williams
& Dritschel, 1992). Furthermore, the ability to retrieve specific memories (as
part of a narrative) has been found to be related to the function of
supervisory control processes in young children (Fivush & Nelson, 2004) and
in brain damaged participants (Baddeley & Wilson, 1986). Finally, from a
series of laboratory experiments designed to further investigate the role of
executive control in overgeneral ABM retrieval in depression, Dalgleish et al.
(2007) concluded that reduced executive control plays a significant role in
explaining the overgeneral memory retrieval patterns typically observed in
individuals suffering from depression. This again makes this model of reduced
executive resources as an explanation of overgeneral autobiographical
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memory is particularly relevant to individuals suffering from depression,
where cognitive resources are known to be strained (e.g. Ellis & Ashbrook,
1988).
However, while extensive theories have been formulated to explain
overgeneral ABM recall (particularly in individuals suffering from depression),
no theory exists to date that specifically explains the negative facilitation effect
which is sometimes observed in individuals suffering from traumatic stress
responses and/or those who self harm. If an individual recalls negative
information about the self relatively easier than positive memories, this could
in theory have a negative impact on their overall self-schema, which in turn
could have a knock-on effect on confidence, self-esteem and wellbeing. The
first step in understanding this negative facilitation effect of episodic ABMs
retrieval is to identify why it occurs, and on a cognitive level identify which
processes are related to and responsible for this phenomenon. The next
section of this thesis discusses thought suppression as a theoretically
important mechanism that could be related to this negative facilitation effect.
1.6 Thought Suppression and Autobiographical Memory Recall
Thought suppression refers to the conscious effort used to direct
attention away from a particular thought (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White,
1987). The concept was first introduced by Pierre Janet (Janet, 1889), shortly
before the Freudian concept of repression was introduced (Freud & Breuer,
1895). Unfortunately, although there are important differences in the two
processes, the terms have often been used interchangeably. Brewin and
Andrews (1998) have pointed out that as an unconscious process, repression
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implies the need for unconscious mechanisms to block all conscious
processing of the repressed material, which results in a failure to encode this
information. They further argued that this lack of encoding implies that
repressed memories can not be accessed consciously. Thought suppression,
on the other hand, refers to the conscious effort to not recall material that has
been encoded to some degree at least and could be accessed if the individual
should choose to retrieve it (Brewin and Andrews, 1998). Suppression,
therefore, refers to an inhibition of storage or retrieval, rather than encoding.
As a cognitive coping strategy, thought suppression has been
highlighted to play an important role in numerous psychological disorders,
including depression, specific phobias and post-traumatic stress disorder (for
an overview see Purdon, 1999). In the case of post-traumatic stress, not only
is avoidance a key symptom of the disorder (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994), but thought suppression has also been argued to be an
important underlying mechanism that is responsible for the maintenance of
chronic PTSD by directly hindering the assimilation of trauma-related
memories (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). In an empirical investigation into the
coping styles in post-traumatic stress disorder, it was found that thought
suppression was positively correlated with intrusion and avoidance symptoms
of PTSD, and furthermore, that PTSD patients scored significantly higher on
a measure of a suppressive coping style when compared to both anxiety
patients and healthy controls (Amir, Kapla, Efroni, Levine, Benjamine &
Kotler, 1997).
The process of thought suppression is thought to require the effective
operation of two mental processes: an operating process and a monitoring
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process (Wegner, 1994). Initially, the mental content that is to be suppressed
has to be marked for suppression, which in itself cues the material for recall.
Following this, the two processes act simultaneously in an attempt to exert
mental control. The operating process is effortful and cognitively demanding,
and searches for mental content that yields the desired state (i.e. not activating
the “to be suppressed” material). A simultaneously operating automatic and
ironic monitoring process, on the other hand, searches for mental contents
that signal failure of mental control by activation of the material that is to be
suppressed. For instance, when trying to suppress any thoughts of white
bears, the goal of the cognitively demanding operating process acts to activate
representations that are of anything but white bears, while the unconscious
and far less demanding monitoring process searches for mental representation
that indicate white bears.
Thought suppression can be seen as an adaptive coping strategy if it is
successful in temporarily inhibiting a thought that is inappropriate or if the
thought can not be addressed at the moment in time when it occurs. For
instance, successfully suppressing a thought of needing to go shopping during
a business meeting can be adaptive, as it can free cognitive resources to be
available for the meeting.
If used frequently, however, suppression of a particular thought or
memory is viewed as a maladaptive coping strategy, and it typically results in a
paradoxical effect. Contrary to intentions, suppression often results in an
increased frequency of intrusions of the suppressed material into
consciousness (for a review see Abramowitz, Tolin & Street, 2001). The
paradoxical effects of thought suppression are thought to occur when the
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operating process of the suppression is undermined, thereby leaving the ironic
monitoring process to search for and focus on mental contents that signal
failure of the operating process (Wegner, 1994). In a seminal study by
Wegner, Schneider, Carter and White (1987), participants were instructed to
suppress thoughts of a white bear for a period of five minutes, and
subsequently reported an increased frequency of thoughts about white bears
as compared to the control participants who were instructed to express
thoughts about white bears. Furthermore, in the five minute period following
the task, participants in the suppression condition experienced a “rebound
effect”, a continued preoccupation with thoughts of white bears.
These paradoxical effects of thought suppression have been found to
extend from thoughts of white bears (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White,
1987) to stereotypical preconceptions (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Jetten,
1994), episodic memories of neutral film clips (Wegner, Quillian & Houston,
1996), traumatic film clips of a grizzly bear attack (Rassin, Merckelbach &
Muris, 1997) and a fatal office fire (Davies & Clark, 1998), as well as
obsessional thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 2001). Furthermore, these effects have
been found to extend to suppressed autobiographical memories of past
relationships (Wegner & Gold, 1995), bereavement (Rassin, Merckelbach &
Muris, 2001), and traumatic memories of a motor vehicle accident (Beck,
Gudmundsdottir, Palyo, Miller & Grant, 2006).
The theory of thought suppression holds that when mental capacity is
reduced (for instance by stress, time pressure, or increased cognitive load), the
effortful operating process is undermined. By virtue of being far less
cognitively demanding, however, the simultaneous automatic monitoring
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process remains intact, thereby continuously activating the very mental
content that was meant to be suppressed (Wegner, Erber & Zanakos, 1993).
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that the ironic effects of
thought suppression are more prone to occur when mental capacity is
diminished. For instance, in studies where participants were subjected to
cognitive load, the paradoxical effects of thought suppression were
exacerbated (Mikulincer, Dolev & Shaver, 2004; Wegner & Erber, 1992;
Wegner, Erber & Zanakos, 1993; Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor, Stultz & Sweatt,
2001). Further support for the theory that successful thought suppression
depends on sufficient cognitive resources comes from studies in which
experiencing fewer intrusions in a suppression task was significantly correlated
with better performance on a measure of working memory capacity (Brewin
& Beaton, 2002; Brewin & Smart, 2005).
Additionally, recent research has suggested that suppression itself can
incur cognitive costs and hinder other cognitive processes. For instance, in a
situational emotion suppression task, it was found that suppression impaired
incidental memory for information presented during the suppression task
(Richards & Gross, 1999). In another experiment, participants were asked to
suppress all negative thoughts and memories during a stream-of-
consciousness task, and content analysis revealed that thought suppression led
to significantly less causal reasoning and discrepancy seeking (Beevers &
Scott, 2001).
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1.7 Aims of this Program of Research
The aim of the present program of research is to investigate the role
of thought suppression in the retrieval of both episodic as well as personal
semantic ABMs. Because of the paradoxical effects of thought suppression, as
well as its importance in PTSD (a disorder where the negative facilitation
effect of ABM retrieval has been observed – see Section 1.4), it is
hypothesized that suppression could be a mechanism that is related to a
negative facilitation effect of ABM retrieval, much like rumination as a coping
mechanism is related to overgeneral ABM retrieval in depression (see Section
1.5). The investigation of this hypothesis is the purpose of the current
program of research; in the first instance by establishing whether a link exists
between thought suppression and ABM retrieval patterns, and then by
opening the research into investigating how thought suppression affects ABM
retrieval. Finally, the importance of thought suppression in ABM is assessed
in a clinical sample of participants.
During the course of this program of research, two studies have been
published that have examined the direct effects of thought suppression on
ABM retrieval. Schönfeld, Ehlers, Böllinghaus and Rief (2007) set out to
examine the effects of thought suppression on overgeneral ABM retrieval in
adult survivors of assault. All participants were asked to suppress their
thoughts of the assault while completing a standard oral autobiographical
memory test (AMT – see Section 2.2.1) and also completed a further AMT
under control conditions (i.e. no suppression instructions) in a
counterbalanced order. Those assault survivors who met the criteria for a
diagnosis of PTSD reported significantly higher levels of trait suppression
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than the assault survivors without a diagnosis of PTSD. In terms of ABM
retrieval, Schönfeld et al. (2007) found that, firstly, individuals with PTSD
recalled significantly more categoric memories and had more omissions in
response to cue words (when these two dimensions were considered together)
than those individuals who did not meet the PTSD criteria. However, these
effects were only observed when all assault related memories retrieved in
response to the cue words were removed from the analysis. This was done
because the assault-related memories were thought to be specific by default.
Overgeneral ABM retrieval was found to be significantly correlated with
PTSD symptom severity but not working memory capacity as measured by a
digit span task (Schönfeld et al., 2007). When the participants were subjected
to the thought suppression task, these overgeneral ABM retrieval effects were
enhanced, that is, the individuals with PTSD retrieved more categoric
memories and had more omissions than those without PTSD. The authors
offer two possible explanations for these results. Firstly, Schönfeld et al.
(2007) argue that overgeneral memory in PTSD depends on the degree of
effortful thought suppression, and that the more an individual with PTSD
suppresses, the higher the overgeneral ABM retrieval. The second explanation
that is offered is that cognitive load is higher for individuals with PTSD than
those who do not meet the criteria for a diagnosis. Therefore, the suppression
condition is a more effortful task for individuals with PTSD than those
without the disorder (Schönfeld et al., 2007). However, in this study the
material that was suppressed (i.e. the assault) differed for each participant,
which implies that the suppression task was different for each participant.
Furthermore, only one dimension of accessibility of ABMs, namely
- 27 -
overgeneral retrieval, was considered in this study, and no measures of latency
were taken. However, most relevant to this program of research, Schönfeld et
al (2007) did not assess any valence effects in the ABM retrieval, and personal
semantic memory retrieval, which is consistently affected in PTSD (Section
1.4) was also not assessed.
A second study utilised a suppression manipulation to assess the
effects of thought suppression on ABM retrieval with respect to valence
effects and did indeed find a negative facilitation effect (Dalgleish & Yiend,
2006). A sample of dysphoric adults were asked to recall a specific and
negative event from their past, and were subsequently asked either to suppress
this memory or were given no specific instructions. It was found that thought
suppression resulted in the faster recall of negative episodic memories. This
study, however, had several methodological limitations, such as no baseline
measures of ABM retrieval were taken, the suppressed material was different
for each participant, and not all participants in the depressed group were
depressed at the time of testing. These limitations are discussed in more detail
in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The present program extends to other populations
(including nonclinical student groups, as well a group of clinical adolescents),
and also seeks to examine the effects of thought suppression not only on
episodic, but also on personal semantic memory retrieval. The motivation
behind examining the effects of thought suppression on personal semantic
memory is that the reduced ability to retrieve personal semantic information is
a key memory feature in PTSD (section 1.4), a disorder in which both the
negative facilitation effect has been observed (section 1.4) and where thought
suppression is a theoretically important variable.
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1.8 Thesis Overview
The literature reviewed in this chapter highlights conscious thought
suppression as a theoretically important mechanism that may be related to
ABM retrieval patterns. The purpose of this program of research is to
investigate the role of thought suppression in the retrieval of both episodic as
well as personal semantic autobiographical memories.
Initially, the role of thought suppression in ABM retrieval has to be
established. Accordingly, Chapter 3 investigates the role of thought
suppression as a correlate of ABM recall in a non-clinical undergraduate
student sample while current levels of dysphoric mood and post-traumatic
stress symptoms are taken into account (Study 1). Chapter 4 (Study 2)
employs a suppression manipulation and aims to replicate the findings of
Study 1 and to establish a causal effect of thought suppression on ABM
retrieval patterns. Chapter 5 (Study 3) employs a similar suppression
manipulation to investigate the effects of thought suppression on mood. This
study was conducted to establish whether the previously observed effects of
thought suppression on ABM recall could be explained as occurring as a
result of a mood-congruent retrieval effect.
Finally, after having established the role of thought suppression in
ABM retrieval in non-clinical samples, this program of research turns to
investigating the levels of thought suppression, ABM retrieval patterns and
correlations between the two variables in a clinical sample of self-harming
adolescents with high levels of trauma in Chapter 6 (Study 4).
This initial chapter has highlighted the theoretical importance of
conscious thought suppression in ABM retrieval patterns, and justified the
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need for empirical research in this area. The research in this thesis employs
various methodologies to investigate this concept and thus make inferences
about the role of thought suppression in ABM retrieval. Analogue studies in
non-clinical student samples allow for insights into the causal effects of
thought suppression on ABM recall, as well as clarifying the role of a mood-
congruency effect in mediating this relationship. Finally, this thesis documents
an investigation into the role of thought suppression and ABM retrieval in a
clinical sample.
This thesis now turns to present the methodology employed
throughout this program of research, before presenting the four empirical
studies that were conducted as part of this program of research.
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C h a p t e r 2
METHODOLOGY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will introduce the psychological tests and measures
which are most relevant to this program of research. Three different measures
used to assess ABM retrieval are presented, namely the Autobiographical
Memory Cueing task (AMT - Williams & Broadbent, 1986) and two modified
versions of the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI - Kopelman,
Wilson & Baddeley, 1989). Because ABM retrieval is known to be affected in
depression and PTSD (see Section 1.4), these factors were controlled for in
the relevant studies. Accordingly, the measures used to assess mood (Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale – HADS: Zidmond & Snaith, 1983; Children’s
Depression Inventory – CDI: Kovacs & Beck, 1977; Profile of Mood States –
POMS: McNair, Lorr & Droppleman, 1971) and post-traumatic-stress
reactions (Impact of Event Scale – IES-R: Weiss, 1996; When Bad Things
Happen Scale – WBTHS: Fletcher, 1996) in this program of research are
discussed in this chapter. A measure of thought suppression, the White Bear
Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) is also presented.
Finally, this chapter presents a pilot study which was designed to assess the
suitability and valence of two video clips, which were used as the material to
be suppressed in the suppression manipulation studies in Chapters 4 and 5.
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2.2 Measures of ABM Recall
Multiple psychological measures exist to assess an individual’s ability
to retrieve information from their past. A number of these measures are
designed to elicit episodic ABM retrieval using emotional cue words; other
measures elicit episodic and personal semantic memory retrieval using
temporal cues and specific questions. The Autobiographical Memory Test
(AMT – Williams & Broadbent, 1986), a cueing technique, was employed in
this program of research as the main measure to assess episodic
autobiographical memory retrieval. The AMT has been employed widely to
study episodic ABM retrieval in the emotional disorders (for a review see
Williams et al., 2007). Variations of the Autobiographical Memory Interview
(AMI – Kopelman et al., 1989), a semi-structured interview for eliciting
autobiographical information by focussing on different time periods of the
participants’ pasts were employed to assess personal semantic memory as well
as episodic ABM retrieval in the present program of research.
2.2.1 The Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT)
This measure was first introduced by Williams & Broadbent (1986)
and was designed to test cued recall of episodic ABMs. The AMT is based on
Galton’s cue word paradigm (Galton, 1883). Participants are verbally
presented with individual cue words and are instructed to retrieve a memory
from their past in response to each cue word. Usually the cue words alternate
between positive and negative valance, but a number of studies have also
included neutral cue words. In the majority of studies this is administered as
an oral test, where both the cue words and responses are presented verbally.
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However, a number of studies have also used a written variant of the AMT
(e.g. Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz & Merckelbach, 2001; Arntz, Meeren &
Wessel, 2002; Henderson, Hargreaves, Gregory & Williams, 2002; Peeters,
Wessel, Merckelbach & Boon-Vermeeren, 2002), and in terms of overgeneral
recall these studies generally either failed to produce any results (Wessel et al.,
2001; Arntz et al., 2002) or produced results that are generally consistent with
the existing literature (Henderson et al., 2002; Peeters et al., 2002) . While the
written versions are attractive because they are timesaving as participants can
be tested in groups, one major shortcoming of the written versions of the
AMT is that the response time to retrieve a memory cannot be measured, and
only the nature of the first memory can be considered for analysis (see below).
In order to obtain a very sensitive index of the accessibility of episodic ABMs
(i.e. both in terms of specificity and recall latencies), participants were
interviewed individually using the oral version of the AMT throughout this
program of research.
If both positive and negative cue words are used, a general
assumption is made that the memories the participants retrieve are consistent
the valence of the cue words. Because the present program of research
focuses on valence effects, the assumption of emotional congruence between
cue words and memories was verified by two raters on 50% of the memories
retrieved in the first experiment, where it was confirmed that this consistency
is high (see Section 3.2.3.1). Furthermore, because valence effects are of
interest in the present program of research, it is important that positive and
negative cue words are matched to ensure that it is not relatively easier to
retrieve memories to one set of the cue words. 27 undergraduate students
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were asked to rate each cue word used in the present program of research on
the dimensions of imageability, concreteness, and how readily they felt the
word would elicit a specific memory (Hauer, Wessel, Geraerts, Merckelback &
Dalgleish, in press). The mean scores for each cue word are presented in
Appendix A.1.1 and analysis is reported in the method sections of the relevant
empirical studies (Sections 3.2.3.1, 4.2.3.1 and 6.2.3.2).
For the purpose of scoring the memory responses elicited by the
AMT, a specific memory is defined as an event that took place at a specific
time and place and lasted less than one day. Participants are encouraged to
retrieve a specific memory as quickly as possible (this instruction was
primarily given to explain the presence of the stopwatch), and for each cue
word the time taken to recall a specific memory is recorded in seconds. This
measurement is taken from the moment the cue word is presented to the time
when the participants begins the verbal recall of a relevant memory, but
utterances such as “now let me think!” are ignored. Furthermore, the nature
of the first memory that is recalled (specific or overgeneral) for each cue word
is also recorded. Participants are given 3 practise words to ensure that they
have understood the instructions. If the first memory the participant reports
is overgeneral in nature, the participant is prompted again to think of a
specific event. The participant is also prompted again to think of a specific
memory if the first response is a semantic associate of the cue word. Should a
participant fail to recall any memory within the timeframe of one minute, a
recall time of 60 seconds is noted for that cue word and the next word is
presented. This is then noted as an omission.
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Overgeneral ABM recall on the AMT can occur in one of two ways:
categoric or extended memory recall. Categoric ABMs are memories that refer
to specific events that occur repeatedly (e.g. “Friday nights at the pub”) and
extended ABMs refer to events that lasted longer than one day (e.g. “My
holiday in Cuba”) (see Section 1.2.2). Because determining the nature of the
memory (specific, extended, categoric) is somewhat subjective, inter-rater
reliability is required for this dimension, which is consistently found to be
high. For instance, in the seminal study by Williams and Broadbent (1986),
two independent researchers rated 20% of the memories recalled by the
participants as specific or overgeneral and this resulted in 87% and 93%
agreement with the experimenter’s ratings. In the present program of
research, for each study employing the AMT, one independent rater was
asked to rate 20% of the recalled memories as either specific or non-specific
(overgeneral or semantic associate). Consistent with previous research, inter-
rater reliability for specific/non-specific memories was found to be high in
this program of research, and the results are reported separately for each
study that employed the AMT in the relevant chapters of this thesis (Section
3.2.3.1, Section 4.2.3.1 & Section 6.2.3.2).
The accessibility of episodic ABMs can then be analysed on the two
dimensions of latency to recall a specific memory and the nature of the first
recall. The longer it takes to recall a specific memory, the less accessible it is
thought to be. Similarly, if the first recall is not a specific ABM, this error in
retrieving a specific memory when requested to do so also provides evidence
that the specific memory is less accessible. The retrieval of an overgeneral
memory or the failure to retrieve any memory within 60 seconds both
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constitute errors on the AMT. In the present program of research, the issue
of accessibility is examined by considering the recall latencies to positive
versus negative cue words separately.
For the purpose of the present program of research, data analysis was
conducted with respect to the latency to retrieve a specific memory and the
number of first responses that were specific memories for each participant as
indexes of accessibility. No separate analysis was conducted for omissions
(though they were reflected in the data as latencies of 60 seconds) and
semantic associates, or the different types of overgeneral memories produced
(i.e. categoric versus extended).
2.2.2 The Children’s Autobiographical Memory Interview (CAMI)
This Children’s Autobiographical Memory Interview (CAMI:
Bekerian, Dhillon & O’Neill, 2001; see also Stokes, Dritschel & Bekerian,
2004) is a semi-structured interview used to assess children’s and adolescents’
ability to retrieve personal semantic as well as episodic ABMs across different
lifetime periods. It is based on the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI,
Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 1989), which is similar in format, but
designed for adult participants. The AMI is generally used to assess memory
recall in elderly and neurologically impaired participants, for instance to
investigate the memory deficits associated with dementia. Examples of
memories that are elicited by these interviews include naming friends from
school (for personal semantic memory items) and recalling a specific incident
that happened during the time at primary school (as an example of an
episodic memory question). The difference between the AMI and the CAMI
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lies in the specific lifetime periods that are covered in the interviews. The
AMI covers a whole lifespan, inquiring about events such as marriage and
career moves, which are not relevant to young people. Accordingly, the CAMI
only covers lifetime periods that are appropriate for school-aged children,
with the most recent lifetime period referring to secondary school.
The CAMI consists of 54 questions that attempt to elicit personal
semantic memories. One point is given for the recall of each item, resulting in
a possible total score for personal semantic memory recall of 80 (as some
items require multiple responses, for instance naming three friends from
school). Names are always given half a point each for first and last names
recalled, so that the recall of a full name is also given one point on the
personal semantic scale. The CAMI also includes 16 episodic memory
questions, each of which can result in a maximum score of three points. One
point is given for the dimensions of time, place, and specificity of the memory
recalled, thereby resulting in a possible total episodic memory score of 48.
The Autobiographical Memory Interviews (AMI and CAMI) differ
from the cue-word paradigm (AMT) in numerous ways. The interviews focus
on eliciting memory recall using temporal cues; participants are requested to
retrieve autobiographical information from different lifetime periods. The
AMT, on the other hand, focuses on eliciting a specific memory, regardless of
how long ago it occurred or the associated lifetime period. Moreover, the
AMT cue words used to elicit memories are often emotional, thereby
encouraging the retrieval of emotional ABMs. In contrast, the AMI and
CAMI do not include an emotional dimension. The emotional dimension of
the AMT is crucial to this program of research, as it aims to specifically
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investigate the facilitated recall of negative episodic ABMs (see Section 1.7).
Furthermore, previous studies failed to detect any differences in episodic
memories as measured by the AMI between survivors of trauma versus
controls and have speculated that this was due to the lack of an emotional
dimension within this measure (Hunter & Andrews, 2002). A final difference
between the ways in which the AMI and AMT assess episodic ABM retrieval
is that the AMI does not give a time limit within which the participant has to
produce a response to the questions. Therefore, response latency can not be
assessed on the AMI, which makes the AMT a more sensitive measure of
accessibility of episodic ABMs.
Therefore, while variations of the AMI are primarily used to assess
personal semantic memory in this program of research, the AMT is used to
investigate episodic ABM recall, as it takes into account the valence of the
memory, as well as recording the length of time it takes the participant to
retrieve a specific memory.
2.2.3 The Student’s Autobiographical Memory Interview (Student’s AMI)
The Student’s Autobiographical Memory Interview was developed for
this program of research by combining items from both the CAMI and the
AMI to make it suitable for an undergraduate student sample (see Appendix
A.1.2 for this interview). The Student’s AMI covered the three lifetime
periods of early childhood, adolescence, and recent (university) life. For each
lifetime period there are 21 personal semantic memory items (such as names
of people the participant went to school with) and 9 episodic memory items
(such as what they did on their first day of school), which are scored
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according to the same criteria as the AMI. One point is given for each correct
personal semantic fact that is recalled, resulting in a possible total score of 63.
Each episodic item is given one point for time, place and specificity of the
memory, resulting in a possible total score of 27.
2.3 Measures of Mood
Autobiographical Memory retrieval is known to be affected in
depression, and therefore two of the studies in this program of research had
to take the participants’ current levels of depression into account (Chapter 3
and Chapter 6). The first of these two studies used a nonclinical
undergraduate student sample, and therefore used the Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale (HADS; Zidmond & Snaith, 1983) in order to assess both
levels of depression as well as anxiety in the participants. The Children’s
Depression Inventory (CDI; Kovacs & Beck, 1977) was used instead of the
HADS in Chapter 6, because it is better suited for the adolescent participant
sample in that study.
Another study in this program of research (Chapter 5) assessed the
effects of thought suppression on mood, and therefore required a mood
measure both at baseline and following the suppression manipulation. The
Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr & Droppleman, 1971) was used
as a sensitive measure to detect changes in the mood of the participants as a
result of the manipulation.
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2.3.1 The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zidmond &
Snaith, 1983)
This 14-item self-report questionnaire was used in this program of
research to measure symptoms of depression and anxiety in an undergraduate
student sample over the seven days prior to testing. Seven questions each are
used to assess current symptoms of depression and anxiety and items
alternate in describing a symptom of depression or anxiety. Each item has 4
possible responses, which are scored from 0-3, with 0 given to the response
indicating the absence of the described symptom of anxiety/depression and a
score of 3 given to the response indicating the most severe symptoms.
Therefore, both subscales of depression and anxiety have possible scores
ranging from 0 to 21, with 21 indicating the most severe symptoms. Both the
factor stability and internal consistency of the HADS are high (Moorey,
Greer, Watson, Gorman, Rowden, Tunmore, Robertson & Bliss, 1991;
Mykletun, Stordal & Dahl, 2001).
2.3.2 The Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI; Kovacs & Beck, 1977)
This 27-item self-report questionnaire is designed to measure
depression in children and adolescents over the past 14 days. Each item
describes a symptom of depression and has 3 possible responses, which are
scored from 0-2. A score of 0 indicates the absence of that particular
symptom of depression, and a score of 2 given to the response indicating the
most severe symptom of depression. The scale therefore ranges from 0 to 54,
with higher score indicating more severe symptoms of depression. The cut-
off score for defining severe symptoms of depression was set at 19 or above
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by Kovacs (1981). The CDI has been found to have good internal consistency
as well as discriminant reliability (Smucker, Craighead, Craighead & Green,
1986; Carey, Faulstich, Gresham, Ruggiero & Enyart, 1987; Doerfler, Felner,
Rawlinson, Raley & Evans, 1988). The CDI was used in the study presented
in Chapter 6 as it is suitable for the adolescent participant sample.
2.3.3 The Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr & Droppleman.,
1971)
The POMS is a 65 item self-report scale used to assess current levels
of mood. Each item consists of a mood adjective, which participants are
asked to rate on a Likert scale ranging from 1 “Not at all” to 5 “Extremely”,
depending on how the participant is feeling at that particular moment.
Together, the 65 items form the 6 subscales of Tension – Anxiety, Depression
– Dejection, Anger – Hostility, Vigor – Activity, Fatigue – Inertia, and
Confusion – Bewilderment. The scores from the subscales are added together,
except for the Vigor – Activity subscale score, which is instead subtracted
from the total, in order to obtain a score for the total mood disturbance
(TMD) of the participant. The POMS has a consistent factor structure, as well
as good convergent and discriminant validity (Nyenhuis, Yamamoto,
Luchetta, Terrien & Parmentier, 1999).
The POMS was specifically selected for a study that assessed the
effects of thought suppression on mood (Chapter 5) because of the multiple
dimensions of mood that it assesses, but more importantly, because of its
sensitivity to changes in mood over time, which this particular study
attempted to capture.
- 41 -
2.4 Measures of Post-traumatic Stress Reactions
Because ABM is also known to be affected in individuals suffering
from post-traumatic stress reactions (PTSD) (see Section 1.4), levels of this
condition had to be taken into account in two studies (Chapter 3 and Chapter
6). In the non-clinical student sample (Chapter 3), the Impact of Event Scale
– Revised (IES-R; Weiss, 1996) was used to assess trauma-related intrusions
and avoidance as an index of post-traumatic stress reactions, rather than
attempting to establish a full diagnosis of PTSD in this non-clinical sample.
Chapter 6, on the other hand, engaged a sample of self-harming adolescents,
where a diagnosis of PTSD was much more likely. Therefore, the When Bad
Things Happen Scale (WBTHS; Fletcher, 1996) was selected for this study as
a self-report diagnostic measure of PTSD that is suitable for an adolescent
sample.
2.4.1 The Impact of Event Scale – Revised (IES-R; Weiss, 1996)
This 22-item self-report questionnaire is used to measure symptoms
of traumatic intrusions (7 items), avoidance (8 items), and hyperarousal (7
items) which participants have experienced over the seven days prior to
testing as a result of a single traumatic event. Participants respond to the 22
symptom statements by rating how often they have experienced the
symptoms over the past week, with the response options being “not at all”,
“rarely”, “sometimes” or “often”. Possible scores on the IES-R range from 0
to 110, with higher scores indicating more frequent and more severe
symptoms. Psychometric properties of this scale are good, with good internal
consistency as well as test-retest consistency (Weiss, 1996).
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However, one limitation of the IES-R is that it requires participants to
respond to the item with respect to a single traumatic event. In order to
overcome this limitation, previous studies have resorted to having control
participants complete it in response to an event which they all shared, for
instance having received orthodontic treatment (Stokes, Dritschel & Bekerian,
2004). One problem with this approach is that the participants may have
experienced other adverse events, which could have been more “traumatic” in
nature. In this case the IES-R scores would not give an accurate measure of
the trauma-related symptoms that the participant is actually experiencing. In
order to overcome this limitation, a “trauma questionnaire” was employed in
this program of research (see Appendix A.1.3 and A.1.4). This questionnaire
requires participants to identify their most traumatic experience by selecting
one of nine categories of traumatic events prior to completing the IES-R. The
categories are based on commonly reported traumatic events in the literature
and are: accident, serious medical condition/injury, medical
treatment/procedure, sexual abuse, physical abuse, divorce of parents, death
of a loved one, illness of a loved one, and other. Participants are then required
to complete the IES-R with respect to their most traumatic experience.
Because a shared but generic event, such as having received orthodontic
treatment may not have been the most traumatic experience for the
participants, completing the IES-R together with the trauma questionnaire is
more likely to result in a more accurate index of the amounts of post-
traumatic stress reactions that participants are experiencing at the time of
testing.
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2.4.2 When Bad Things Happen Scale (WBTHS; Fletcher; 1996)
The When Bad Things Happen Scale is a self-report questionnaire
which is suitable for children and adolescents to assess post-traumatic stress
symptoms. The scale consists of 90 questions which participants answer by
ticking one of three boxes: “never”, “some” or “lots”. However, only the first
58 items of the scale assess immediate PTSD symptoms, with 4 items
assessing whether the event was sufficiently traumatic and distressing, 16
items assessing intrusiveness, 23 items assessing the avoidance, and 15 items
assessing the hypertension as a result of the traumatic event. The remaining
32 items of the WBTHS focus on possible co-morbid symptoms of post-
traumatic stress such as anxiety, depression, feelings of guilt and dangerous
behaviours. Because this measure was used in this program of research to
measure PTSD symptoms, only the initial 58 items of the WBTHS were used
accordingly (see Appendix A.1.5). Possible scores on the WBTHS range from
0 to 116, with higher scores indicating more frequent symptoms. Preliminary
data gathered from 30 children ages 7 to 14 suggests that this measure
provides high internal consistency and is a valid measure of PTSD (Flecher,
1996).
2.5 Measures of Thought Suppression
In order to assess the participants’ trait tendency to suppress
unwanted thoughts, the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner &
Zanakos, 1994) was used throughout this program of research. The WBSI
consists of 15 statements such as “There are things I prefer not to think
about” which the participants rate on a 5 point Likert scale, ranging from
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“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Possible scores on the WBSI range
from 0 to 75. Subsequent factor analyses of this measure remain somewhat
ambiguous, with some studies supporting a satisfactory uni-dimensional
construct (e.g. Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), while other studies report support
for multiple factors (Blumberg, 2000; Hoping & de Jong-Meyer, 2003; Rassin,
2003). While these latter studies have identified thought suppression as the
primary factor, a secondary factor which measures a general tendency to
experience intrusive thoughts has also been proposed. This poses a serious
problem when thought suppression is to be studied in psychological disorders
where a tendency to experience unwanted intrusions is high such as
depression (Kuyken & Brewin, 1995; Brewin, Hunter, Carroll & Tata 1996)
and most notably PTSD (see for instance, Ehlers & Clark, 2000). In
participants suffering from these conditions the scores on the WBSI might be
artificially exaggerated due to the tendency to experience intrusions rather
than a suppressive coping style (Rassin, 2003).
It is therefore important to determine which items of the WBSI most
strongly define and measure thought suppression. By applying item-response
theory, Palm and Strong (2007) have identified 6 items of the WBSI which are
effective in making discriminations throughout different levels of thought
suppression. These 6 “effective” items retained strong and highly significant
correlations with the full scale of the WBSI, as well as the Acceptance and
Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al, 2004), a measure of emotional
avoidance.
Throughout this program of research the full WBSI has been used.
However, in order to obtain a purer measure of the tendency to engage in
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thought suppression, the 6 “effective” suppression items (as identified by
Palm & Strong, 2007) have been used as the primary indicator of a
suppressive coping style. This sub-set of items was chosen in order to avoid
the possibility of “false” correlations between the full WBSI and measures of
clinical conditions such as depression and PTSD.
2.6 Videos for Thought Suppression Tasks (Pilot Study)
2.6.1 Video Pilot Study - Introduction
A suppression manipulation task was used in two studies of this
program of research to investigate the effects of thought suppression on
ABM retrieval (Chapter 4) and mood (Chapter 5). In order to ensure that all
participants were suppressing the same information they were shown a short
video clip and were asked either to monitor or to suppress any thoughts and
memories of the clip immediately thereafter. There were two separate clips;
one was selected for its negative content and realistically depicts a grizzly bear
attacking a tourist. A second video clip was selected for its positive content
and consists of a cartoon of a squirrel gathering nuts. The two video clips
were of a similar length (~ 4 minutes). A pilot study was conducted in order
to assess the suitability and valence of these video clips. The purpose of the
pilot study was to determine the valence of the video clips to ensure that they
could subsequently be used as suitability positive and negative material for
suppression in a suppression manipulation experiment (Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5). Specifically, this pilot study aimed to assert that the two video
clips differed significantly from each other in terms of their valence ratings,
and that the clips were also significantly different from a neutral rating, with
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the negative clip being rated as significantly more negative than neutral, and
the positive clip as significantly more positive.
2.6.2 Pilot Study - Method
2.6.2.1 Design
A matched between subjects design with two conditions (positive
versus negative video) was used, where the participants between the
conditions were matched for age and gender. The independent variable was
the valence of the video clip (positive or negative) and the dependent
variables were the ratings on the scales of the Video Valence Questionnaire.
2.6.2.2 Participants
34 undergraduate students (28 females, 6 males) participated in this
pilot study on a voluntary basis. The mean age of the participants was 19.35
(range 18-21, s.d. = 0.93).
2.6.2.3 Materials
2.6.2.3.1 “Negative Video”
The video that was used as negative material to be suppressed (see
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) is a about 4 minutes long and realistically depicts a
grizzly bear attack on a tourist (taken from “Faces of Death”). The clip has
previously been used in similar suppression tasks (Rassin et al, 1997) where it
was selected for its aversive and emotional nature.
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2.6.2.3.2 “Positive Video”
The video clip that was used as a the positive material to be
suppressed (see Chapter 5) is also about 4 minutes long and is a cartoon of a
squirrel gathering nuts (“Scrat’s Missing Adventure - Gone Nutty” taken from “Ice
Age”).
2.6.2.3.3 Video Valence Questionnaire
This questionnaire was designed for the present study and consisted
of nine 100mm Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) ranging from one emotional
extreme to the other. A rating of 0 indicates the most positive score and 100
the most negative score that a subscale could achieve, with a score of 50 being
a hypothetical neutral rating. The individual scales were selected for their
valence, but care was taken to not select adjectives which were felt to be
particularly descriptive of either one of the clips (e.g. “violent”). The scales
were: happy – sad, appealing – aversive, agreeable – disagreeable, positive –
negative, good – bad, easy to watch – hard to watch, tolerable – intolerable,
reassuring – unnerving and calm – anxious.
2.6.2.4 Procedure
Participants were tested together in a classroom setting in groups of 3
to 12 per session, and after giving informed consent were either shown the
video of the grizzly bear attack (“Negative Video”, n = 17), or the cartoon
video of the squirrel (“Positive Video”, n = 17). They were then given the
Video Valence Questionnaire to complete before being fully debriefed. For
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the information sheet and debriefing form see Appendix A.1.6 and Appendix
A.1.7.
2.6.3 Pilot Study – Results
2.6.3.1 Participant Characteristics
Participants were matched for age and gender, therefore each video
was rated by 14 females and 3 males, and the mean ages for both participant
groups were also similar (mean age = 19.35, s.d. = 0.93).
2.6.3.2 Positive versus Negative Video Ratings
In order to assess whether the ratings of the two video clips differed
significantly from each other, the means of each scale were compared using
between subjects t-tests. The results showed that the mean ratings differed
significantly on all scales (p < 0.001). The Bonferroni adjustment method to
correct the p-values for an increased probability of a type I error yields an
adjusted alpha level of 0.006, indicating that all differences remained
significant at p < 0.05. In all cases, the negative video was rated as being
significantly more negative than the positive video (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Positive versus negative video ratings:
Scale Negative Positive T p
happy – sad 77.47 (10.39) 30.88 (20.17) 8.47 < 0.001
appealing – aversive 84.47 (9.55) 16.41 (11.44) 18.83 < 0.001
agreeable – disagreeable 81.53 (11.74) 16.88 (12.49) 15.55 < 0.001
positive – negative 86.29 (9.27) 30.76 (16.35) 12.18 < 0.001
good – bad 77.18 (15.75) 22.00 (15.66) 10.24 < 0.001
easy to watch – hard to watch 73.71 (19.86) 11.18 (12.98) 10.87 < 0.001
tolerable – intolerable 67.76 (19.07) 11.59 (10.14) 10.72 < 0.001
reassuring – unnerving 84.71 (13.07) 37.94 (13.89) 10.11 < 0.001
calm – anxious 89.06 (6.28) 48.41 (22.52) 7.17 < 0.001
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2.6.3.3 Video Ratings versus Neutral Ratings
In order to assess the actual valence of each video clip, one-sample t-
tests were used to compare the mean ratings for each video to a hypothetical
neutral rating of 50 on each scale. The results showed that the negative video
was rated as significantly more negative than neutral on all subscales (p <
0.001) and the positive video was also rated as significantly more positive than
neutral on all subscales (p < 0.001), except for reassuring – unnerving (p <
0.003). The only exception occurred for the subscale of calm – anxious for
which the mean score for the positive video was less (i.e. more positive) than
the hypothetical neutral rating of 50, but not significantly so (see Table 2.2 for
a summary of the results). Bonferroni adjustments yielded a new alpha level of
0.006, indicating that all significant differences remain significant at p < 0.05.
Table 2.2: Video ratings versus neutral scores
Negative Positive
Scale t p t p
happy – sad 10.90 < 0.001 - 3.91 < 0.001
appealing – aversive 14.88 < 0.001 - 12.11 < 0.001
agreeable – disagreeable 11.08 < 0.001 - 10.93 < 0.001
positive – negative 16.14 < 0.001 - 4.85 < 0.001
good – bad 7.12 < 0.001 - 7.37 < 0.001
easy to watch – hard to watch 4.92 < 0.001 - 12.33 < 0.001
tolerable – intolerable 3.84 < 0.001 - 15.61 < 0.001
reassuring – unnerving 10.95 < 0.001 - 3.58 < 0.003
calm – anxious 25.65 < 0.001 - 0.29 = 0.78
2.6.4 Pilot Study – Discussion
The results show that the two video clips differ significantly from each
other in terms of their valence. Specifically, the negative video clip was rated
as significantly more negative than the positive clip on all scales. Moreover,
the negative clip was also rated as significantly more negative than a
hypothetical neutral rating on each scale. The positive video clip was also
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rated as significantly more positive than a hypothetical neutral rating on each
scale except for the calm – anxious scale. Overall the results show that both
video clips are noticeably different and extreme in their respective positive
and negative valence. Therefore, both clips were deemed as suitable material
for the suppression manipulation studies of this program of research (Chapter
4 and Chapter 5).
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C h a p t e r 3
STUDY 1: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF THOUGHT SUPPRESSION
AS A CORRELATE OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY RECALL 1
3.1 Introduction
As a first step in assessing the role of thought suppression in the
retrieval of autobiographical memories, this first study of this program of
research investigated whether a suppressive coping style is correlated with
different aspects of ABM retrieval.
The recall of overgeneral episodic ABMs has been well established in
the literature and has been linked with psychopathology (see Section 1.4), with
overgeneral ABM retrieval having been documented in both individuals with
depression and PTSD. However, a recent review has argued that overgeneral
ABM retrieval is unlikely to be related to the mere exposure to traumatic
events, but is instead related to psychopathological conditions such as major
depression and PTSD (Moore & Zoellner, 2007). Indeed, the ABM recall
patterns in individuals with a history of trauma tend to be somewhat
heterogeneous (see Section 1.4). On the one hand, overgeneral episodic ABM
retrieval is reported (deDecker et al., 2003; Henderson, et al., 2002; Hermans
et al., 2005; Kuyken & Brewin, 1995; McNally et al., 1995; McNally et al.,
1994; Raes et al., 2005; Stokes, Dritschel & Bekerian, 2004; Wessel,
Merckelbach & Dekkers, 2002). Other studies, however, have reported a
positive association between trauma and the enhanced retrieval of negative
episodic ABMs (Peeters et al., 2002; Burnside et al., 2004; Swales, Williams &
1 The study outlined in the present chapter was provisionally accepted to be published in
Behaviour Research and Therapy pending minor alterations to the manuscript (11-12-2007)
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Wood, 2001). A key question is which individual difference factors could be
responsible for these different patterns of ABM retrieval observed in
individuals with a history of trauma.
In the case of depression, individual difference factors have been
reported to be related to ABM retrieval. In particular, past research has
demonstrated that a tendency to engage in rumination can directly lead to
overgeneral ABM retrieval in depression (see Section 1.5), highlighting the
importance of coping mechanisms in understanding ABM retrieval patterns.
In the case of PTSD, a theoretically important coping mechanism is
thought suppression (see Section 1.6). Avoidant coping may occur in response
to negative memories, which are, by definition, likely to be present in
survivors of traumatic experiences. Could thought suppression therefore be
an individual difference factor, which like rumination in depression,
contributes to explaining the ABM retrieval patterns we see in PTSD?
To date, one study has investigated the role of thought suppression,
along with other types of avoidant coping in the retrieval of episodic ABMs.
In a sample of 60 school-aged adolescents, an avoidant coping style, including
the dimension of thought suppression, was significantly correlated with the
retrieval of fewer specific episodic ABMs (Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams
& Eelen, 2005). The authors explain the correlation between thought
suppression and overgeneral ABM retrieval by arguing that thought
suppression may act as an affect-regulating mechanism (Hermans et al., 2005).
Intense emotional experiences are thought to be associated with the retrieval
of specific episodic ABMs. Therefore, if the generative retrieval is terminated
at a general level (i.e. an overgeneral memory), the specific memories and
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associated emotions are never accessed (see Section 1.5), thereby protecting
the individual from such intense emotions. However, the authors did not
distinguish between the retrieval of positive versus negative memories.
Furthermore, the AMT was presented as a written task, so response times
could not be considered as an index of accessibility of positive versus negative
episodic ABMs.
However, because valence effects were not considered by Hermans et
al. (2005), it is possible that thought suppression may nevertheless be a
mechanism underlying the negative facilitation effect. It is well documented
that thought suppression often results in a paradoxical effect, making the
suppressed thought, which is arguably negative in nature, more accessible (see
Section 1.6). It is therefore possible that thought suppression could activate
other negative information, thereby making negative representations more
accessible. More accessible negative information could then, in turn, prompt
more thought suppression in order to cope with these increased thoughts and
memories.
Another memory pattern associated with trauma is that of reduced
personal semantic memory retrieval (Hunter & Andrews, 2002; Meesters et
al., 2000; Stokes, Dritschel & Bekerian, 2004). As an important cognitive
coping mechanism in PTSD, thought suppression may therefore also be
related to personal semantic memory retrieval. Accordingly, the present study
investigates the correlations between thought suppression and both episodic
as well as personal semantic memory retrieval.
The present study employed a nonclinical student sample to examine
the correlations between thought suppression and ABM retrieval irrespective
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of any specific psychopathology. A sample of undergraduate students were
given measures of both episodic and personal semantic ABM recall, as well as
a measure of the trait tendency to engage in thought suppression in order to
cope with unwanted thoughts and memories. The present study expands the
research by Hermans et al. (2005) by distinguishing between the retrieval of
positive versus negative ABMs. Furthermore, the present study used a oral
version of the AMT, in order to obtain a measure of response latency to
positive and negative cue words, as well as the number of specific memories
produced in response to the cue words. Despite the nonclinical participant
pool, levels of post-traumatic stress symptoms and dysphoric mood were also
measured and considered in the statistical analyses, as it is well established that
ABM retrieval is affected in depression and PTSD (see Section 1.4).
Because of the exploratory nature of this study, the predictions
regarding thought suppression and episodic ABM retrieval remain two-tailed.
More specifically, consistent with the findings of Hermans et al. (2005),
thought suppression may be correlated with increased overgeneral ABM
retrieval to both positive and negative cue words (affect regulation). However,
because of the paradoxical effects of thought suppression, it is also possible
that thought suppression may be related to a pattern of enhanced retrieval of
negative episodic ABMs. Furthermore, if thought suppression is indeed
related to the ABM recall patterns found in PTSD, it is expected that
increased thought suppression would be correlated with a reduced ability to
retrieve personal semantic information. All of these correlations are expected
to remain significant even when levels of post-traumatic stress responses and
depression have been controlled for.
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3.2 Method
3.2.1 Design
Stepwise multiple regression analysis was used to assess which
independent variables explained most of the variability observed in the ABM
retrieval patterns. The different aspects of ABM recall were treated as the
dependent variables, and the independent variables were the levels of
symptoms of anxiety and depression (HADS), traumatic intrusion, avoidance
and hyperarousal (IES-R) as well as total WBSI scores and “effective”
suppression scores from the six WBSI items identified by Palm and Strong
(2007) as an index of trait thought suppression. Each dependent variable was
predicted separately by all the independent variables together, which was
followed by stepwise multiple regression to eliminate those independent
variables that did not significantly account for any variability in the ABM
recall.
3.2.2 Participants
The participants were fifty (39 female and 11 male) undergraduate
students from the University of St. Andrews. Participation was on a voluntary
basis, and occurred in return for a small financial compensation. The mean
age of the participants was 21.58 years (s.d. = 3.47).
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3.2.3 Materials
3.2.3.1 Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) (Williams & Broadbent,
1986)
See Section 2.2.1 for a description of the AMT and how it was
administered. The AMT was used in the present study to measure the
participants’ ability to retrieve specific episodic ABMs of both positive and
negative valence. The ten cue words used in the present study were: lonely,
happy, hurt, safe, clumsy, interested, angry, successful, sorry and surprised,
which were the original AMT cue words used by Williams and Broadbent
(1986). No differences were found between the positive and negative cue
words in terms of imageability, concreteness, and how readily raters felt that
they may elicit a specific memory (see Section 2.2.1 and Appendix A.1.1).
Two researchers subsequently rated the memories recalled by the participants
as either overgeneral or specific. Inter-rater reliability was calculated for a
random sample of 20% of the participants and was found to be high (Cohen’s
Kappa K = 0.80). Furthermore, in order to verify the assumption that
retrieved memories match the valence of the cue words, 50% of the recalled
memories were subsequently rated by two raters as either positive or negative.
It was found that for 96% of the memories recalled the valence of the
memory matched the cue word valence. Discrepancies between the memories
and cue word valence were only found for three memories (1%). Additionally,
there were seven memories where the valance was deemed ambiguous (e.g.
the memory “an e-mail that I got on Monday” in response to the cue word
‘surprised’). The inter-rater reliability for valence was also found to be very
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high (Cohen’s Kappa K = 0.96 ). Therefore, it can be assumed that in the vast
majority of cases the retrieved memory matches is consistent with the valence
of the cue word.
3.2.3.2 Student’s Autobiographical Memory Interview (S-AMI)
See Section 2.2.3 for a description of this measure. The S-AMI was
used in the present study primarily to obtain a measure of the participants’
ability to retrieve personal semantic memories.
3.2.3.3 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zidmond &
Snaith, 1983)
See Section 2.3.1 for a description of this measure. This measure was
used in the present study to obtain an index of the participants’ current levels
of depressed mood and anxiety.
3.2.3.4 Impact of Event Scale – Revised (IES-R) (Weiss, 1996) and
Trauma Questionnaire
See Section 2.4.1 for a description of this measure. The IES-R was
used in the present study to measure participants’ current symptoms
indicative of post-traumatic stress reactions, namely intrusions of the
traumatic event, avoidance thereof, as well as hyperarousal. A full diagnostic
measure of PTSD was not used in this study as the participants were general
undergraduate university students and not expected to suffer from PTSD.
Because the IES-R has to be completed with reference to a single traumatic
event, it was preceded by a “trauma questionnaire” (see Section 2.4.1) which
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required participants to first identify their most traumatic experience so that
the IES-R could subsequently be completed with reference to this event.
3.2.3.5 White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) (Wegner & Zanakos,
1994)
See Section 2.5 for a description of this measure. The WBSI was used
in the present study to obtain a measure of the participants’ levels of trait
predisposition to engage in thought suppression in order to cope with
unwanted thoughts and memories.
3.2.4 Procedure
Participants were tested individually and were fully informed about the
nature of the study prior to the testing. After giving informed consent,
participants completed the measures in the above order. The measures of
ABM were given first to prevent contamination from the other measures. As
part of the debriefing the participants were asked to engage for 2 minutes in a
distraction procedure (taken from Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). This
small task was given to lift the participants’ mood and counter any possible
negative impact that the completion of the mood and trauma questionnaires
may have had. Participation was voluntary and all participants received a small
financial compensation for their time. The information sheet (A.2.1), consent
form (A.2.2) and debriefing form (A.2.3) for this study are included in the
appendix.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Traumatic Experiences
The participants completed the IES-R in response to their most
traumatic experience, as identified by the trauma questionnaire. The number
of participants who chose each of the trauma categories as their most
traumatic experiences as well as the average IES-R and “effective” WBSI
scores (Palm & Strong, 2007) for each trauma type are summarized in Table
3.1. As can be seen, the most common traumatic experience reported by the
participants was “other trauma”, followed by “death of a loved one” and
“serious medical condition/injury”.
Table 3.1: Frequency of reported most traumatic event, means (s.d.) for IES-
R and WBSI-E for each traumatic event
Type of Event Frequency IES-R WBSI-E
Accident 4 (8%) 22.50 (18.77) 22.50 (3.87)
Serious Medical Condition/Injury 6 (12%) 39.67 (16.75) 20.33 (3.67)
Medical Treatment/Procedure 2 (4%) 30.50 (33.23) 18.00 (1.41)
Sexual Abuse 3 (6%) 30.67 (37.74) 17.67 (9.07)
Physical Abuse 4 (8%) 10.25 (6.70) 21.75 (1.71)
Divorce of Parents 4 (8%) 25.50 (24.28) 20.75 (5.85)
Death of a loved one 8 (16%) 28.88 (31.22) 17.38 (2.92)
Illness of a loved one 3 (6%) 33.00 (29.81) 20.00 (2.65)
Other (e.g. witnessing violence, bad experiences
with drugs, relationship break-ups)
16 (32%) 39.69 (28.09) 19.94 (5.11)
IES-R = Impact of Event Scale-Revised, WBSI-E = “effective” suppression
items of the WBSI.
There were no significant differences in the IES-R (F(8,41) < 1) scores
nor in effective thought suppression (F(8,41) < 1) across the different types of
trauma reported. The data was therefore collapsed across the different trauma
types for the remainder of the analysis.
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3.3.2 Correlational Analyses: Independent Variables
Mean scores and Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients of
the independent variables are presented in Table 3.2. As can be seen, the full
WBSI scale was significantly correlated with all subscales of the IES-R as well
as the HADS. However, the 6 items that were identified as effective indicators
of thought suppression (Palm & Strong, 2007) were only significantly
correlated with the avoidance subscale of the IES-R, and not the intrusion
and hyperarousal subscales. This correlation pattern further supports that
these items provide an effective and uncontaminated measure of avoidance
coping, rather than a general tendency to have intrusive thoughts, which some
items of the full WBSI have previously been identified to capture (see Section
2.5). At the same time, the effective items of the WBSI also remained highly
correlated with the full WBSI scale. All subscales of the IES-R were also
significantly and positively correlated with each other (all p < 0.01). Because
of these high inter-correlations the IES-R was treated as a single scale of post-
traumatic stress symptoms in the subsequent multiple regression analysis (see
Section 3.3.3).
Table 3.2: Means (s.d.) of the WBSI, IES-R and HADS and correlations
between the subscalesa
Mean (S.D.) Correlations
WBSI WBSI-E IES-I IES-A IES-H HADS-A
WBSI 48.08 (9.78) ---
WBSI- E 19.78 (4.46) .832** ---
IES-I 11.80 (10.04) .259* .154 ---
IES-A 12.38 (9.28) .347** .318* .818** ---
IES-H 7.60 (8.91) .255* .180 .779** .645** ---
HADS-A 8.62 (3.84) .569** .446** .250* .130 .377** ---
HADS-D 3.28 (2.70) .439* .336** .322* .174 .442** .673**
a WBSI = White Bear Suppression Inventory; WBSI-E = effective items from
the WBSI (Palm & Strong, 2007); IES-I = intrusion subscale; IES-A =
avoidance subscale; IES-H = hyperarousal subscale; HADS-A = anxiety
subscale; HADS-D = depression subscale
* p < 0.05, two tailed, ** p <0.01, two-tailed
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3.3.3 Thought Suppression and ABM Recall
A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted in order to
establish the degree to which thought suppression accounts for variability in
ABM recall. Different dimensions of ABM recall scores were treated as
separate dependent variables, and a separate multiple regression analysis was
carried out for each of these dimensions of ABM retrieval. These dimensions
consisted of 1) total overall latency for the recall of specific memories to all
cue words (AMT); 2) total latency to recall negative episodic memories
(AMT); 3) total latency to recall positive episodic memories (AMT); 4)
number of personal semantic memories recalled (S-AMI); and 5) overall
episodic ABM recall as measured by the S-AMI (see Appendix A.2.4 for the
complete multiple regression models). The number of overgeneral ABMs
recalled in response to cue words on the AMT could not be used as an
indicator of accessibility of positive and negative memories as there was a
ceiling effect for both positive and negative memories. Therefore insufficient
variability in the data was found; in fact, out of the 50 participants, 32 never
produced a single overgeneral memory, and 47 eventually produced specific
memories to all 10 cue words when they were prompted to do so. The means
and standard deviation as well as the empirical (observed) range and
theoretical (possible) range of all the dimensions of ABM retrieval considered
in the present study are presented in table 3.3 below.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for the measures of ABM retrieval
ABM variable Mean (S.D.) Empirical Range Theoretical Range
AMT:
Total latency (sec.) 99.97 (34.45) 33.20 – 198.20 0 – 600
Positive latency (sec.) 51.22 (23.78) 16.80 – 145.00 0 – 300
Negative latency (sec.) 48.97 (20.95) 16.40 – 99.10 0 – 300
Total first specific* 9.5 (0.79) 7 – 10 0 – 10
Positive first specific* 4.74 (0.53) 3 – 5 0 – 5
Negative first specific* 4.76 (0.59) 2 – 5 0 – 5
S-AMI:
Personal Semantic 59.89 (3.37) 49.00 – 63.00 0 – 63
Episodic 24.76 (2.59) 18.00 – 27.00 0 – 27
* omitted from the analysis because of lack of variability
HADS Depression, HADS Anxiety, IES-R Scores and WBSI
“effective” suppression scores were treated as independent variables in the
multiple regression analysis. The IES-R was treated as a single indicator of
trauma-induced symptoms, rather than considering the three separate
subscales, because the subscales were highly correlated with each other (see
section 3.3.2)2.
For each multiple regression model, stepwise regression analysis was
used subsequently in order to reduce the independent variables to only those
that could significantly account for the variability in the dependent variable.
For both the overall latency and latency to retrieve a positive ABMs, none of
the independent variables remained as significant predictors after the stepwise
regression analysis was applied, indicating that these dimensions of ABM
retrieval are not associated with any of the independent variables. In the case
of latency to retrieve negative episodic ABMs, only suppression remained as a
significant predictor after the stepwise regression analysis (r = -.363, p <
0.01). This result indicates that the more the participants engaged in thought
2 The analysis was repeated using the three subscales of the IES-R to replace the total IES-R
score as a single independent variable, and it was found that like the total IES-R scores, all
subscales were removed in the stepwise multiple regression analysis in each case. Therefore,
the results of this analysis did not differ from those reported here.
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suppression as a trait coping strategy, the faster their recall of negative
episodic memories. Similarly, following stepwise regression analysis, only
thought suppression remained as a significant predictor of variability in the
number of personal semantic memories that were recalled (as measured by the
Student’s AMI), r = -.386, p < 0.01. This indicates that higher levels of trait
thought suppression were correlated with the recall of fewer personal
semantic memories. As with overall latency and latency to retrieve positive
episodic ABMs, the quantity and quality of episodic memories recalled for
different lifetime periods on the Student’s AMI were not significantly
accounted for by any of the independent variables after the stepwise multiple
regression analysis.
Because suppression was significantly correlated with both the
depression and anxiety subscale of the HADS (see table 3.2), the possibility of
the correlations between thought suppression and latency to retrieve negative
episodic memories as well as personal semantic memory being mediated by
either depression or anxiety were considered. However, mediational analysis
as specified by Baron and Kenny (1986) yielded no significant results.
3.4 Discussion
The findings of the present study revealed that higher levels of
thought suppression were significantly correlated with the faster recall of
specific negative episodic memories, as well at the recall of fewer personal
semantic memories. In terms of the episodic ABM retrieval, these results are
inconsistent with those obtained by Hermans et al. (2005). Instead of being
unselectively related to overgeneral ABM retrieval, it appears that thought
- 64 -
suppression is also related to the enhanced retrieval of negative ABMs.
Thought suppression could, therefore, be an individual difference factor that
may contribute to explaining the heterogeneous findings regarding the
episodic ABM retrieval patterns observed in trauma samples (Section 1.4).
In this nonclinical student sample, current levels of dysphoric mood,
anxiety, and IES scores (i.e. intrusion and avoidance of trauma-related stimuli)
failed to account significantly for any variability in ABM recall. However,
symptoms of psychopathology such as depression and PTSD were relatively
low in this nonclinical student sample, and there may have simply been too
little variability in these variables to observe any correlations. Nevertheless,
the core findings of the present study could still have important implications
for clinical psychology, as the recall patterns that were correlated with higher
levels of thought suppression, i.e. reduced personal semantic memory recall as
well as enhanced negative episodic memory recall are similar to those also
found in individuals suffering from PTSD. Therefore, it is theoretically
possible that a suppressive coping style could be one of the factors that
influence whether or not a person will develop cognitive symptoms of PTSD
following a traumatic experience. This possibility is considered in detail in the
general discussion of this thesis (Section 7.6).
There was a ceiling effect for the number of specific first responses in
response to cue words on the AMT. Therefore, it was not possible to
investigate any possible correlation between levels of thought suppression and
number of overgeneral responses to the AMT cue words. This was likely a
result of the nature of the actual cue words that were used. The cue words
used in the present study have both a relatively high frequency and high
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emotional content, making memory retrieval easier. In future studies of this
program of research this problem will be addressed by employing different
cue words of lower frequency, to make the recall of specific memories
somewhat more challenging, thereby increasing the likelihood of overgeneral
responses.
The lack of a results on the number of specific memories recalled in
the present study means that it cannot be directly compared to prior research,
which has demonstrated that thought suppression was correlated with fewer
numbers of specific memories recalled (Hermans et al., 2005). These
discrepant results may be due to the numerous methodological differences
between the two studies. First of all, the present study used the original ten
cue words of the AMT (Williams & Broadbent, 1986), while Hermans et al.
(2005) used a different set of words where only three cue words overlapped
with those used in the present study. The original 10 cue words which were
used in the present study are words of relatively high frequency and of high
emotional content. This could mean that the retrieval of specific ABMs was
relatively easier in response to the cue words used in the present study than to
those used by Hermans et al. (2005), thereby resulting in more specific
responses. However, more importantly, the two studies differ in the ways in
which the AMT was administered. In the verbal paradigm which was used in
the present study, overgeneral memories are indirectly corrected by repeatedly
prompting the participant to retrieve a specific memory following an
overgeneral response. It is possible that this indirect feedback makes repeated
overgeneral ABM retrieval by the same participant less likely. In the written
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version of the AMT used by Hermans et al. (2005), no such prompts could be
given, and hence overgeneral memory retrieval was never indirectly corrected.
Secondly, Hermans et al. (2005) imposed more constraints on what
constitutes an acceptable specific memory by stipulating that the specific
memory had to be longer than a week ago and that the same memory could
not be repeated twice. Because no such instructions were given in the present
study, specific memory retrieval was relatively easier, as more memories
constituted acceptable responses. On the other hand, by imposing more
restrictions on acceptable responses, it is likely that Hermans et al. (2005)
increased the cognitive load of the participants during the ABM retrieval task.
Reduced executive control has been established to play a significant role in
the retrieval of overgeneral ABMs (see Section 1.6). The differences in the
higher cognitive load between the two studies could also contribute to
explaining the differences in the number of overgeneral memories recalled by
the participants.
Furthermore, while the present study found that thought suppression
was only related to faster negative ABM retrieval, Hermans et al. (2005) did
not consider positive and negative memory retrieval separately. Indeed,
because Hermans et al. (2005) used a written version of the AMT, response
latency could not possibly be considered at all in this prior research study, and
is therefore another dimension on which the two studies cannot be compared.
The present study has highlighted the importance of response latency when
assessing the accessibility of positive versus negative episodic ABMs. Even
when the number of overgeneral ABM retrievals could not be taken into
account because of ceiling effects, the response latency has nevertheless
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indicated an interesting pattern. Because overgeneral ABM retrieval has only
two response categories (either the memory is overgeneral or it is specific),
latency can be seen as a much more sensitive indicator of accessibility of
ABMs.
The second key finding of the present study is that of a significant
correlation between thought suppression and reduced personal semantic
memory retrieval. Personal semantic memory retrieval is so far only
documented to be affected in PTSD, and not in other psychopathologies (see
Section 1.4). This provides further support of the importance of thought
suppression as an individual difference factor which is particularly important
in PTSD. However, the assumption so far has been that personal semantic
memory is affected as a result of childhood trauma because it is never
properly encoded under such circumstances (Hunter & Andrews, 2002). The
present study, on the other hand, indicates that by virtue of being variable and
correlated with a cognitive coping mechanism, perhaps personal semantic
memory may not be as stable as previously assumed. Further research is
needed to investigate this possibility, but the present study has provided an
important basis to further explore the effects of thought suppression on
personal semantic memory retrieval.
However, while the present study offers a promising indication that
thought suppression may play an important role in ABM recall, the
correlational nature of the study limits the interpretability of these results.
Before any conclusions can be drawn regarding the causal effects of thought
suppression on ABM retrieval, the crucial next step in this program of
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research must be to determine the causal nature of this relationship, which is
addressed in the following chapter.
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C h a p t e r 4
STUDY 2: THE EFFECTS OF INDUCED THOUGHT SUPPRESSION
ON ABM RECALL3
4.1 Introduction
Following the fruitful findings of the correlational study in Chapter 3,
where higher levels of thought suppression were found to be significantly
correlated with the faster recall of negative episodic memories as well as a
reduced ability to retrieve personal semantic information, the purpose of the
present study is to examine the causal nature of this relationship. Specifically
the effects of thought suppression on ABM retrieval will be examined here, as
opposed to the effects of negative ABM retrieval on levels of thought
suppression. The motivations for this were twofold. Firstly, the prior research
that has manipulated a ruminative thinking style has demonstrated that
cognitive coping mechanisms can influence ABM recall patterns (see Section
1.5). Furthermore, while arguably everyone will have negative ABMs, not
everyone will use thought suppression to cope with them. Therefore, it can be
speculated that the enhanced retrieval of negative ABMs is less likely to lead
to a suppressive coping style (by virtue of everyone experiencing these
memories at times) than vice-versa.
To date, only one study has examined the effects of thought
suppression on ABM retrieval in terms of valence effects (see Section 1.7).
Dalgleish and Yiend (2006) conducted a suppression manipulation study in
which a group of dysphoric adults and a non-dysphoric control group were
3 The study outlined in the present chapter was provisionally accepted to be published in
Behaviour Research and Therapy pending minor alterations to the manuscript (11-12-2007)
- 70 -
asked to either suppress or not suppress a negative ABM which participants
were asked to identify prior to the suppression manipulation. The results
showed that dysphoric participants in the suppression group retrieved
negative ABMs significantly faster on a subsequent cued ABM retrieval task
(AMT) than dysphoric participants who were not suppressing a negative
memory. According to Dalgleish and Yiend (2006) this effect of facilitated
negative ABM retrieval observed in depressed participants in their ABM
retrieval following the suppression of a negative memory is a result of these
individuals activating other negatively valenced mental representations as
distractors from the memory that is to be suppressed, thereby making other
negative material relatively more accessible on the subsequent memory recall
task. Furthermore, the results also showed that higher levels of depressed
mood in the participants were also significantly related to more intrusions of
the suppressed negative ABM. The authors argue that these results are due to
the increased cognitive load that depressed individuals experience as a result
of their depression (Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006). Because depressed mood in
itself can be seen as a cognitive load, suppression is more likely to fail in these
conditions, as suppression is more likely to result in paradoxical effects under
cognitive load (see Section 1.6).
The present study seeks to expand on the previous research by
Dalgleish and Yiend (2006) in numerous ways. Firstly, the present study will
use a similar undergraduate student sample to that used in Chapter 3, as the
main purpose is to further investigate those findings. Dalgleish and Yiend
(2006) used a sample of dysphoric adults who were, on averaged, middle aged.
However, by the time of testing the BDI scores for 10 out of the 31
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dysphoric participants had dropped below the pre-experiment screening cut-
off level. Though the participants in the dysphoric groups still had
significantly higher BDI scores than those in the control groups, the
classification of those participants as dysphoric could be questioned.
Furthermore, and despite the small sample sizes in Dalgleish and Yiend
(2006) where there were between 10 and 16 participants per group, there was
a trend in the dysphoric suppression group to have higher IES scores than
their non-suppression control group, which was approaching significance. It is
therefore possible that these results were in part due to post-traumatic stress
responses, which were not properly assessed or considerd in this clinical
sample. Replicating this study in a nonclinical student sample allows for the
investigation of thought suppression as a coping mechanism on ABM
retrieval irrespective of any psychopathology.
The methodology employed by the present study also differs from
Dalgleish and Yiend (2006) in a number of ways. Firstly, a baseline measure of
ABM retrieval was taken in the present study, something which was not done
by Dalgleish and Yiend (2006). This is considered imperative in order to draw
reliable inferences about the effect of thought suppression on ABM retrieval,
especially when such small sample sizes are used as was the case with
Dalgleish and Yiend (2006). Secondly, in the current study all participants
were exposed to the same material (i.e. a negative video) for the thought
suppression task, which is to ensure that the material is consistent for each
participant. Dalgleish and Yiend (2006) asked participants to suppress a
personal negative ABM, which meant that each participant was suppressing
different material, resulting in less consistency. Crucially, the present study not
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only seeks to assess the effects of thought suppression on episodic ABM
retrieval, but also on personal semantic memory retrieval. This is rationalised
in light of the correlations observed in Chapter 3, as well as the theoretical
importance of thought suppression in PTSD, where both episodic ABM as
well as personal semantic memory retrieval are affected (see Section 1.4).
Finally, in order to assess the effects of thought suppression on general
cognitive functioning, a semantic fluency task will also be included in the
present study.
Though to date only two studies have investigated the effects of
thought suppression on episodic ABM retrieval (Section 1.7), the effects of
thought suppression on nonpersonal episodic memory have been studied in
somewhat more detail. The negative video clip used as the material for
suppression in the present study was previously used by Rassin, Merckelbach
and Muris (1997) to assess the effects of thought suppression on memory for
the suppressed material, which was subsequently assessed by a short-answer
questionnaire. Though investigating non-personal episodic memory was not
the primary purpose of the present study, in order to replicate Rassin et al.
(1997), the same questionnaire was therefore also used in the present study.
Rassin et al. (1997) found that thought suppression led to an increase of
thoughts about the suppressed material in the 5 hours in which the
participants were asked to suppress the video clip, but had no effect on the
participants’ ability to recall information regarding the facts or chronology of
events from the video clip. Earlier research by Wegner, Quillian and Houston
(1996) used a similar suppression task and found that participants who that
had suppressed a video clip subsequently made significantly more errors in
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recalling the chronology of events in a free recall task when compared to
participants who had not suppressed the video. It is important to note that
the video used by Wegner et al. (1996) depicted a clash between union
representatives and coal miners in West Virginia, and was not selected
because of it’s negative content, but rather on the basis that few participants
would have seen it before. The video used by Wegner et al. (1997) may have
arguably been less negative and aversive than that used by Rassin et al. (1997).
It is therefore possible that the discrepancies in the results of these two
studies are a result of the different natures of the video clips used as material
for suppression, as suppression of non-emotional and negative material seem
to result in different levels of cognitive costs (Klein & Bratton, 2007).
However, the results of these two studies may have been discrepant due to
the different ways in which the memory for the video was tested (the closed
questionnaire used by Rassin et al. (1997) versus the free recall task employed
by Wegner et al. (1996)). The present study therefore also employs a free
recall task similar to the one used by Wegner et al. (1996) in addition to the
closed questionnaire used by Rassin et al. (1997). Non-personal episodic
memory retrieval is assessed in the present study to replicate the prior work in
this area, but also in order to investigate whether suppression has a different
effect on personal as opposed to non-personal memory retrieval. Though no
personal ABMs are suppressed in the present study as this would relinquish
too much experimental control over the crucial suppression manipulation
task, pervious research has demonstrated that, in terms of cognitive costs,
personal negative memories are significantly harder to suppress than non-
personal negative memories (Klein & Bratton, 2007).
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In summary, the present study was set out primarily to establish a
causality of the correlations observed in Chapter 3 between thought
suppression and both episodic ABM personal semantic memory retrieval by
engaging a similar nonclinical student sample in a thought suppression task
and assessing their subsequent memory retrieval. Furthermore, the present
study expands on pervious work by Dalgleish and Yiend (2006) and
Schönfeld et al. (2007) by including measures of personal semantic memory
and semantic fluency, as well as conducting a suppression manipulation under
better controlled conditions with more participants in each condition, where
baseline measures of the dependent variables are taken, and the material to be
suppressed is similar for all participants. Finally, the present study has a
secondary aim of assessing non-personal episodic memory recall for the
suppressed material, seeking to replicate either Rassin et al. (1997) or Wegner
et al. (1996).
It is hypothesised that the induced thought suppression of the
negative material (i.e. the video clip) would lead to the same recall patterns
observed as correlations in Chapter 3, i.e. more accessible negative ABMs as
well as the recall of fewer personal semantic memories and that no such
effects would be observed in the control group of participants who would not
suppress any thoughts of the video. Furthermore, if the discrepant prior
findings in the literature regarding the effects of thought suppression on non-
personal episodic memory retrieval were a result of the different assessments
methods used by Rassin et al. (1997) and Wegner et al. (1996), it is predicted
that thought suppression will affect the memory for the video only on the free
recall task (Wegner et al., 1996). In other words, only those participants in the
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suppression condition should make significantly more errors recalling the
events in sequence, whereas no such differences would be expected on the
closed questionnaire about the video (Rassin et al., 1997).
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Design
A 2 (time: before and after manipulation) x 2 (condition: suppression
vs. no suppression) mixed model was used to assess the effects of thought
suppression on ABM recall, with time as the repeated measure factor. For
ABM retrieval on the AMT, an additional within subject factor was added for
valence of the cue words (positive and negative). In the case of the memory
for the video, which could only be assessed after the manipulation, a between
subjects design was applied (suppression vs. no suppression conditions).
Participants were randomly assigned to either the suppression or no
suppression condition. The presentation of the different versions of the
AMT, Student’s Autobiographical Memory Interview and Semantic Fluency
tasks before and after the suppression manipulation were completely
counterbalanced throughout.
4.2.2 Participants
Participants were sixty-four (51 female and 13 male) undergraduate
students from the University of St. Andrews. Participation was voluntary and
occurred in return for a small financial fee. The mean age of all participants
was 20.94 years (s.d. = 2.97).
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4.2.3 Materials
4.2.3.1 Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) (Williams & Broadbent,
1986)
See Section 2.2.1 for a general description of the AMT. In the present
study, two different versions of the AMT were used to assess cued episodic
memory recall before and after the manipulation. Each version of the AMT
consisted 5 positive and 5 negative cue words; the words were matched for
their emotional content as well as their frequency (see table 4.1). (Version A:
proud, guilty, amazed, weak, lively, bored, eager, helpless, excited, upset)
(Version B: friendly, rejected, faithful, bad, calm, awful, pleased, ashamed,
hopeful, miserable).
Table 4.1: Means (s.d.) of the emotional content and frequency of the cue
words for versions A and B of the AMT
AMT Version A Version B t p
Emotional content 5.14 (0.59) 5.04 (0.50) 0.44 0.66
Frequency 25.4 (14.53) 24.80 (17.73) 0.08 0.94
Furthermore, no differences were found between the positive and negative
cue words on each AMT in terms of imageability, concreteness, and how
readily raters felt that they may elicit a specific memory (see Section 2.2.1 and
Appendix A.1.1). Inter-rater reliability regarding the coding of the nature of
the first memory that was recalled for each cue word (overgeneral versus
specific) was calculated for two independent raters on a sample of 20% of the
participants’ memories and was found to be high (Cohen’s Kappa K = 0.92).
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4.2.3.2 Students’ Autobiographical Memory Interview (S-AMI)
See Section 2.2.3 for a description of the Students’ Autobiographical
Memory Interview (S-AMI). In order to assess the personal semantic memory
recall prior to and after the manipulation, two different but shortened
versions of the Student’s Autobiographical Memory Interview were used (see
Appendices A.3.4 and A.3.5). Each shortened version of the S-AMI consisted
of three sections covering early childhood, adolescence, and recent memories.
Each section contained eight questions used to elicit personal semantic
information, and inquire about one episodic event from that time period,
which was scored on the three dimensions of time, place and specificity.
4.2.3.3 Semantic Fluency Task
In order to assess semantic fluency prior to and after the suppression
manipulation, participants were asked to name as many vegetables or animals
as they could in one minute.
4.2.3.4 White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) (Wegner & Zanakos,
1994)
See Section 2.5 for a description of this questionnaire. The WBSI was
used in the present study to obtain a measure of the participants’ trait
tendency to engage in thought suppression as a way of coping with unwanted
thoughts and memories. This measure was used to rule out any differences in
trait thought suppression in the participants between the different conditions,
and also to replicate the correlations between thought suppression (as
measured by the WBSI) and ABM retrieval reported in Chapter 3.
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4.2.3.5 Video of a “Grizzly Bear Attack” (from “Faces of Death”)
Participants were shown a 4 minute video clip showing a grizzly bear
attack on a tourist. It was selected for the realistic nature of the film and its
emotional and fairly aversive nature. The clip was taken from the “Faces of
Death” video, and was also used by Rassin et al. (1997). Section 2.6 outlines a
pilot study conducted to obtain an emotional rating for this video clip.
4.2.3.6 Memory for the Video Questionnaire
This questionnaire consisted of a free recall task followed by 36
questions about the video. For the free recall task participants were asked to
fill one page of ruled paper by writing about the video clip. The following
instructions for this task were printed at the top of the page and taken from
Wegner et al. (1996): “Write the story of the film, from the beginning to the
end, on the lines provided. Write this summary of the film in as much detail
as possible. Please fill the entire page with remarks about the film. If you can’t
think of something to say just write “blah, blah, blah” until you come up with
your next sentence. It is important that you fill this page.” In order to score
the free recall task, a master list of events was first composed, and each
participant’s free recall response was evaluated against this list. For each event
that the participant mentioned that was on the list they received one point
(number of events). For each incorrect piece of factual information recalled
(e.g. confusing the male with the female tourist), the participant received one
factual error point. Finally, for each event that was recalled in the wrong order
compared to the events mentioned beforehand or afterwards, the participant
received one point for a chronological error. The scoring was conducted by
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two independent researchers, who were unaware of the different experimental
conditions. Inter-rater consistency in the scores was high for the number of
events recalled (r2 = 0.99, p < 0.001), number of factual errors (r2 = 0.97, p <
0.001), and number of errors in the chronological order of events (r2 = 0.91, p
< 0.001).
This free recall task was followed by a set of specific questions about
the video which were closely modeled on those used by Rassin et al. (1997)4.
The questionnaire was only altered to make it appropriate to the current
study, meaning that only those questions that referred directly to the specific
manipulation of the Rassin et al. (1997) study were excluded. There were eight
questions about the nature of the film, e.g. “How vivid is your memory for
the film?” and these questions were rated on 100mm visual analogue scales
(VAS), ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 100 (“extremely”). Of the remaining 28
questions, 17 were about details of the film (e.g. “Does the deer have horns?”)
and 11 were about the chronological order of the film scenes (e.g. “Which of
the following shots appears first: that of the landscape or that of the bear?”).
All these questions were open-ended, and the each correct answer was scored
as one point. Therefore, high scores on the questionnaire indicate good
memory for the film. See Appendix A.3.6 for a full list of the questions.
4.2.3.7 Suppression Questionnaire
In order to ascertain the effectiveness of the suppression
manipulation, all participants were asked to rate on a 100mm visual analogue
scale (VAS) how much they tried to suppress their thoughts of the video
4 The questions were obtained by correspondence with the author.
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during the subsequent thought monitoring/suppression tasks. The scale
ranged from 0 (“not at all”) to 100 (“very much”).
4.2.4 Procedure
Participants were tested individually and were first presented with a
set of the AMT, Student’s AMI and Semantic Fluency Task. These tasks were
followed by the viewing of the grizzly bear video on a TV screen. Following
the viewing of the film, participants were given a five minute thought
monitoring task, in which they were asked to press a button whenever they
had a thought about the video that they had just seen. Instructions for this
task differed according to the experimental condition; for the suppression
condition participants were told to “try as hard as they can to NOT think about the
film they have just viewed”, and in the no suppression (control) condition
participants were told to “think freely about anything they liked”. After the five
minute thought monitoring period was completed, participants were
immediately given different versions of the AMT, Student’s Autobiographical
Memory Interview, and Semantic Fluency Task again. Finally, the participants
were given a set of questionnaires to complete, which included the Memory
for the Video Questionnaire, the Suppression Manipulation Questionnaire,
and the WBSI. After the testing the participants were fully debriefed and all
received a small financial compensation for their participation. The
information sheet (A.3.1), consent form (A.3.2) and debriefing form (A.3.3)
for this study are included in the Appendix.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Replication of Correlations from Chapter 3
Linear Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were
calculated between the “effective” WBSI scores as well as the ABM baseline
measures taken before the participants were subjected to the suppression
manipulation. The results were consistent and replicated those of Chapter 3 in
that thought suppression was significantly and negatively correlated with the
latency to recall negative ABMs (r = -.260, p < 0.05) as well as personal
semantic memory recall (r = -.249, p < 0.05).
4.3.2 Effectiveness of the Suppression Manipulation
Participants’ age and gender, as well as levels of thought suppression
(both as a trait characteristic as measured by the WBSI as well as the reported
levels of thought suppression during the experimental task are presented in
table 4.2. There were no differences in the gender ratio between the two
groups (Fisher’s exact, p > .5), nor did the two groups differ significantly in
age (t(62) = 1.01, p > 0.31). The two groups differed significantly in their self-
reported levels of thought suppression as a result of the instructions given.
The suppression group reported significantly higher levels of thought
suppression during the thought monitoring tasks than the non-suppression
group, indicating that the experimental instructions were followed (t(62) = -
2.90, p < 0.01). The groups did not, however, differ in their reported levels of
trait thought suppression as a general coping strategy as measured by the
WBSI (t(62) = 0.42, p > 0.67) and the effective suppression items of the WBSI
(t(62) = -0.51, p > 0.27). This lack of a difference between the groups indicates
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that any effects of suppression occurred as a result of the manipulation, as
opposed to the participants’ general tendency to engage in thought
suppression.
Table 4.2: Gender ratio, means (s.d.) for age, suppression (self-report),
reported intrusions (i.e. button presses) and WBSI per suppression condition
Groups
Suppression
(n = 32)
No Suppression
(n = 32) t
Gender (m:f) 6:26 7:25 -
Age 20.65 (2.12) 21.31 (3.62) 1.010
Suppression (self report) 74.30 (23.00) 56.20 (26.70) -2.903**
Button Press 13.44 (10.70) 15.59 (10.44) 0.816
WBSI 52.31 (8.95) 53.16 (7.00) 0.420
WBSI – E 21.34 (3.70) 20.88 (3.59) -0.514
** p < 0.01, two-tailed
4.3.3 Effects of Thought Suppression on the Memory for the Video
The results for the measures of memory for the video clip by group
(suppression vs. control) are presented in table 4.3. There were no significant
differences between the two groups in their ability to recall information about
the video, in terms of the factual events, factual errors as well as the
chronology of the events (all p > 0.05). This was the case for both the free
recall task as well as the specific questions about the video. Furthermore,
ratings of the quality of the memory for the video in terms of how vivid and
fragmented it is did not differ significantly between the two groups (all p >
0.5).
- 83 -
Table 4.3: Means (s.d.) for memory of the video per suppression condition
Post Manipulation Groups
Suppression
(n = 32)
No Suppression
(n = 32) T
Free Recall Task:
Number of Events 19.97 (4.92) 19.29 (4.95) .546
Chronological Errors 0.19 (0.47) 0.29 (0.59) -.767
Factual Errors 1.22 (1.48) 1.10 (1.19) .360
Content Questionnaire:
Facts 6.97 (1.98) 6.09 (1.77) 1.868
Chronology 6.59 (1.81) 6.63 (1.34) -.078
Rating of the Memory:
Vivid 7.80 (1.48) 7.97 (1.26) -.500
Clear 7.02 (2.69) 7.32 (1.90) -.521
Likely 5.90 (2.92) 6.35 (2.95) -.613
Snapshot-like 4.39 (2.33) 4.68 (2.53) -.486
4.3.4 Effects of Thought Suppression on ABM Recall
The results for the measures of ABM recall between the two groups
taken before (baseline) as well as after the suppression manipulation are
presented in table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Means (s.d.) of ABM measures pre and post manipulation per
suppression condition
Baseline Post Manipulation
Suppression
(n = 32)
No
Suppression
(n = 32)
Suppression
(n = 32)
No
Suppression
(n = 32)
Episodic Latency:
AMT – positive 53.72 (33.24) 48.28 (22.62) 53.19 (26.48) 57.31 (40.72)
AMT – negative 48.72 (22.26) 45.66 (24.22) 31.56 (20.00) 59.50 (37.42)
Specific Episodic first response:
AMT – positive 4.69 (0.47) 4.81 (0.40) 4.66 (0.55) 4.66 (0.65)
AMT – negative 4.66 (0.48) 4.72 (0.68) 4.94 (0.25) 4.59 (0.56)
ABM Interview:
S-AMI episodic total 8.56 (0.91) 8.22 (1.52) 8.13 (1.48) 8.41 (1.24)
S-AMI episodic childhood 2.81 (0.47) 2.69 (0.90) 2.53 (0.88) 2.88 (0.55)
S-AMI episodic adolescence 2.84 (0.57) 2.63 (1.01) 2.69 (0.82) 2.72 (0.81)
S-AMI episodic recent 2.91 (0.53) 2.91 (053) 2.91 (0.39) 2.81 (0.64)
S-AMI per. sem. total 22.13 (1.73) 22.22 (1.78) 20.91 (1.93) 22.25 (1.66)
S-AMI per. sem. childhood 6.36 (1.57) 6.41 (1.53) 5.52 (2.01) 6.72 (1.31)
S-AMI per. sem. adolescence 7.95 (0.20) 7.97 (0.18) 7.75 (0.67) 7.61 (0.97)
S-AMI per. sem. Recent 7.81 (0.73) 7.84 (0.63) 7.70 (0.63) 7.61 (1.10)
Semantic Fluency:
Semantic Fluency 22.50 (8.63) 21.84 (7.90) 20.84 (7.20) 23.19 (7.93)
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In order to investigate the main hypothesis that thought suppression
would lead to more accessible negative memories, a 2 (condition: suppress vs.
control) x 2 (time: baseline and post-manipulation) x 2 (cue valence: positive
and negative) mixed model ANOVA was calculated for the recall latencies,
with time and cue valence as the repeated measures factors. This analysis
yielded a significant main effect of valence, F(1,62) = 6.75, p < 0.05, with
negative memories being produced faster than positive memories, but no
significant main effects of condition (F(1,62) < 1) or time (F(1,62) < 1).
However, there were significant interactions for time x condition, F(1,62) =
10.60, p < 0.01, and cue valence x condition, F(1,62) = 6.32, p < 0.05. The
hypothesised three-way interaction, condition x time x cue valence was
approaching significance, F(1,62) = 3.76, p = 0.06.
To further investigate this three-way interaction, two separate time x
condition mixed ANOVAs were performed for positive and negative cue
words. For positive cue words, no significant time x condition interaction
(F(1,62) = 1.07, p > 0.3) was observed, indicating that there were no differences
in recall latencies between the conditions for positive cue words at any time.
For the negative cue words, however, there was a significant time x condition
interaction, F(1,62) = 18.01, p < 0.001. Follow-up independent sample t-tests
showed that there were no differences between the groups in the recall
latencies for negative memories at baseline, t(62) = 0.53, p > 0.6. However,
consistent with the hypothesis, after the suppression manipulation,
suppression led to significantly faster recall of specific memories to negative
cue words than no suppression, t(62) = 3.73, p < 0.001.
- 85 -
Figure 4.1: Means (s.e.) of recall latencies to cue words on the AMT pre and
post manipulation per suppression condition
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In order to examine the effects of thought suppression on the number
of specific first responses, a 2 (condition: suppress vs. control) x 2 (time:
baseline, post-manipulation) x 2 (cue valence: positive, negative) mixed model
ANOVA was calculated, with time and cue valence as the repeated measures
factors. This analysis yielded no significant main effects of condition (F(1,62) <
1), cue word valence (F(1,62) < 1) or time (F(1,62) < 1). There was a significant
interaction of time x condition, F(1,62) = 6.03, p < 0.05, but the time x valence
x condition three-way interaction was not significant F(1,62) = 1.23, p = 0.27).
However, in light of the hypothesis, which predicted an effect of
negative facilitation only, this model was nevertheless deconstructed based on
cue word valence. As predicted, the time x condition interaction for positive
cue words was not found to be significant (F(1,62) < 1). However, for negative
cue words, the time x condition interaction was significant; F(1,62) = 6.30, p <
0.05. Follow-up independent sample t-tests showed that the suppression
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group produced significantly more specific responses to negative cue words
after the manipulation than the control group, t(62) = 3.18, p < 0.01, but no
such difference was found prior to the manipulation (i.e. at baseline) t(62) =
0.42, p > 0.6.
For analysis of the results obtained by the S-AMI two separate 2
(condition: suppress vs. control) x 2 (time: baseline and post-manipulation)
mixed model ANOVAs were calculated for episodic and personal semantic
memory recall, with time as the repeated measures factor. For the S-AMI
episodic recall there were no significant main effects of condition (F(1,62) < 1)
or of time (F(1,62) < 1). There was also no significant interaction, F(1,62) = 1.99,
p > 0.1.
For the S-AMI personal semantic recall, however, there were
significant main effects of condition, F(1,62) = 4.46, p < 0.05, with fewer
personal semantic memories being generated in the suppression condition, as
well as a significant main effect of time, F(1,62) = 4.33, p < 0.05, with
participants recalling fewer personal semantic memories after the
manipulation. However, these main effects were qualified by a significant
condition x time interaction, F(1,62) = 4.79, p < 0.05. A follow up independent
sample t-test revealed that the after the manipulation, the suppression group
recalled significantly fewer personal semantic memories than the control
group, t(62) = 2.99, p < 0.01. No such differences were found at baseline, t(62) =
0.21, p > 0.8.
Finally, a 2 (condition: suppress vs. control) x 2 (time: baseline, post-
manipulation) mixed model ANOVA was calculated for the semantic fluency
scores, with time as the repeated measures factor. There were no main effects
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of condition (F(1,62) < 1), or of time (F(1,62) < 1), nor was there a significant
interaction (F(1,62) < 1). This analysis shows that semantic fluency itself was not
affected as a result of the suppression manipulation.
4.3.5 Nature of the Specific ABM Recall
In a preliminary attempt to investigate how thought suppression
might affects episodic ABM retrieval, a number of aspects of the specific
memories that the participants retrieved on the AMT were retrospectively
examined in more detail. Specifically, the number of times a memory was
retrieved repeatedly to the same cue word, as well as the number of recent
memories was recorded. Memories of events which occurred less than a week
ago were counted as recent memories. Furthermore, in order to conduct a
preliminary assessment of whether thought suppression affects generative or
direct retrieval, memories that were recalled in less than two seconds were
considered to be directly activated (see Haque & Conway, 2001). The
descriptive statistics for the number of repeated memories, recent memories,
and direct recalls are summarised in table 4.5 below.
Table 4.5: Means (s.d.) for number of repeated memories, recent memories
and direct recalls pre and post manipulation per suppression condition
Baseline Post Manipulation
Suppression
(n = 32)
No
Suppression
(n = 32)
Suppression
(n = 32)
No
Suppression
(n = 32)
Repeated Memories
positive 0.03 (0.18) 0.06 (0.25) 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.18)
negative 0.16 (0.37) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.12 (0.30)
positive from baseline - - 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.17)
negative from baseline - - 0.34 (0.60) 0.28 (0.52)
Recent Memories ( < 1 week ago)
Positive 1.66 (1.23) 1.65 (1.13) 1.69 (1.42) 1.59 (1.39)
Negative 1.72 (1.35) 1.69 (1.35) 1.78 (1.45) 1.78 (1.50)
Direct Retrieval ( < 2 sec)
Positive 0.69 (0.90) 0.72 (0.85) 0.66 (0.83) 0.53 (0.67)
Negative 0.55 (0.80) 0.50 (0.84) 0.56 (0.80) 0.57 (0.81)
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Nonparametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U test revealed that
there were no significant difference in the number of repeated memories,
recent memories, and directly retrieved memories recalled of any valence
between the suppression and no suppression condition (all p > 0.5).
Furthermore, the Wilcoxon test revealed that there were no differences
between the number of repeated, recent, and directly retrieved memories as a
result of the suppression manipulation (i.e. baseline vs. post-manipulation) for
any valence (all p > 0.2). These preliminary results indicate that thought
suppression does not result in increased retrieval of recent memories, nor
does it appear to result in an increase in the same memories to be recalled
repeatedly to the same cue word. Furthermore, thought suppression did not
appear to lead to an increase of negative memories that were recalled very
quickly, which could have indicated that it affects direct rather than generative
retrieval.
4.4 Discussion
Firstly, the present study replicated the correlations observed in Study
1 (Chapter 3), in that higher levels of thought suppression were significantly
correlated with the faster recall of specific negative episodic ABMs as well as
reduced recall of personal semantic memories. Furthermore, the present study
showed that when thought suppression was induced in a laboratory setting, it
directly led to the same recall patterns previously observed as correlations in
this program of research. However, the ability to recall the information that
was suppressed (i.e. the video clip) was not affected by the suppression
manipulation, despite the fact that this was assessed using both a closed
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questionnaire (Rassin et al., 1997) as well as a free recall task (Wegner et al.,
1996).
Together with Dalgleish and Yiend (2006), the present research
expands on previous research regarding the ironic and paradoxical effects of
thought suppression (e.g. Wegner et al., 1987, Abramowitz et al., 2001) by
demonstrating that not just the material that is to be suppressed, but also any
negative ABM can be made more accessible by virtue of engaging in this
coping mechanism. These results are consistent with Dalgleish and Yiend
(2006), in that thought suppression resulted in the faster recall of specific
episodic memories in response to negative cue words. However, Dalgleish
and Yiend (2006) found that this facilitation was only the case for dysphoric
participants. Because no baseline measures of ABM retrieval were taken in
this prior work, the conclusions that can be drawn by Dalgleish and Yiend
(2006) regarding the effects of thought suppression on ABM recall in the
dysphoric group are limited to comparison with the non-dysphoric group
following the manipulation, as opposed to the effects of thought suppression
on ABM retrieval prior to and following the manipulation. To add to the
findings of Dalgleish and Yiend (2006), the present study also demonstrated
that thought suppression also had a detrimental effect on personal semantic
memory retrieval, rather than just affecting episodic ABM recall.
Following the results that thought suppression resulted in enhanced
negative episodic ABM retrieval, the nature of the specific ABMs retrieved
was retrospectively further examined. Though these results are tentative, they
suggest that thought suppression had no effect on the number of memories
that were recalled repeatedly, the number of recent memories that were
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recalled, nor on the number of memories that were recalled in less than two
seconds. The finding that thought suppression does not appear to affect the
number of memories that were recalled repeatedly may suggest that thought
suppression does not appear to result in increased intrusions of previously
accessed negative memories. Instead, it is possible that thought suppression
results in a general facilitation of specific negative representations, which do
not have to have been accessed beforehand. The result that thought
suppression did not lead to an increase in memories that were recalled in less
than two seconds may indicate that the enhanced retrieval of negative
episodic ABMs as a result of thought suppression was not due to a higher
number of directly activated representations following the suppression
manipulation. While generative retrieval of episodic ABMs generally takes
some time, direct retrieval tends to occur very quickly, and the speculation is
that a participant is able to begin a verbal report of a directly retrieved
memory within two seconds of being given the cue word (Haque & Conway,
2001). Therefore, these preliminary results may indicate that thought
suppression affects generative episodic ABM retrieval rather than simply
resulting in an increased activation of directly activated or intrusive
representations.
The second key finding of the present study was that personal
semantic memory retrieval was also affected by thought suppression
demonstrates that this research is increasingly relevant to understanding the
cognitive underpinnings of PTSD, where thought suppression is a common
coping mechanism (e.g. Ehlers & Clark, 2000), and which is also the only
emotional disorder where personal semantic memory retrieval is consistently
- 91 -
found to be affected (see Section 1.4). The present study also extends
previous research by demonstrating that the retrieval of personal semantic
memories can be affected by thought suppression. Previous theories regarding
personal semantic memory retrieval in PTSD have proposed that these
memories are not encoded well as a result of traumatic experiences (e.g.
Hunter & Andrews, 2002). The present results, however, suggest that
personal semantic memories, like episodic memories, may not be as stable as
previously thought. The present study clearly demonstrates that the retrieval
of personal semantic memories is susceptible to the effects of experimental
manipulations. Taken together with the result of affected episodic ABM
retrieval, these results also imply that thought suppression has a complex
effect on cognitive systems; on the one hand it facilitates negative episodic
ABM retrieval while at the same time debilitating the retrieval of personal
semantic memories.
In the present study, there were no differences between the groups in
the number of intrusions of the suppressed material (i.e. the video clip)
between the conditions. This finding is inconsistent with prior research which
has demonstrated that suppression resulted in increased intrusions of the
suppressed material compared to a condition where the material was not
suppressed (see Abramowitz et al., 2001). This finding may have been a result
of a methodological limitation of the present study, as the number of
intrusions of the suppressed material was only assessed during the suppression
manipulation (by the number of times the participants pressed a mouse
button during this task), and could not be assessed in the time thereafter. An
analysis of intrusions after the manipulation may have been fruitful because
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many studies have reported a delayed rebound effect of intrusive thoughts as
a result of thought suppression, i.e. in the time period following the suppression
task, rather than during the suppression task (Beck et al., 2006; Davies & Clark,
1998; Harvey & Bryant 1998a, 1998b; Wegner et al., 1987; Wenzlaff et al.,
1988). Such an analysis was not done in the present study because it was
crucial to re-assess ABM retrieval following the manipulation in the same way
as was done prior to the manipulation.
Finally, the present study also set out to investigate the effects of
thought suppression on memory for the suppressed material, in the case a
non-personal but negative video clip. The results indicated no differences
between the conditions in the present study in the memory on any of the
dimensions. This finding is inconsistent with both Wegner et al. (1996) and
Rassin et al. (1997), who found that memory for the suppressed material was
affected as a result of the suppression manipulation. It is possible that this
was a result of a second methodological limitation of the present study,
namely that the five minute duration of the suppression manipulation was
relatively short. Despite the fact that it was deemed successful by virtue of the
participant’s ratings of their levels of suppression, as well as the significant
differences observed in the ABM retrieval patterns following the suppression,
these effects may not have lasted long enough to affect all subsequent
measures. In fact, significant differences between the groups were only
observed in the two measures given immediately after the suppression
manipulation (namely the AMT and the S-AMI), but not on any of the
measures following this, including the memory for the video questionnaires,
semantic fluency test and WBSI.
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Despite the methodological limitations, the findings of the present
study strengthen the previously mentioned implications for clinical
psychology. The fact that PTSD-like recall patterns can be created in a
nonclinical student sample by engaging the participants in thought
suppression of negative material could help explain why some individuals
develop PTSD symptoms following a traumatic event while others do not.
One of the factors that could determine whether PTSD symptoms develop
could be the trait coping style of the individual. The results of the present
study suggest active thought suppression of negative material could directly
lead to the PTSD-typical recall patterns.
While the decreased ability to retrieve personal semantic information
is specifically relevant to PTSD, the facilitated recall of negative episodic
information could be relevant both PTSD as well as self-harm (see Section
1.4). There are two possible reasons why this negative facilitation effect might
occur as a result of thought suppression. The first explanation may be that
this is a result of mood congruent recall. Numerous studies have
demonstrated that memories are easier to recall if the valence of the memory
is consistent with the current mood state (Lloyd & Lishman, 1975; Clark &
Teasdale, 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). In the present study, the negative
video clip by itself could have functioned as a negative mood manipulation.
However, because all participants watched the same negative video clip, this
in itself can not explain the observed negative facilitation effect, as it would
also have occurred in the no suppression group. Therefore, it is perhaps
possible that the process of thought suppression of the negative material itself
could have resulted in a more negative mood in the participants. Those
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participants who were in the suppression group were continually reminded of
their “failure” to adhere to the experimental instructions each time they
experienced a thought or memory relating to the video. This could have led to
frustrations and a decrease in mood, which could explain why subsequent
ABM recall was affected. Further investigations should therefore examine the
effects of thought suppression on mood using a similar experimental
paradigm. This issues is addressed in Chapter 5 of this program of research.
The second way in which negative information could have become
more accessible may be as a result of the thought suppression itself.
Conscious thought suppression is thought to require two cognitive processes
(Wegner, 1994). After the material is marked for suppression (which in itself
requires accessing the material, thereby making it more likely to be recalled
and adding to the paradoxical effects of thought suppression), both processes
have to occur simultaneously in order to ensure successful thought
suppression. The effortful operating process searches for material for
distraction from the suppressed material, while the automatic monitoring
process searches for indications that signal failure of the operating process, i.e.
that the material has been accessed. As a result of having accessed the
negative information and marking it for suppression, it is possible that the
negative material that the participant thinks about during this time will be
consistent in valence, but semantically unrelated to the suppressed material.
Due to the adverse content of the video clip (and, indeed, any information
that needs to be suppressed), it is therefore likely that the information used
for distracting attention away from the suppressed material was also negative
in valence, thereby enhancing the subsequent negative ABM recall.
- 95 -
C h a p t e r 5
STUDY 3: THE EFFECTS OF INDUCED THOUGHT SUPPRESSION
ON MOOD STATES
5.1 Introduction
Together, the previous two studies have demonstrated that thought
suppression is correlated with the faster recall of specific negative episodic
ABMs (Chapter 3). Furthermore, a suppression manipulation task revealed
that thought suppression of negative material directly led to the faster retrieval
of negative episodic ABMs and more initial specific responses to negative cue
words (Chapter 4). Two possible explanations have been offered to explain
this phenomenon of facilitated negative ABM retrieval as a result of thought
suppression. Firstly, it is possible that in the thought suppression condition,
the process of engaging in thought suppression itself acts as a cognitive load,
thereby undermining the monitoring process of suppression and resulting in
the hyperaccessibility of negative thoughts and memories. As a result of
repeated intrusions of the negative material presented in the video, it is
possible that the information which the participants used as distraction
material (i.e. in order to avoid thinking about the suppressed thought) was
triggered by, yet semantically unrelated to the suppressed material. Due to the
adverse content of the video, it is therefore likely that the material that was
used to distract from the suppressed material was also negative in valence,
thereby enhancing subsequent negative ABM recall.
The second possible explanation for this negative facilitation effect is
that it occurred as a result of mood congruent recall. If suppression of the
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negative material resulted in a more negative mood state than simply watching
the negative video, the subsequent ABM retrieval may have been more
negatively biased because it was mood congruent. This explanation is further
considered in the present chapter. Numerous studies have demonstrated that
memories that are consistent in valence with a current mood state are easier to
recall than those inconsistent with the mood state (Lloyd & Lishman, 1975;
Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). In the previous study
(Chapter 4), it is possible that watching the negative and adverse video itself
could have functioned as a negative mood manipulation, thereby enhancing
subsequent negative ABM retrieval. However, because all participants were
exposed to the same video clip, yet only those in the suppression condition
exhibited the negative facilitation effect as a result, this explanation is not
sufficient in explaining the results of Chapter 4. Therefore, what must be
considered is whether the process of thought suppression of the negative
material could have resulted in a more negative mood in the participants than
simply watching the negative video without suppression. In the suppression
condition, participants were continually reminded of their “failure” of
adhering to the experimental instructions each time they experienced a
thought or memory relating to the video. This could have resulted in
frustrations and a decrease in mood (over and above that which may have
been induced by simply watching the video), which in turn could explain why
subsequent ABM recall became negatively biased. Indeed, during the
suppression condition, participants frequently made utterances that suggested
that they were frustrated over their failure (such as swearing as they pressed
the button to indicate a video-related thought).
- 97 -
The purpose of the present study is to assess the effects of thought
suppression on mood, in order to exclude or confirm it as a mechanism which
could explain the previously observed negative facilitation effect following of
thought suppression. To date, the literature examining the relationship
between thought suppression and mood remains limited, and reliable
conclusions regarding the effects of thought suppression on mood can not be
drawn. While a number of studies of thought suppression have included some
measure of mood (e.g. Dalgleish and Yiend, 2006), so far, only two studies
have examined the direct effects of thought suppression on mood, with
contradictory results. In one experiment by Purdon and Clark (2001),
participants were either instructed to suppress or not to suppress a self-
selected neutral, positive, or obsessive thought and it was found that thought
suppression of the obsessive thought was associated with a more negative
subsequent mood state than suppressing the positive or neutral thoughts.
Furthermore, in the condition where participants were suppressing an
obsessive thought, a higher frequency of intrusions of the suppressed target
thought was significantly correlated with a more negative mood (Purdon &
Clark, 2001). The authors argue that this was a result of the discomfort
experienced as a result of thinking about the obsessive thought which
participants were trying to suppress. Despite the fact that the number of
overall intrusions was similar across all groups (suppression and no
suppression of any type of thought), those participants who were suppressing
an obsessive thought reported a significantly higher level of discomfort when
experiencing an intrusion of the target thought than those who were not
suppressing an obsessive thought. However, in a separate study it was found
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that higher numbers of intrusions of personally relevant intrusive thoughts
were significantly correlated with a more negative mood in both the
suppression and control conditions (Brewin & Smart, 2005). This is generally
consistent with earlier literature which demonstrated that in a negative mood
it is more difficult to suppress a negative thought (Conway, Howell &
Giannopoulos, 1991; Wenzlaff, Wegner & Klein, 1991; Wenzlaff, Wegner &
Roper, 1988) and that thoughts are more difficult to dismiss during negative
mood states (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987; Sutherland, Newman & Rachman,
1982). These studies appear to indicate that not only is suppression more
likely to fail in negative mood states and lead to paradoxical effects, but also
that intrusions of the material that is to be suppressed can lead to a decrease
in mood.
However, a second study which directly assessed the effects of
thought suppression on mood yielded contradictory results. In this study,
participants were required to perform a written stream-of-consciousness task
either while suppressing any negative thoughts, or without any such
restrictions (Beevers & Scott, 2001). In contrast with the results obtained by
Purdon & Clark (2001), it was found that suppression of all negative thoughts
resulted in a more positive mood. This was thought to be the result of
successful thought suppression (Beevers & Scott, 2001). However, this
successful suppression also came at a cognitive cost, in that the participants in
the suppression condition also showed fewer signs of causal reasoning and
discrepancy seeking.
Because of the discrepant results of the two studies, it is not possible
to draw any reliable conclusions about the effects of thought suppression on
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mood. It is therefore important to note the methodological differences
between these studies. The first major difference lies in the material that was
to be suppressed; where Purdon and Clark (2001) asked participants to first
identify a single thought and then suppress it, Beevers and Scott (2001)
instructed participants to suppress any negative thought. This is an important
difference, as recent research as provided evidence that the cognitive effort
required in order to suppress may differ with the material to be suppressed, in
that personally relevant negative material was found to be harder to suppress
than non-personal negative experiences or non-emotional memories (Klein &
Bratton, 2007). Suppressing any negative material, which includes non-
personal negative thoughts (Beevers & Scott, 2001) should therefore be
relatively easier and more successful than suppressing only a personally
relevant obsessive thought (Purdon & Clark, 2001). This may contribute to
explaining why the suppression of any negative though was deemed to have
been successful by Beevers and Scott (2001) while the suppression of a
personally relevant obsessive thought was not found to be successful by
Purdon and Clark (2001).
A second important methodological difference between the two
studies lies in the way in which the number of intrusions of the suppressed
material was assessed. In Purdon and Clark (2001), participants were asked to
report any occurrences of the target thought during the suppression or
thought monitoring conditions, but whether this was done verbally or in
writing or as part of a computer task is unclear. However, Beevers and Scott
(2001) used computer-based content analysis to examine the written text
which participants had produced during the stream-of-consciousness writing
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task (during which they were either suppressing or not suppressing any
negative thought). The number of negative emotion words in the text was
taken as an index of the number of intrusions. These differences make it
difficult to directly compare the two studies on the number of intrusions,
which could have been taken as an indication of how successful the
participants were suppressing.
However, irrespective of the methodological issues, a possible
explanation for the different results may be related to whether or not the
suppression was successful. In one study (Purdon & Clark, 2001), it was
found that suppression of an obsessive thought led to a decrease in mood, but
also resulted in more distress over intrusions of the suppressed material,
indicating that the participants may have felt that they have failed at the
suppression task. In the study where suppression of any negative thought
resulted in a more positive mood (Beevers & Scott, 2001), the indications are
that the suppression was successful, because participants in the suppression
condition used fewer negative emotion words than those who were not
suppressing.
In the previous study of this program of research (Chapter 4), the
suppression manipulation was deemed successful by virtue of the participants
reporting significantly different levels of efforts to suppress between the
conditions, which were consistent with the experimental instructions. That is,
participants in the suppression condition reported significantly higher levels
of thought suppression after watching the video than those who were
instructed to simply monitor their thoughts. Furthermore, the subsequent
differences which were observed in ABM retrieval patterns between the
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conditions are also indicative of a successful suppression manipulation.
However, there were no differences in the number of intrusive memories of
the suppressed material between any of the conditions. Though this was not
assessed, it is possible that as in Purdon and Clark (2001), those participants
who were instructed to suppress experienced greater levels of distress as a
result of intrusions of the material they were meant to suppress than those
who were not instructed to suppress and could freely think about the material
without a sense of failure.
In this present study, the effects of thought suppression on mood
were examined in a similar paradigm as was used in Chapter 4, in order to
evaluate the possibility that the enhanced negative ABM recall observed in the
previous study was a result of a mood-congruent recall effect. It was therefore
crucial to the present study that it replicated the same suppression
manipulation procedure as was used in the previous study (Chapter 4).
However, ABM recall was not re-assessed in the present study as there was
ambiguity as to whether or not the effects of the relatively short suppression
manipulation employed in Chapter 4 lasted long enough to affect all the
subsequent measures. In the previous study, ABM recall was the primary
dependent variable of interest, and hence this was assessed immediately after
the suppression manipulation. Variables which were assessed thereafter, such
as the memory for the video and the semantic fluency may not have yielded
significant results, possibly because these measures were taken when the
effects of the suppression manipulation had already worn off. In the present
study, the participants’ mood state is the primary dependent variable of
interest, and will therefore be measured immediately after the suppression
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manipulation. Because Purdon & Clark (2001) found that only suppression of
the obsessive thoughts (which might arguably be negative in nature) led to a
decrease in mood, as opposed to the suppression of positive and neutral
thoughts, the present study also included a positive suppression condition.
This was to function mainly as a control condition, to investigate whether the
act of engaging in suppression itself has an adverse effect on mood,
irrespective of the valence of the suppressed material. An alternative outcome
would be that suppression merely leads to a mood state that is consistent with
the suppressed material, i.e. that only suppression of negative material leads to
a more negative mood state, while suppression of positive material has no
effect or may even result in a more positive mood. Strong bonds between
suppressed thoughts and mood states have previously been demonstrated by
Wenzlaff, Wegner and Klein (1991), who found that a suppressed thought
becomes bonded to the mood state that was experienced during the
suppression task. Therefore, revisiting the mood state makes the previously
suppressed thought more accessible. Similarly, recalling the suppressed
thought re-instates the mood state experienced during the suppression
condition (Wenzlaff et al., 1991).
Due to the inconsistencies in the previous literature, two sets of
hypotheses are considered in the present study. These are that (a) thought
suppression of negative material only would result in a significantly more
negative mood as compared to the mood at baseline (consistent with Purdon
& Clark, 2001). This would indicate that the enhanced negative ABM recall in
Chapter 4 may have been the result of mood congruent recall. The second
possibility is that (b) thought suppression would lead to a more positive mood
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state (consistent with Beevers & Scott, 2001). If the latter is the case, an
alternative explanation for the results of Chapter 4 must be sought, for
instance an effect of cognitive load.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Design
This study employed a 2 (condition: suppression vs. no suppression) x
2 (valence of video: positive vs. negative) x 2 (time: baseline and post-
manipulation) mixed model design with time as the repeated measures factor.
The dependent variables were the mood ratings and were taken prior to as
well as following the suppression manipulation task. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of suppression (positive or
negative video) or no suppression (positive or negative video).
5.2.2 Participants
Participants were sixty-four (45 female and 19 male) undergraduate
students from the University of St. Andrews. Participation was voluntary and
occurred in return for a small financial fee. The mean age of all participants
was 20.48 years (s.d. = 3.44).
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5.2.3 Materials
5.2.3.1 Profile of Mood States (POMS) (McNair, Lorr & Droppelman,
1971)
See Section 2.3.3 for a description of this measure. The POMS was
used in the present study as it is sensitive to changes in mood states, and was
used to obtain an index of the mood state of participants baseline as well as
after the suppression manipulation.
5.2.3.2 Negative Video: “Grizzly Bear Attack” (from “Faces of Death”)
This 4 minute video clip was selected for its realistic and aversive
nature. See Section 2.6 for the content of this video, as well as a pilot study
which was conducted to assess the suitability of this video clip and its negative
content for the present study.
5.2.3.3 Positive Video: “Gone Nutty” (from “Ice Age”)
This 4 minute cartoon of a squirrel trying to gather acorn nuts was
selected as a positive counterpart to the negative video of the grizzly bear
attack. Section 2.6 describes the content of this video as well as a pilot study
which was conducted to assess the suitability of this video clip and its positive
content for the present study.
5.2.3.4 Suppression Questionnaire
This questionnaire consisted of a single question, asking participants
to retrospectively rate how much they tried to suppress any thoughts of the
video they had viewed during the suppression or thought monitoring task (see
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Section 4.2.3.7). The responses were rated on a 100 mm Visual Analogue
Scale (VAS) ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 100 (“very much”). This was used
to assess the effectiveness of the suppression manipulation, and to establish
that the experimental instructions to suppress any thought of the video were
adhered to in the suppression condition.
5.2.3.5 White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) (Wegner & Zanakos,
1994)
See Section 2.5 for a description of this measure. The WBSI was used
in the present study to get an index of the participants’ trait tendency to
engage in thought suppression as a means of coping with unwanted thoughts
and memories. This was done to rule out any differences in these
predispositions between the conditions at baseline, to ensure that any
subsequent effects of thought suppression on mood were a result of the
experimental manipulation and not due to any individual differences.
5.2.4 Procedure
Participants were tested individually and were fully informed of the
tasks prior to giving informed consent. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of the four experimental conditions (positive video – suppression,
positive video – no suppression, negative video – suppression, negative video
– no suppression), and then received identical questionnaire packs. The
experimental procedure began with a POMS questionnaire (baseline measure),
followed by the presentation of a positive or negative video clip (via DVD
and television). Instructions were then given for the five-minute thought
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monitoring period. In the no suppression (control) condition, participants
were instructed to: “think freely about anything they liked, but to press the mouse
button for each thought they have about the video”. In the suppression
condition participants were instructed to “try as hard as they can to NOT think
about the film they have just viewed, but to press the mouse button for each
thought they have about the video”. Participants then completed the
remainder of the questionnaire pack: the POMS questionnaire (post-
manipulation), suppression questionnaire and WBSI. At the end of the session
all participants were fully debriefed. (see Appendix 4 for participant
information (A.4.1), consent (A.4.2) and debriefing forms (A.4.3)).
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Participant Characteristics
The participants’ gender ratio, age and trait suppression are
summarised in table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Gender ratio, means (s.d.) for age and WBSI per suppression
condition
No Suppression Suppression
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Gender (f:m) 12:4 10:6 12:4 11:5
Age 19.88 (3.14) 20.50 (3.92) 20.81 (3.06) 20.75 (3.82)
WBSI total 50.31 (11.95) 47.75 (9.09) 52.56 (6.88) 51.69 (11.08)
WBSI effective 19.50 (5.18) 19.06 (4.95) 21.38 (3.28) 21.00 (5.18)
There was no significant difference in the gender ratio between the
four conditions (Fisher’s exact p > 0.9, two-tailed). A 2 (valence: positive vs.
negative) x 2 (condition: suppression vs. no suppression) between subjects
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ANOVA was calculated for age, and revealed that there were no significant
differences in the ages of the participants between the groups (F(1,60) < 1).
Two further 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (condition:
suppression vs. no suppression) between subjects ANOVAs were calculated
to assess the participants’ trait suppression, as measured by the WBSI scores
(F(1,60) < 1) as well as scores from “effective” WBSI items (F(1,60) < 1), both of
which yielded non-significant results. This suggests that there were no
differences in levels of trait suppression between the participants in the four
conditions, and therefore any effect of thought suppression on mood can be
attributed to the suppression manipulation, rather than the participants’
predispositions to suppress unwanted thoughts.
5.3.2 Effectiveness of the Suppression Manipulation
The means (and standard deviations) for levels of thought suppression
and number of intrusions reported by the participants (as measured by the
number of mouse button presses) during the thought monitoring task are
summarised in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Means (s.d.) for suppression (self-report) and reported intrusions
(i.e. button presses) per suppression condition
No Suppression Suppression
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Suppression 52.31 (29.29) 68.31 (23.04)
Suppression 59.00 (23.80) 45.63 (33.33) 67.81 (27.97) 68.81 (17.34)
Button Press 12.44 (6.23) 11.81 (8.40) 8.00 (6.64) 13.63 (9.29)
In order to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, a 2 (valence:
positive vs. negative) x 2 (condition: suppression vs. no suppression) between
subjects ANOVA was calculated for the self-reported levels of thought
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suppression. This analysis revealed a main effect of condition (F(1,60) = 5.91, p
< 0.05), but no significant main effect of valence (F(1,60) < 1) or interaction
(F(1,60) = 1.19, p = 0.28). A subsequent independent-samples t-test showed
that those participants who were instructed to suppress reported significantly
higher levels of thought suppression than those in the control condition (t(62)
= -2.43, p < 0.05), indicating that the experimental instructions were adhered
to.
A similar 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (condition: suppression
vs. no suppression) between subjects ANOVA was calculated to examine any
differences in the number of video-related intrusions reported during the
thought monitoring task, but revealed no main effects of valence (F(1,60) =
1.67, p = 0.20), condition (F(1,60) < 1), and no significant interaction (F(1,60) =
2.61, p = 0.11).
5.3.3 Effects of Thought Suppression on Mood
Exploratory analysis of the data using boxplots revealed three outlying
scores (greater than 1.5 inter-quartile ranges from the mean) for total mood
disturbance (TMD) scale of the POMS at baseline, such that these three
participants showed a comparatively higher mood disturbance at the
beginning of the experiment compared to the other participants. Because
there was doubt as to how effective any mood manipulation would be on
participants who were already in such a negative mood, the analysis was not
only conducted for the full data set (n = 64), but was repeated with the data
of these three outlying participants retrospectively removed from the data set
(n = 61). However, the patterns in the results remained the same, and only the
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results of the full data set will be presented hereafter. (For the complete data
analyses for the reduced data set see Appendix A.4.5).
The POMS scores for the four experimental conditions at baseline
and post-manipulation are summarised in table 5.3 below, and the scores for
total mood disturbance (TMD) are also displayed in figure 5.1 (as TMD
reflects the mood state across all 6 subscales).
Table 5.3: Means (s.d.) for TMD and each POMS subscale pre and post
manipulation per suppression condition
Baseline Post-Manipulation
No Suppression Suppression No Suppression Suppression
Video Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
(n) n = 16 n = 16 n = 16 n = 16 n = 16 n = 16 n = 16 n = 16
TMD 60.69
(23.40)
57.31
(26.32)
67.44
(40.90)
56.69
(29.51)
60.75
(25.49)
58.56
(20.27)
59.19
(36.26)
62.25
(31.84)
Tension 15.31
(5.49)
15.44
(5.25)
16.38
(6.50)
15.56
(5.99)
13.75
(4.14)
13.13
(2.96)
14.13
(5.78)
15.94
(6.96)
Depression 21.38
(5.81)
19.19
(6.35)
24.88
(14.25)
20.00
(9.19)
21.13
(8.28)
18.50
(5.25)
22.50
(12.94)
20.13
(8.91)
Anger 14.50
(2.99)
16.25
(5.86)
19.56
(9.10)
14.19
(2.97)
15.19
(4.58)
15.69
(4.69)
17.81
(8.53)
13.44
(2.78)
Vigour 22.00
(6.25)
21.63
(5.61)
24.38
(7.68)
23.19
(6.09)
19.31
(5.44)
17.94
(5.59)
23.63
(5.70)
19.81
(6.74)
Fatigue 16.06
(7.08)
14.25
(5.51)
14.38
(6.84)
16.06
(6.66)
15.38
(7.91)
14.88
(6.46)
12.63
(5.46)
16.44
(6.50)
Confusion 15.44
(4.27)
13.81
(2.23)
16.63
(4.24)
14.06
(4.52)
14.63
(3.48)
14.31
(3.00)
15.75
(4.49)
16.13
(5.71)
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Figure 5.1: Means (s.e.) for TMD pre and post manipulation per suppression
condition
Graph of Total Mood Disturbance (TMD)
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In order to investigate the effects of thought suppression on mood, a
series of 2 (time: baseline and post-manipulation) x 2 (condition: suppression
vs. no suppression) x 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) mixed model
ANOVAs were calculated for TMD as well as the 6 POMS subscales, with
time as the repeated measures factor. For TMD, no significant main effects of
time (F(1,60) < 1), valence (F(1,60) < 1) or suppression condition (F(1,60) < 1) were
found, and no significant interaction occurred for time x condition x valence
(F(1,60) = 2.68, p = 0.11). Thus, suppression of any material did not lead to
significant changes in mood.
Similar patterns emerged for each of the POMS subscales. Critically,
no significant 3-way interaction between time, condition, and valence were
found on any of the POMS subscales: tension (F(1,60) = 1.94, p = 0.18);
depression (F(1,60) = 1.77, p = 0.19); anger (F(1,60) = 2.48, p = 0.12); vigour
(F(1,60) < 1); fatigue (F(1,60) < 1); and confusion (F(1,60) = 1.08, p = 0.30) (for full
models please refer to Appendix A.4.4).
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5.3.4 Power Analyses
In order to further validate the non-significant findings obtained in
the three way interactions and to ensure that these results were not due to an
inadequate sample size an a priori power analysis was performed. The effect
size for the time x valence x condition interaction for TMD was relatively
small (effect size = 0.212) and based on this effect size a sample of 292
participants would be required to obtain a significant three way interaction at
p < 0.05.
However, the 64 participants in the pervious study (Chapter 4) only
viewed the negative and not the positive video clip, and therefore the power
analysis was repeated for those 32 participants in the present study who
viewed the negative video. The size of this effect was 0.173 and the a priori
power analyses revealed that a sample of 437 participants would be needed to
observe a significant change in TMD (at p < 0.05) as a result of the time x
condition interaction. It therefore remains unlikely that the effects of thought
suppression on ABM recall observed in Chapter 4 occurred as a result of
changes in mood.
5.4 Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the
enhanced recall of negative ABMs following thought suppression
manipulation in Chapter 4 may have been a result of mood congruent recall.
In order to achieve this, a similar participant sample was subjected to a similar
suppression manipulation paradigm. However, the present results revealed no
significant effect of thought suppression on mood. This non-significant
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finding is inconsistent with previous research. Though contradictory in
themselves, with one study reporting that thought suppression resulted in a
more negative (Purdon & Clark, 2001) and another in more positive
subsequent mood state (Beevers & Scott, 2001), both prior studies have
yielded a significant effect of thought suppression on mood.
All three studies employed different methodologies, and one key
difference between these studies lies in the nature of the material that was
suppressed. As was demonstrated in a recent study by Klein and Bratton
(2007), the cost of suppressing different types of thoughts may vary.
Therefore, it is possible that the difficulty of suppression task was easiest
when any negative thought was to be suppressed (as by Beevers & Scott,
2001), moderate in the present study where a non-personal negative event was
suppressed, and hardest when a personally relevant obsessive, and arguably
negative thought was suppressed (Purdon & Clark, 2001), which is consistent
with the results by Klein and Bratton (2007). It is possible that suppression
was most successful when suppressing the easier material (any negative
thought) and most likely to fail and result in a paradoxical effect when
suppressing personally relevant material, which should be the hardest to
suppress. Furthermore, it is likely that the distress associated with
experiencing intrusions of the suppressed material also varies according to the
nature of the material. Accordingly, it is likely that there is more distress
associated with intrusions of personally-relevant negative material than of
non-personal negative material (such as the grizzly bear video). Therefore,
whether or not effects of suppression on mood are observed may depend in
the first instance on how successful the suppression was, and therefore the
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number of intrusions experienced. Beevers and Scott (2001) found that
suppression of any negative material (which may have been a relatively easy
task) was successful in that it resulted in fewer negative intrusions, and an
increase in mood as compared to controls. More important, however, may be
the amount of distress associated with the experience of intrusions. It follows
that the more distress is associated with the experience of intrusions of the
suppressed material, the more likely it is that the suppression will result in a
more negative mood. Purdon and Clark (2001) found that although
suppression of a personal obsessive thought (which may have been a relatively
difficult task) did not result in more intrusions, but nevertheless the intrusions
were perceived as more distressing intrusions. Moreover, participants who
experienced more intrusions of the obsessive thought also reported a more
negative mood state. In the present study, a non-personal negative event was
suppressed. This may mean that intrusions of the suppressed material (which
also did not differ between the groups) may not have been as distressing as
intrusions of personally-relevant negative thoughts and memories, which
would explain why the suppression of the negative material in the present
study did not result in a more negative mood state. Future suppression
manipulation studies should therefore assess not only the number of
intrusions, but also the amount of distress associated with having intrusions
of the suppressed material. Furthermore, future studies aiming to investigate
the effects of thought suppression on mood should focus on the suppression
of personally relevant information, as this is arguably more ecologically valid.
A second finding of the present study was that the valence of the
suppressed material also had no significant effect on subsequent mood states.
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The trend in the means indicate that suppression of positive material resulted
in a slight increase in mood, whereas suppression of negative material led to a
slight decrease in mood (as captured by the TMD), but these effects were
small and not approaching significance. While the videos have been rated as
significantly different in valence, and also as sufficiently positive and negative
(as opposed to neutral) (See Section 2.6), it does not appear that the videos
were powerful enough to induce a certain mood state. The number of
intrusions of video-related thoughts and memories reported by participants
were similar across all conditions, meaning that those participants who were
shown the negative video experienced a similar number of intrusions of that
material as those who watched the positive video. If the valence of the
intrusion itself had been a factor, then the positive video could have resulted
in a more positive mood than watching the negative video. However, this was
not found to be the case.
Due to the substantial differences in the methodologies employed by
previous research (Prudon & Clark, 2001; Beevers & Scott, 2001) as well as
the present study, no valid conclusions regarding the general effect of thought
suppression on mood can be drawn. The existing research, including the
present study, only allow for conclusions about the effects of thought
suppression on mood as a result of the specific experimental paradigms used,
and not about what effect thought suppression may have on mood outside of
the laboratory.
Nevertheless, it was the purpose of this study to investigate the
precise effects of thought suppression on mood within the suppression
manipulation paradigm used in Chapter 4. By failing to demonstrate a
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significant effect of this suppression manipulation on mood, the present
results suggest that the possibility that the negative facilitation effect of ABM
retrieval observed in Chapter 4 could have been a result of mood congruent
recall should be ruled out.
To provide further evidence for this conclusion, an a-priori power
analysis was conducted and revealed that a substantially larger sample size (n
= 437) than was used in Chapter 4 (n = 64) would have been required to
observe significant effects of thought suppression on mood in the present
thought suppression manipulation paradigm. Based on the present results it
can be speculated that if there were any mood changes in the participants
following the manipulation then these would have been random differences
and not responsible for the subsequent negative facilitation effect in ABM
retrieval. It is therefore highly unlikely that the ABM recall patterns observed
as a result of the suppression manipulation in Chapter 4 were an indirect
result of mood congruent recall.
The present study was carefully designed to exactly replicate the
suppression paradigm used in Chapter 4, and therefore shares similar
methodological limitations. There were no differences in the number of video
related intrusions across the conditions (as measured by the number of button
presses), which is consistent with the results of Chapter 4, where there was a
similar lack of significant differences. This is most likely a consequence of this
paradigm resulting in a paradoxical rebound effect of thought suppression
and these effects are likely to occur after, and not during the suppression task
(see Section 4.4).
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The results of the present study have demonstrated that mood
congruent recall is an unlikely mechanism to explain the enhanced negative
ABM recall observed in Chapter 4. Therefore, future research should focus
on investigating other potential reasons for this effect, such as cognitive load,
which will be further considered in the discussion of this program of research
(Section 7.5).
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C h a p t e r 6
STUDY 4: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THOUGHT SUPPRESSION
AND ABM RECALL IN SELF-HARMING ADOLESCENTS
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the importance of
thought suppression in the retrieval of ABMs in a sample of self-harming
adolescents with high levels of trauma. Firstly, the differences in the ABM
retrieval patterns between the sample of self-harming adolescents versus a
matched control group are compared. Furthermore, the role of thought
suppression in explaining the ABM retrieval pattern, particularly in terms of
negative episodic ABM retrieval and personal semantic memory retrieval is
investigated.
So far, the theoretical emphasis of this program of research has been
on the importance of thought suppression in explaining ABM retrieval
patterns, with particular emphasis on the ABM retrieval patterns associated
with post-traumatic stress reactions. However, this was only investigated in
nonclinical student samples. The present study, therefore, aims to investigate
the relationship between thought suppression and ABM retrieval patterns in a
clinical sample of self-harming adolescents. This particular sample was
targeted as, based on the previous literature (Section 1.4), the facilitated
retrieval of negative episodic ABMs was generally found in self-harming
individuals or those with post-traumatic stress responses, and may therefore
be particularly likely to be observed in the present clinical sample. Multiple
regression analysis will be used to investigate the degree to which thought
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suppression explains variability in negative episodic ABM retrieval and
personal semantic memory retrieval while simultaneously accounting for
variability due to symptoms of depression and PTSD. The key prediction here
is that thought suppression will remain an important predictor of both the
faster latency to retrieve negative episodic ABMs and reduced personal
semantic memory retrieval above and beyond the variability that is explained
by symptoms of PTSD and depression.
Along with trauma, deliberate self-harm is theoretically important
condition in which the role of thought suppression in the retrieval of ABMs
should be examined. As with trauma, thought suppression is also an
important coping mechanism for individuals who self-harm. Repeated,
deliberate self-harm has been proposed to constitute an avoidant coping
strategy by itself, whereby deliberate self harm is thought to reduce unwanted
emotional arousal (Chapman, Gratz & Brown, 2006). Empirical evidence of
the importance of thought suppression in self harm comes from a sample of
female inmates with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). In this group,
thought suppression was significantly and positively correlated with levels of
deliberate self-harm (Chapman, Specht & Cellucci, 2005).
It must be noted that post-traumatic stress and self-harm are often
comorbid conditions. Childhood trauma is a long-established vulnerability
factor for deliberate self-harm (Low, Jones, MacLeod, Power & Duggan,
2000; van der Kolk, Perry & Herman, 1991; Wiederman, Sansone & Sansone,
1999). It can therefore be speculated that levels of trauma are likely to be high
in a group of self-harmers.
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As with depression and trauma, overgeneral ABM retrieval is also a
well documented ABM retrieval pattern seen in parasuicidal individuals and
self-harmers (Evans, Williams, O’Loughlin & Howells, 1992; Pollock &
Williams, 2001; Sidley, Whitaker, Calam & Wells, 1997; Sinclair, Crane,
Hawton & Williams, 2007; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams, Ellis,
Tyers, Healy, Rose & MacLeod, 1996). However, similar to trauma, there are
indications in the literature that in some cases, negative ABMs are actually
relatively easier to retrieve by self-harmers than controls (Williams &
Dritschel, 1988; Swales, Wood & Williams, 2001). Investigating the role of
thought suppression in the retrieval of ABMs is therefore particularly
intriguing in the present sample of self-harming adolescents, as the negative
facilitation effect of episodic memory retrieval may be particularly prevalent in
this sample. As with Chapter 3, the predictions for episodic autobiographical
memory retrieval in the present study must remain twofold. The most
consistent finding in the literature is that of overgeneral ABM retrieval, both
in self-harmers as well as in PTSD (Section 1.4). Therefore, it is possible that
the self-harmers will retrieve significantly fewer specific memories as first
responses to all cue words. The other possibility is that of a negative
facilitation effect, especially if levels of thought suppression are high in the
self-harmers. If this is the case, it is possible that the self-harmers will retrieve
specific negative episodic ABMs significantly faster than the control group.
Personal semantic memory has, to date, not been investigated in a
self-harm sample. However, because the ability to retrieve personal semantic
information appears to be reduced in individuals with a history of trauma
(Section 1.4), it is likely that if levels of trauma are high in the group of self-
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harmers, personal semantic memory retrieval will also be affected in the self-
harmers. The present study will explore the personal semantic memory
retrieval patterns in self-harming adolescents, while controlling for the role of
trauma.
The reason for choosing an adolescent sample in the present study is
that adolescence is an important time for the development of a self-concept
(Habermas & Bluck, 2000). An enhanced tendency to retrieve specific
negative episodic memories during adolescence may be particularly damaging
to the self-concept when it is still developing so intensively. Examining
whether the previously observed negative facilitation effect of episodic ABMs
is already present in this adolescent sample and whether this is associated with
thought suppression is therefore of particular clinical relevance in an
adolescent sample. A second motivation for using an adolescent sample in the
present study arises from the results of a study conducted by Swales et al.
(2001), where the authors investigated ABM retrieval in a sample of mood-
disturbed adolescents. The results showed a positive correlation between
hopelessness and specific ABM retrieval, which was a result of the increased
specific negative memory retrieval of the self-harming adolescents. However,
in retrospect the authors noted that this was a result of a number of the self-
harming adolescents recalling the same traumatic memory repeatedly to
different negative cue words. The present study will therefore also examine
the number of specific episodic memories that are recalled repeatedly, to
ensure that any differences between the self-harmers and control group are
not a result of repeated retrieval of the same ABM.
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In summary, the hypotheses for the present study are as follows:
firstly, it is predicted that the self-harmers will have significantly higher levels
of post-traumatic stress symptoms than the control group. Secondly it is
predicted that the self-harmers will report significantly higher levels of
thought suppression than the control group. In terms of ABM retrieval, the
hypothesis remains two tailed. Based on the previous literature it is possible
that the self-harmers will exhibit greater difficulty than the control
participants in the retrieval of specific ABMs. If this is the case, it is predicted
that the self harmers will produce fewer specific first responses to all cue
words than controls. However, in terms of the response latency to negative
cue words, it is also predicted that the self-harmers may be faster than the
control participants in their responses, especially if levels of post-traumatic
stress symptoms and thought suppression are high. Furthermore, it is
predicted that the self-harmers will retrieve significantly fewer personal
semantic memories than the control group. Finally, it is predicted that thought
suppression will remain a significant predictor of variability in both negative
episodic ABM retrieval latencies as well as personal semantic memory
retrieval in the self-harming participants, even when symptoms of post-
traumatic stress and depression have been accounted for.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Design
This study employed a between subjects design in which levels of
thought suppression and ABM retrieval of a group of adolescent who self
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harm were compared to those of a matched group of controls. Participants
were matched for age, gender, and verbal fluency.
6.2.2 Participants
Participants were 20 self-harming adolescents (mean age = 15.30, s.d.
= 1.42) and 20 matched controls (mean age = 15.20, s.d. = 1.51). There was
an equal number of females (n = 16) and males (n = 4) in each group. The
self harmers were recruited on the basis of having disclosed at least 3 separate
acts of deliberate self harm and no obvious history of drug abuse to their
therapist. The therapist also conducted a clinical interview, the Suicide
Ideation Interview (K-SADS-PL) with the clinical group to obtain a profile of
the self-harming behaviours of these participants. The control participants
were subsequently recruited to match the self-harmers for age, gender, and
verbal fluency.
6.2.3 Materials
6.2.3.1 British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-II) (Dunn, Dunn,
Whetton & Pintilie, 1982)
The BPVS is a measure of verbal fluency where the participant is
given a spoken word which then has to be matched to the correct one of four
pictures, with the three other pictures acting as distractors. The BPVS was
used in the present study to match the self-harmers and the control
participants for verbal fluency. This matching was deemed to be especially
important because the dependent measures of ABM retrieval were presented
in a verbal interview, and therefore any differences in verbal fluency between
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the two groups had to be ruled out. The BPVS has been found to be a reliable
and valid measure of verbal fluency in British children and adolescents (Dunn
et al., 1982).
6.2.3.2 Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) (Williams & Broadbent,
1986)
See Section 2.2.1 for a general description of the AMT. The AMT was
used in the present study to assess both positive and negative episodic ABM
retrieval. For this study, the cue words that were used were: bored, lucky,
hurt, proud, upset, relieved, guilty, interested, lonely and safe. The cue words
were specifically selected to be different and of lower frequency than those
used in the first study in order to avoid the ceiling effect of specific responses
to all cue words. No differences were found between the positive and
negative cue words in terms of imageability, concreteness, and how readily
raters felt that they may elicit a specific memory (see Section 2.2.1 and
Appendix A.1.1). Inter-rater reliability regarding the nature of the memories
recalled (i.e. specific or overgeneral) was conducted for 20% of the memories
recalled by the participants and was found to be high (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.93).
6.2.3.3 Children’s Autobiographical Memory Interview (CAMI) (Bekerian
et al., 2001)
See Section 2.2.2 for a description of this measure. The CAMI was
used in the present study to assess personal semantic memory retrieval. The
CAMI was used as opposed to the S-AMI used in Chapters 3 and 4 because
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this is the equivalent measure that is appropriate for use with the adolescent
participants in the present study.
6.2.3.4 Suicidal Ideation Interview (from K-SADS-PL) (Kaufman,
Birmaher, Brent, Rao & Ryan, 1996)
The Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for school-
aged children (K-SADS-PL) assesses both lifetime and current psychiatric
diagnoses. It is a semi-structured interview that needs to be administered by a
trained clinician. The Suicide Ideation Interview of the K-SADS-PL (see
Appendix A.5.7) contains 5 items inquiring about recurrent thoughts of death,
suicidal ideation, seriousness of suicidal acts, medical lethality of suicidal acts,
as well as non-suicidal self damaging acts. It does not assess symptom
severity, but rather symptoms are rated as not present, subthreshold, or
threshold (present). The Suicidal Ideations Interview was used in the present
study to obtain an index of the self harming and suicidal behaviour of the self-
harming participants only. Initial reliability data for the K-SADS-PL suggests
that the measure generates reliable and valid diagnoses (Kaufman, Birmaher,
Brent, Rao, Flynn, Moreci, Williamson & Ryan, 1997).
6.2.3.5 When Bad Things Happen Scale (Fletcher, 1996)
See Section 2.4.2 for a description of this measure. The When Bad
Things Happen Scale was used in the present study to assess the participants’
intrusions, avoidance, and hyperarousal experienced as a result of their most
traumatic experience. The most traumatic experience was identified by each
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participant on the trauma questionnaire (see Appendix A.1.4) prior to
completing this measure.
6.2.3.6 Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI) (Kovacs & Beck, 1977)
See Section 2.3.2 for a full description of this measure. The CDI was
used in the present study to assess symptoms of depression in the
participants.
6.2.3.7 White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1996)
See Section 2.5 for a description of this questionnaire. The WBSI was
used in the present study to assess the participants’ trait thought suppression.
6.2.4 Procedure
All participants were tested individually. The data from all the self-
harmers was collected first, so that the control participants could be matched
to the clinical group for age, gender, and verbal fluency. The self-harmers
were recruited from the local Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services.
Potential participants that fulfilled the criteria of having committed at least 3
separate acts of self-harm were identified by their therapist and were given the
information sheets for the present study. After informed consent was
obtained from the participants (and their parents/guardians if the participant
was under 16 years of age), the participants were invited individually for a
testing session. The researcher started by giving the AMT, CAMI, and the
BPVS. Following this the participant’s therapist completed the Suicidal
Ideations Interview (K-SADS-PL) with the participant. The participant was
then given a questionnaire booklet containing the above questionnaires in the
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following order: Trauma Questionnaire and WBTHS, CDI, and WBSI.
Following this, the participants were fully debriefed and received a small
financial compensation for their participation.
After all the clinical data was collected, control participants were
recruited from a local school. Participants were approached on the basis of
being of the same age and gender as the self-harming participants. Participants
were given information sheets, and after informed consent was obtained from
them (and their parents/guardians if applicable), they were invited for a
formal testing session at their school. Control participants were first given the
BPVS, to determine whether they matched a clinical participant on verbal
fluency. The BPVS score was calculated and it was determined whether the
participant was a suitable match for a clinical participant. Testing only
continued if this was the case, otherwise the participant was thanked and fully
debriefed. Suitable participants were then given the AMT and CAMI,
followed by the questionnaires given in the same order as to the clinical
participants. The only exception was that the control participants were not
given the Suicidal Ideation Interview (K-SADS-PL), as this interview needs to
be administered by a clinician, and it was not deemed ethical to ask
participants in their schools about possible self-harming behaviour. Instead,
the suicide ideation item from the CDI was used as an index of suicidal
ideation in the control participants, and if they indicated any level of suicidal
ideation their data was excluded from the study. Following the testing, the
participants were debriefed. For participant information, parent information
and consent forms for both clinical and control participants see Appendices
A.5.1 – A.5.6.
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6.3 Results
Of the 20 clinical participants, one participant did not complete the
set of questionnaires. This participant’s data from the memory interviews
(AMT and CAMI) and Suicidal Ideation Interview (K-SADS-PL) is
nevertheless included in the present study. Another self-harmer only gave
temporal responses to the cue words on the AMT, despite numerous attempts
of prompting him to do otherwise. To all cue words this participant only gave
responses such as “I felt happy last night” or “I was angry on Monday”,
without giving any information about an event. The AMT data from this
participant was therefore discarded from the data set. However, the data from
the CAMI, the Suicidal Ideations Interview and the questionnaires from this
participant have been kept in the data set.
6.3.1 Participant Characteristics
The clinical and control participants were matched for gender, age and
verbal fluency, and the descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in
table 6.1 below. There were no differences in the gender ratio of the
participants, and there was also no significant difference in the age (t(38) = -
0.10, p > 0.9) between the two groups. While the self-harmers had a slightly
lower verbal fluency than the control group, this difference was not significant
(t(38) = 1.31, p > 0.2) .
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Table 6.1 Gender ratio, means (s.d.) for age, BPVS, WBTHS, CDI and WBSI
per participant group
Groups
Self-Harmers
(n = 19)
Control
(n = 20) t
Gender (m:f) 4:16 4:16 -
Age (months) 189.50 (16.57) 188.95 (18.94) - 0.098
Verbal Fluency (BPVS) 125.05 (17.21) 131.40 (13.33) 1.305
Trauma Symptoms (WBTHS) 62.79 (10.99) 32.45 (16.26) - 6.791**
Depression (CDI) 22.58 (9.36) 6.85 (4.51) - 6.740**
WBSI 59.58 (7.44) 49.65 (10.09) - 3.481**
WBSI – Effective 23.89 (2.90) 19.65 (4.82) - 3.312**
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
Furthermore, table 6.1 also summarises the participants self-reported
post-traumatic stress symptoms, depression, as well as levels of trait
suppression. As expected, the self-harmers reported significantly higher levels
of post-traumatic stress symptoms (t(37) = -6.79, p < 0.001) and symptoms of
depression (t(37) = - 6.74, p < 0.001) than the control group. Consistent with
the hypothesis, the self-harmers were also significantly higher trait
suppressors than the control participants, as measured by both the total scale
of the WBSI (t(37) = - 3.41, p < 0.001), as well as the “effective” items of the
WBSI (t(37) = -3.29, p < 0.01).
6.3.2 Self-Harming Behaviour and Suicide Ideation
The Suicide Ideations Interview was only administered to the self-
harmers. The responses are summarised in table 6.2 below.
Table 6.2 Number (frequency) of responses to the Suicide Ideations
Interview (self-harmers only, n = 20)
Not Present Subthreshold Threshold
Recurrent thoughts of death 0 (0%) 17 (85%) 3 (15%)
Suicidal ideation 1 (5%) 13 (65%) 6 (30%)
Suicidal acts – seriousness 4 (20%) 13 (65%) 3 (15%)
Suicidal acts – medical lethality 5 (25%) 13 (65%) 2 (10%)
Non-suicidal physical self-damaging acts 0 (0%) 4 (65%) 16 (80%)
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As indicated in the table above, the clinical participants were mostly
serious and repeated self-harmers, but only a small minority had inflicted
serious or even lethal damage on themselves. Serious suicide ideators were
also in the minority.
The control participants were not given the Suicidal Ideation
Interview (K-SADS-PL) as no clinician was involved in the testing of the
control participants. The suicide ideation item on the Children’s Depression
Inventory (CDI) was flagged as an index of suicidal ideation in the control
participants. If a participant indicated any level of suicidal thoughts or
ideation their data was discarded and a new participant was recruited of the
same age and gender. This was only the case for one control participant.
Therefore, in the present sample all control participants indicated no suicide
ideation on the CDI. On this item of the CDI, 8 of the self-harmers indicated
no suicide ideation (“I do not think about killing myself”), 9 indicated suicidal
thoughts (“I think about killing myself”), and 2 indicated suicide ideation (“I
want to kill myself”).
6.3.3 Traumatic Experiences
The participants completed the Trauma Questionnaire to give an
indication of which traumatic events they have experienced, as well as which
events they considered to be their most traumatic event. Following this, the
participants completed the WBTHS in reference to their most traumatic
experience. The self-harmers reported significantly more post-traumatic stress
symptoms than the control group (Section 6.3.1), and the traumatic events
which the participants reported are listed in table 6.3 below.
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Table 6.3: Number (frequency) of traumatic events and most traumatic
experiences per participant group
Self-Harmers (n = 19) Controls (n = 20)
Type of Traumatic Event Occurred Most Occurred Most
Accident 9 (47%) 2 (11%) 7 (35%) 2 (10%)
Serious Medical Condition/Injury 5 (26%) 0 (0%) 4 (20%) 1 (5%)
Medical Treatment/Procedure 6 (32%) 0 (0%) 7 (35%) 0 (0%)
Sexual Abuse 7 (37%) 6 (32%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Physical Abuse 11 (58%) 4 (21%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Divorce of Parents 6 (32%) 3 (16%) 5 (25%) 3 (15%)
Death of a loved one 18 (95%) 4 (21%) 15 (75%) 4 (20%)
Illness of a loved one 12 (63%) 0 (0% 13 (65%) 2 (10%)
Other (e.g. witnessing violence, bad experiences
with drugs, relationship break-ups, being bullied)
4 (21%) 0 (0%) 14 (70%) 8 (40%)
The most common most traumatic event for the self-harmers was
sexual abuse. In fact, a history of both physical and sexual abuse was high
among the self harmers. In contrast, not one of the control participants
reported any history of physical or sexual abuse. For the control participants
the most common most traumatic event was being bullied, which was coded
as “other” on the questionnaire.
6.3.4 ABM Recall
The results of the measures of ABM retrieval for the two groups are
presented in table 6.4 below.
Table 6.4: Means (s.d.) of the ABM measures per participant group
Self-Harmers
(n = 19 (AMT))
(n = 20 (CAMI))
Controls
(n = 20)
Episodic Latency:
AMT – total 130.95 (68.28) 142.55 (57.97)
AMT – positive 76.10 (44.28) 63.65 (31.20)
AMT – negative 54.85 (38.64) 78.40 (34.21)
Specific Episodic first response:
AMT – total 8.45 (1.32) 8.90 (0.91)
AMT – positive 4.30 (0.80) 4.60 (0.50)
AMT – negative 4.15 (0.88) 4.30 (0.66)
CAMI:
CAMI episodic total 31.45 (6.30) 35.30 (4.88)
CAMI personal semantic total 57.38 (7.62) 62.48 (3.46)
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In order to investigate any differences between the two groups in the
latencies to retrieve a specific memory to different cue words, a 2 (group: self-
harm vs. control) x 2 (cue valence: positive and negative cue words) mixed
model ANOVA was calculated for the recall latencies, with cue valence as the
repeated measures factor. This analysis did not yield a significant main effect
of group (F(1,37) < 1) or cue word valence (F(1,37) < 1) for recall latencies to
produce a specific memory. However, the interaction for group x cue valence
was found to be significant, F(1,37) = 6.13, p < 0.05.
To further investigate this significant interaction, two separate follow-
up independent sample t-tests were conducted, comparing the two groups
separately for each cue word valence. This analysis revealed that there were no
significant differences between the two groups in the latencies to retrieve a
specific memory in response to the positive cue words (t(37) = 1.03, p > 0.3).
However, in response to negative cue words only, the self-harmers were
significantly faster than the controls to produce a specific episodic ABM, t(37)
= -2.04, p < 0.05. The recall latencies for both positive and negative cue
words of both groups are depicted in figure 6.1 below.
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Figure 6.1: Means (s.e.) of recall latencies to cue words on the AMT per
participant group
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In terms of the number of specific first responses, the self-harmers
overall gave fewer first specific responses to all cue words; however, these
differences were not significant. There were no significant main effects of
group (F(1,37) = 1.58, p > 0.2) or cue word valence (F(1,37) =2.50, p > 0.1), and
no significant group x cue valence interaction (F(1,37) < 1) for the number of
specific first responses. The effect size for the main effect of the different
number of specific ABMs retrieved as first responses was found to be small
(eta2 = 0.04). A follow up a-priori power analysis revealed that a sample of 61
participants would be needed for a significant difference (at p > 0.05) in the
overall number of specific first responses to cue words on the AMT between
the self-harmers and control participants.
Finally, on the Children’s Autobiographical Memory Interview
(CAMI), the self-harmers produced significantly fewer personal semantic, t(38)
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= -2.73, p < 0.01, and episodic memories, t(38) = -2.37, p < 0.05, than the
control group.
6.3.5 Multiple Regression Analysis
The final prediction was that even when symptoms of post-traumatic
stress and depression were accounted for, thought suppression would remain
an important predictor of both the latency to retrieve a negative memory and
the number of personal semantic memories recalled across the whole sample.
The suicide ideation and self-harming behaviours could not be considered in
this analysis, as the Suicide Ideations Interview (K-SADS-PL) was only given
to the self-harmers. Therefore, only symptoms of depression (CDI), post-
traumatic stress (WBTHS) and thought suppression (“effective” WBSI items)
were used as predictor variables. The linear correlations between these
independent variables are summarised in table 6.4 below.
Table 6.5: Linear correlations for the independent variables: CDI, WBTHS
and WBSI-E
Correlations
WBTHS CDI WBSI - E
WBTHS ---
CDI .770** ---
WBSI – E .647** .453** ---
** p < 0.01
The three variables were all positively and significantly correlated with
one another, which needs to be considered in the subsequent multiple
regression models.
The latency to retrieve a specific negative memory was significantly
predicted individually by post-traumatic stress symptoms (WBTHS), r = -.442,
p < 0.05, symptoms of depression (CDI), r = -.374, p < 0.05 as well as trait
thought suppression (WBSI effective), r = -.459, p < 0.01. However, when all
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three are considered together in a multiple regression analysis, even when
symptoms of depression and post-traumatic stress were taken into account,
thought suppression remained an important predictor of variability in the
latency to retrieve a specific negative episodic memory (table 6.6).
Table 6.6: Multiple regression model for latency to retrieve specific negative
episodic memory (model r = .495, p < 0.05)
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error β t p
(CONSTANT) 130.303 26.757 4.870 0.000
WBTHS - 0.444 0.468 - 0.253 - 0.949 0.349
CDI - 0.249 0.778 - 0.074 - 0.320 0.751
WBSI-E - 1.893 1.531 - 0.235 - 1.237 0.224
None of the independent variables were significant in the model when
the other two had been accounted for, which is a result of the high
correlations between the predictor variables (see table 6.5). Nevertheless, trait
thought suppression explained most of the variability in the latency to retrieve
negative episodic memories even when levels of depression and post-
traumatic stress were accounted for. A subsequent stepwise regression
analysis reduced the predictor variable to only thought suppression (WBSI-E)
as the best and most significant predictor of negative latency (r = -0.459, p <
0.01). Because the independent variables were significantly correlated with
each other (table 6.5), the possibility of mediation was considered.
Mediational analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986), using regression analysis did not
reveal any significant mediational models. However, the mediational model
that thought suppression (WBSI-E) mediates the relationship between
depression (CDI) and latency to retrieve negative memories was approaching
significance. That is, depression significantly predicted latency to retrieve a
specific memory (r = .374, p < 0.01) and depression was significantly
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correlated with suppression (r = .770, p < 0.01). After controlling for
depression, the relationship between thought suppression and latency to
retrieve a negative memory was approaching significance (p = 0.054), while
the relationship between depression and latency to retrieve a negative memory
was no longer significant after controlling for thought suppression (p = 0.17).
Like the latency to retrieve specific memories, personal semantic
memory retrieval was also individually significantly predicted by levels of trait
thought suppression (WBSI effective), r = -.352, p < 0.05, but not by post-
traumatic stress symptoms (WBTHS), r = -.214, p > 0.1 or depression (CDI),
r = -.089, p > 0.5 (see table 6.7).
Table 6.7: Multiple regression model for personal semantic memory retrieval
(model r = .374, p < 0.05)
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error β t p
(CONSTANT) 69.487 4.127 16.836 0.000
WBTHS -0.028 0.072 -0.112 -0.392 0.698
CDI 0.074 0.120 0.152 0.614 0.543
WBSI-E -0.400 0.236 -0.346 -1.696 0.099
Once again, thought suppression remained the best predictor of
variability in personal semantic memory retrieval even when levels of post-
traumatic stress and symptoms of depression had been accounted for. This
was confirmed by the subsequent stepwise regression analysis, which revealed
that thought suppression alone was the best predictor of personal semantic
memory retrieval (r = - 0.325, p < 0.05). As before, mediational analysis was
considered because the independent variables were significantly inter-
correlated (table 6.5). However, no mediational model was found to be
significant.
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A similar analysis was conducted for the other dimensions of ABM
retrieval, but this did not reveal any consistent or noticeable pattern. The
complete regression models and results of the stepwise regression analysis for
all latency variables, specific responses and episodic and personal semantic
memories on the CAMI are summarised in Appendix A.5.8.
6.3.6 Nature of the Specific ABM Recall
Consistent with the analysis of Chapter 4, a number of different
characterising features regarding the nature of the specific responses on the
AMT were also examined in the present study to investigate if there were any
significant differences between the self-harmers and control participants.
Accordingly, the number of times a memory was recalled repeatedly in
response to different cue words, as well as the number of recent memories
was recorded. Memories that were of an event which occurred less than a
week ago were counted as recent memories. Furthermore, the number of
specific memories that were recalled in less than two seconds was also
recorded as a preliminary index of memories that were recalled as a result of
direct retrieval. The descriptive statistics for the number of repeated
memories, recent memories, and direct recalls are summarised in table 6.7
below.
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Table 6.8: Means (s.d.) for number of repeated memories, recent memories
and direct recalls per participant group
Self-Harmers
(n = 19)
Controls
(n = 20)
Repeated Memories
Positive 0.11 (0.32) 0.05 (0.22)
Negative 0.26 (0.56) 0.10 (0.31)
Recent Memories ( < 1 week ago)
Positive 0.84 (1.01) 1.30 (1.26)
Negative 1.00 (1.20) 1.10 (0.85)
Direct Retrieval ( < 2 seconds)
Positive 0.53 (0.61) 0.40 (0.59)
Negative 0.47 (0.70) 0.60 (0.68)
Nonparametric analysis using the Mann-Whitney U test revealed that
there were no significant differences between the self-harmers and controls
for the number of repeated memories, recent memories, and specific
memories that were retrieved in less than two seconds (all p > 0.5).
Furthermore, the Wilcoxon test revealed that there were no differences for
the self harmers between positive and negative memories for any of these
aspects of specific memories, nor for the control participants (all p > 0.5).
6.4 Discussion
The overall aim of the present study was to examine the relationship
between thought suppression and ABM retrieval patterns in a clinical group
of participants where levels of thought suppression would be particularly
high. Furthermore, the present study aimed to target a sample of participants
which were most likely to exhibit facilitated retrieval of negative episodic
memories. Therefore, a group of repeated self-harming adolescents were
compared to a control group of adolescents who were successfully matched
for age, gender and verbal fluency. In this sample of self-harming adolescents,
it was deemed likely that levels of post-traumatic stress responses would also
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be high. It was further speculated that thought suppression would be
particularly high in this sample of self-harming adolescents with high levels of
trauma, and that these participants would be a likely sample for showing
enhanced negative episodic ABM retrieval. Together, these factors made this
sample particularly suitable for examining the relationship between thought
suppression and ABM retrieval.
Consistent with the hypothesis, the results showed that the self-
harmers reported significantly more post-traumatic stress symptoms than the
control participants. Furthermore, the self-harmers reported high levels of
both physical and sexual abuse, which were not reported by a single control
participant.
The self-harmers also reported significantly higher levels of trait
thought suppression than the control participants. This finding indicated that
consistent with predictions, thought suppression is an important coping
mechanism for self-harmers. Furthermore these findings are consistent with
previous research which has demonstrated that thought suppression is related
to self-harming behaviours (Chapman, Specht & Cellucci, 2005).
The findings relating to ABM retrieval in the present study are
particularly intriguing. The self-harmers were significantly faster than the
control participants in their recall of negative, but not positive specific
episodic ABMs. Contrary to Swales et al. (2004), this enhanced negative ABM
retrieval was not found to be due to repeated retrieval of the same negative
episodic ABM to different cue words on the AMT, as there were no
significant differences in the number of repeated memories between the
groups. In terms of the number of specific memories that were recalled in
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response to all cue words of the AMT, the differences between the two
groups were not significant. However, the trend in the data was that the self-
harmers recalled fewer specific first responses to the cue words of the AMT
than the control participants. A subsequent power analysis suggested that a
sample size of 61 participants would be required in order to detect a
significant difference between the groups in terms of overgeneral ABM
retrieval.
Though not significant, this trend towards overgeneral ABM retrieval
of the clinical group is consistent with the bulk of research revolving around
overgeneral ABM retrieval in clinical adult samples, which consistently
demonstrate that adults with depression and/or a history of trauma retrieve
fewer specific or more overgeneral ABMs than controls (Section 1.4). In
terms of studies that investigated overgeneral ABM retrieval in clinical
adolescent samples, the present results are also consistent with Stokes et al.
(2004), who found that a group of trauma-exposed adolescent burn victims
recalled fewer specific memories to AMT cue words than controls. In a study
designed to assess overgeneral ABM retrieval in depressed adolescents with
and without a history of trauma, Kuyken, Howell and Dalgleish (2006) also
found that overall, the clinical group retrieved more overgeneral and fewer
specific ABMs than the control group, which is also consistent with the
trends in the present results. However, interestingly Kuyken et al. (2006) also
found that within the group of depressed adolescents, those who reported a
history of trauma were in fact less overgeneral than those without a history of
trauma, and that within the depressed participants levels of trauma-related
symptoms were significantly and negatively correlated with overgeneral ABM
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retrieval. This was not replicated in the present sample, where levels of post-
traumatic stress symptoms were not significantly correlated with the number
of specific first responses to the AMT cue words. This may be a result of the
relatively different samples that were used, while depression, traumatic stress
reactions and self-harm were prevalent in both clinical samples, Kuyken et al.
(2006) recruited participants on the basis of being depressed, while the
present study recruited participants on the basis of their self-harming
behaviour. While the self-harming adolescents in the present sample had
significantly higher levels of symptoms of depression than controls, it is
uncertain how many actually met the criteria for a diagnosis of major
depression. Kuyken et al. (2006) point out that the findings of increased
memory specificity in depressed adolescent with a history of trauma are
reminiscent of the ABM retrieval patterns of adults with borderline
personality disorder (BPD) (e.g. Arntz et al. 2002). Kuyken et al. (2006)
therefore speculate that their particular results may have been observed
because their sample may have included a number of individuals who were
vulnerable to develop BPD at a later point. While this was not assessed in
either study, it is possible that the number of adolescents who may go on to
develop BPD were different in both studies, which is particularly possibly
when considering the relatively small sample sizes.
When considered together, the results of faster negative memory
retrieval and a tendency towards overall overgeneral ABM retrieval within the
present sample may hint at another interesting possibility, namely that
specificity of recall and recall latencies may be somewhat independent of each
other. In other words, it is possible for a group of participants (in this case the
- 141 -
self-harmers) to produce fewer specific memories overall, yet at the same time
be faster in the retrieval of negative episodic memories than a control group.
The present results also showed that this was not a result of repeatedly
retrieving the same traumatic memories. So far, both overgeneral ABM
retrieval and slower retrieval of ABMs have been treated to be indicators of
less accessible ABMs. However, the present study provides unprecedented
preliminary evidence that these two aspects may be independent of each
other. Furthermore, these results once again highlight the importance of
considering recall latencies in research investigating ABM retrieval patterns,
and not merely focussing on the number of overgeneral or specific memories
that a participant retrieves.
Both depression and PTSD symptoms significantly predicted
variability in the latency to retrieve specific negative memories across the
whole sample. However, the multiple regression analysis revealed that when
depression, PTSD symptoms and trait thought suppression were considered
together as predictors of negative ABM retrieval, thought suppression
remained as the most important predictor of variability in negative ABM
retrieval, over and above the variability explained by depression and PTSD
symptoms. This highlights the theory proposed by this program of research
that an avoidant coping mechanism may be particularly important in
explaining the ABM retrieval patterns seen in clinical populations.
In terms of personal semantic memory retrieval, the self-harmers also
showed a reduced ability to retrieve personal semantic memories when
compared to the control participants. This result was consistent with the
hypothesis. However, the correlational analysis revealed that variability in
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personal semantic memory retrieval was best explained by thought
suppression and not post-traumatic stress symptoms. It is therefore possible
that deficits in personal semantic memory retrieval in trauma identified by the
previous literature (Hunter & Andrews, 2002; Meesters, Merckelbach, Muris
& Wessel, 2000; Stokes, Dritschel & Bekerian, 2004) were an indirect result of
higher levels of thought suppression in these individuals, and not PTSD
symptoms. This is an intriguing possibility that warrants further investigation.
One methodological limitation of the present study is that self-
harming behaviour and suicide ideation were not assessed in the control
participants. This was not possible in the present study as the Suicide Ideation
Interview (K-SADS-PL) which was used to assess parasuicidal behaviour in
the self-harmers had to be given by a trained clinician. It was not ethically
acceptable for a researcher without any clinical training to interview
adolescents in their schools about possible self-harming behaviours. To
overcome this, the suicide ideation item on the CDI was consulted in an
attempt to exclude suicide ideators from the control group. However, the lack
of an index of parasuicidal behaviours in the control group meant that this
important variable could not be considered in the multiple regression analysis
to predict variability in ABM retrieval.
A further methodological consideration revolves around the
possibility that the self-harming participants may have been likely to have or
develop Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Due to this being an
adolescent sample, it is unlikely that any diagnosis of a personality disorder
would have been made for the participants. However, despite levels of
depression, trauma and self-harm being high in BPD, the condition is
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distinguished from the other disorders by virtue of their not being any
noticeable ABM retrieval patterns in BPD (Arntz, Meeren & Wessel, 2002;
Kremers, Spinhoven & Van der Does, 2004; Renneberg, Theobald, Nobs &
Weisbrod, 2005). In fact, Kuyken et al. (2006) speculate that in adolescent
samples, increased specificity in the retrieval of episodic ABMs may be an
early indicator for developing BPD.
Overall, the present study further highlights the importance of
thought suppression as a common coping mechanism in individuals who self-
harm and/or with a history of trauma. Most importantly, however, the
present study demonstrates that thought suppression, and not clinical
symptoms of depression and PTSD, predicts variability in negative episodic
ABM retrieval and personal semantic memory retrieval.
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C h a p t e r 7
DISCUSSION
7.1 Introduction
This thesis now turns to the discussion of the research presented in
the previous empirical chapters. The key findings are summarised before the
theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed and a
number of suggestions for future investigations which expand on the present
research are proposed. Finally, a number of methodological limitations
inherent within this program of research are discussed.
7.2 The Role of Thought Suppression in ABM Recall
The key finding of this program of research in terms of the role of
thought suppression in the retrieval of ABMs was that thought suppression
was related to the faster recall of negative episodic ABMs and fewer personal
semantic memories (Chapter 3). Furthermore, a suppression manipulation
provided evidence that this relationship was causal; that is, that thought
suppression directly led to the enhanced retrieval of negative episodic ABMs
and the reduced ability to retrieve personal semantic information.
The finding that thought suppression is related to enhanced negative
episodic ABM retrieval could contribute to explaining the previously
discrepant results in the literature concerning episodic ABM retrieval in PTSD
and self-harm. The majority of these previous studies have identified
overgeneral episodic ABM retrieval in PTSD and self-harm, but a number of
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studies have also reported the enhanced retrieval of negative memories
(Section 1.4). It is possible that in those samples which showed a negative
facilitation effect, levels of thought suppression were particularly high.
The finding that thought suppression is also related to the reduced
ability to retrieve personal semantic memories is unprecedented, as this is the
first research that has investigated this relationship. It does, however, place
further emphasis on the importance of thought suppression in PTSD, as
reduced personal semantic memory retrieval has so far only been identified in
participants with a history of trauma (Section 1.4).
7.3 The Effects of Thought Suppression on Mood
In an attempt to investigate how thought suppression might lead to
the enhanced retrieval of negative episodic ABMs, the impact of thought
suppression on mood was investigated (Chapter 5). This study yielded no
significant effects of thought suppression on mood. While this study did not
allow for ecologically valid conclusions to be drawn about the effects of
thought suppression on mood as it occurs naturally, it nevertheless excluded
mood-congruent recall as an explanation of the effects of thought
suppression on ABM retrieval following a suppression manipulation (Chapter
4).
7.4 ABM Recall and Thought Suppression in Emotional Disorders
A key finding from the clinical study (Chapter 6) was that thought
suppression appears to be an important coping mechanism not only in
individuals coping with trauma, but also for those who self harm. More
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importantly, however, the clinical study highlighted thought suppression as an
important cognitive coping style for explaining variability in the ABM retrieval
patterns of the participants. Even when clinical symptoms of depression and
PTSD were considered, thought suppression remained as the most important
predictor of variability in negative episodic latency, as well as personal
semantic memory retrieval.
This latter finding is particularly intriguing, as it provides further
evidence that the ABM patterns which are observed in emotional disorders
may not just be related to the symptoms of the disorders themselves, but
rather a result of other underlying cognitive mechanisms. Just like rumination
appears to be at least in part responsible for the overgeneral ABM retrieval
seen in depression (Section 1.5), thought suppression appears to be an
underlying cognitive mechanism that explains the enhanced negative episodic
ABM retrieval and reduced personal semantic memory retrieval in certain
disorders.
7.5 Theoretical Implications
The present program of research has raised important theoretical
implications for the fields of both episodic and personal semantic ABM
research, as well as research revolving around thought suppression.
Furthermore, the present body of work has highlighted a number of
interesting factors which are relevant to the different methodological
approaches used to assess episodic ABM retrieval. These implications are
discussed individually in the present section.
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7.5.1 Thought Suppression and Negative Episodic ABM Retrieval
One key finding of this program of research is that thought
suppression leads to the enhanced retrieval of negative episodic ABMs. While
the present program of research has established that thought suppression
affects ABM retrieval, it remains unclear how this occurs. The only
conclusion that can be drawn is that the enhanced negative ABM retrieval is
not a result of mood congruent recall (Chapter 5).
A possible explanation that was not empirically considered in the
present program of research, but nevertheless warrants future investigation, is
that thought suppression affects ABM retrieval as a result of the cognitive
demands of thought suppression. Thought suppression is a demanding task in
itself, which in imposes a considerable cognitive load and reduces cognitive
processing (e.g. Beevers & Scott, 2001). The way in which thought
suppression may disrupt cognitive process can be considered in light of two
cognitive models. According to the Williams et al. (2007) model of
overgeneral ABM retrieval, reduced cognitive resources may result in
overgeneral ABM retrieval (see Section 1.5). When cognitive resources are
strained and limited, generative retrieval of ABMs may be truncated at the
overgeneral level. If this is the case, the expectation would be that thought
suppression would be related to more overgeneral ABM retrieval (see
Schönfeld et al., 2007). This explanation may be particularly relevant in clinical
samples where cognitive resources are strained to begin with, such as
depression and PTSD. Also consistent with this explanation was the trend in
the clinical study of this program of research (Chapter 6), where the clinical
group tended to recall fewer specific memories than the control participants.
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However, when considered within the predominant model of thought
suppression (Wegner et al., 1994), the cognitive demands of thought
suppression may instead result in the enhanced retrieval of negative ABMs
During the suppression process, the suppressed material is first marked for
suppression, and then two cognitive processes act simultaneously to achieve
suppression: a process that searches for distraction material, and a monitoring
process which continuously monitors that the suppressed material is not
accessed. The monitoring process is automatic and is thought to be the
primary process behind the paradoxical effects of thought suppression
(Wegner, 1994), by continuously accessing the suppressed material. The
distracting process is effortful and is subject to being disrupted by increasing
cognitive load. It is possible that when suppressing a certain thought or
memory, the material that is used for distraction is mood-congruent with the
suppressed thought, yet semantically unrelated to the suppressed material. In
this case the subsequent ABM retrieval may be negatively biased because a
series of negative thoughts and memories have just been accessed in order to
inhibit one particular negative thought (e.g. Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006).
Inhibition of the other negative memories may not occur successfully because
cognitive resources are limited due to the act of suppression itself. This
hypothesis is, of course, subject to future investigation, the first step of which
should be to determine whether the nature of the distracting material used
during a suppression task is similar in valance than that of the suppressed
material.
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7.5.2 Thought Suppression and Personal Semantic Memory Retrieval
This program of research is one of the few investigations of ABM that
not only considers episodic but also personal semantic memory retrieval. To
date, models of personal semantic memory remain very limited. However,
prior research investigating personal semantic memory recall in survivors of
trauma has speculated that survivors of childhood trauma most likely retrieve
fewer personal semantic memories because these memories were never
encoded properly during the traumatic times of their lives, and that this poor
encoding may be due to damage to the hippocampus as a result of prolonged
trauma (Hunter & Andrews, 2002). However, the present research has
demonstrated that personal semantic memory retrieval can also be affected as
a result of a short manipulation (Chapter 4). This implies that personal
semantic memories may not be as solid as was previously assumed, and that
the recall of these personal semantic memories can be disrupted just like
episodic ABM retrieval.
The present program of research has only been able to establish that
thought suppression appears to be related to personal semantic memory
retrieval, but not how this occurs. One possible explanation could be that
personal semantic memory retrieval is also subject to cognitive load. Based on
the present program of research, personal semantic memory retrieval can vary
over short periods of time, and may not be as easy to retrieve as previously
assumed. Introducing a cognitive load may therefore reduce the ability to
retrieve personal semantic memories. The cognitively demanding act of
thought suppression (Beevers & Scott, 2001) may pose a sufficient cognitive
load to disrupt personal semantic memory retrieval. One important future
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direction is therefore to assess the impact of cognitive load on personal
semantic memory retrieval.
Future research should generally increase the focus on personal
semantic memory, which is especially important considering not only the
present relative lack of understanding of this type of memory, but also the
potential clinical implications of reduced personal semantic memory retrieval.
For instance, seeing that personal semantic memories are factually self-
defining, when these memories become less accessible it may imply that the
person has a less stable concept of self, which is more vulnerable to change.
7.5.3 Thought Suppression, ABM Retrieval and the Self-Memory System
When considered within the framework of the Self-Memory System
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Section 1.2.3), the results of the present
research suggest that thought suppression may be a coping mechanism that
may be particularly damaging to an individual’s sense of self. The Self-
Memory System holds that an individual’s sense of self is based on their
ABMs and guided by the present goals of the working self. This sense of self
is not constant, but rather a dynamic concept that can change over time and
based on different experiences and circumstance. Negative ESK poses a
particular problem to the working self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), as
by virtue of being negative this information is inconsistent with the current
goals of the working self. According to the Self-Memory System, negative
information needs to either be assimilated, which requires the adjustment the
goals of the working self, or the material cannot be assimilated, in which case
an individual may chose to engage in some form of avoidant coping. The
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present research suggest that if thought suppression is used to cope with
unwanted negative information, it may lead to a vicious loop in which the
recall of more unrelated negative ABMs are triggered by the suppression. The
retrieval of such memories should, in turn, only increase the strain on the
working self.
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the present research, thought
suppression appears to also result in the reduced ability to retrieve personal
semantic information. Personal semantic memories are more general and may
as such be self-defining on a different level than ESKs. If the accessibility of
personal semantic memories is reduced, it may result in the sense of self being
less stable and more likely to subject to change. The simultaneous increased
recollection of negative memories may, over time, have a considerable
negative impact on the individuals’ sense of self.
7.5.4 Individual Differences in Thought Suppression
The present program of research has investigated thought suppression
mostly as a single process which different individuals may engage in to various
degrees. However, factors that are closely related to thought suppression and
which can play a role in whether or not a thought is successfully suppressed
have not been considered. Two such factors that certainly warrant
consideration are working memory capacity and a repressive coping style.
In the past, research has demonstrated that working memory capacity
is related to the ability to successfully suppress unwanted thoughts, (Brewin &
Beaton, 2002; Brewin & Smart, 2002; Geraerts et al., 2007). In these studies,
evidence for this notion was taken from the fact that a better working
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memory was related to fewer intrusions of an unwanted thought during a
suppression condition.
A second variable that has been related to superior suppression
abilities is a repressive coping style (Barnier et al., 2004; Geraerts et al., 2006).
In fact, Geraerts et al. (2006) found that the repressors’ relatively greater
ability to successfully suppress unwanted thought could be largely explained
by their working memory capacity.
Even though the ability to successfully suppress an unwanted thought
or memory has only been briefly considered in the present program of
research (see Chapter 5), it is nevertheless of considerable importance. While
the present research has not found a difference in the number of intrusions of
the unwanted thought in the suppression versus monitoring conditions
(Chapter4 & Chapter 5), it is nevertheless possible that the observed effects of
thought suppression and ABM retrieval are mediated by the ability to
successfully suppress an unwanted thought. It is, for instance, possible that if
suppression is successful it causes no disruption, and may therefore not result
in altered ABM retrieval patterns. On the other hand, it could be argued that
successful thought suppression is more demanding (see also Beevers & Scott,
2001), and may therefore exaggerate the effects on ABM retrieval as
compared to failed suppression.
Therefore, future research in this field would benefit from considering
the effects of failed versus successful thought suppression on ABM retrieval
patterns, in which a repressive coping style and working memory capacity
should be assessed.
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7.5.5 Generative versus Direct ABM Retrieval
The present findings relating to the effects of thought suppression on
episodic ABM retrieval give rise to an important theoretical consideration,
namely whether thought suppression affects the generative or direct retrieval
of negative episodic memories. While overgeneral ABM retrieval is thought to
be a phenomenon of generative retrieval that is truncated before the search is
completed (e.g. Williams et al., 2007), it is possible that thought suppression
instead simply results in more intrusions. Intrusive memories should, be
directly accessed memories that are not a result of a generative retrieval
search, by virtue of their spontaneous and involuntary nature (see Hauer et al.,
in press).
The present program of research attempted to preliminarily address
this notion of generative versus direct retrieval by including a more detailed
analysis of the episodic memories the participants retrieved following a
suppression manipulation (Chapter 4). This analysis distinguished between
memories that were retrieved very quickly (i.e. in less than two seconds),
which could be an indication of direct retrieval, and memories which took
longer to retrieve, indicating generative retrieval (Haque & Conway, 2001).
However, this analysis was conducted post-hoc, and the cut-off point of two
seconds to distinguish between direct and generative retrieval was set based
on a prior study which had set this point somewhat arbitrarily. Nevertheless,
this preliminary analysis suggests that thought suppression enhances the
generative retrieval of negative episodic memories, instead of leading to the
increased direct retrieval of negative memories (which would have been an
indication of simply resulting in more negative intrusions). Future research
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could be conducted to further address this issue; for example, participants
could be asked for each memory whether they had to search for it, or if it was
activated directly.
7.5.6 Latency versus Specificity of Episodic ABM Retrieval
A final important theoretical implication that arises from this
program of research is how the accessibility of episodic ABMs is measured.
As described in the introduction, the primary indicators for accessibility are
latency to retrieve a specific memory and whether the first response is specific
or overgeneral (Section 1.4). Recently, the literature has predominantly
focused on the latter of these dimensions, with many studies neglecting to
assess the latency to retrieval of a specific memory altogether (e.g. Hermans et
al., 2005). However, the present research has highlighted the importance of
assessing the latency to retrieve a specific memory. In two out of three studies
which assessed ABM retrieval in the present program of research, significant
effects were obtained in terms of latency, but not for the number of specific
first responses (Chapter 3 & Chapter 6). These findings indicate that including
latency as a measure of ABM accessibility may be particularly important when
ceiling effects occur for the number of specific first responses, e.g. in
nonclinical student samples. More intriguingly, however, the final study
(Chapter 6) has highlighted yet another possibility, namely that latency and
specificity may not be entirely reflective of the same concept, i.e. accessibility
of an ABM. It could be argued that latency to retrieve a specific memory gives
an index of the complexity of the search, with longer searches indicating that
more irrelevant or inappropriately overgeneral activations had to be inhibited.
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The specificity of the first response, on the other hand, gives an indication of
whether or not the participant was able to inhibit overgeneral responses in the
first place.
7.6 Clinical Implications
The results of this program of research also provide the foundations
for future work which could have important clinical implications, particularly
for the treatment and prevention of PTSD, as well as the treatment of self-
harmers.
7.6.1 Thought Suppression, ABM Retrieval and PTSD
One of the key findings of this program of research was that thought
suppression was a better predictor of enhanced negative ABM retrieval and
reduced personal semantic memory retrieval than symptoms of depression
and PTSD (Chapters 3 & 6). The retrieval of ABMs is crucial to shaping and
maintaining the concept of the self, and as such recalling and processing
ABMs forms an important part of all talk-based psychotherapies. If thought
suppression, like rumination, is at least in part responsible for producing some
of the ABM patterns observed in clinical populations, then addressing this
coping style in therapies could aid in altering the cognitive symptoms of the
disorders. A crucial future research study here should investigate whether
altering coping mechanisms in high trait suppressors results in changes in
ABM patterns. For instance, if high suppressors are encouraged to only
suppress a thought or memory in situations when they cannot address them,
but to address the issues as soon as the time to do so is appropriate, this may
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break the cycle of perpetual suppression in order to cope with an unwanted
thought or memory. In therapy, high suppressors could be encouraged to
note any thought or memories they are actively suppressing, and to raise these
thoughts during their next therapy session in order to process them. These
thoughts, in return, may become less intrusive in the future and therefore
reduce the need to suppress them. If this is the case, then this coping
mechanism could be addressed in therapeutic settings in order to alter ABM
retrieval patterns in patients.
A second potential clinical implication concerns the prevention of
PTSD in high-risk groups. The research presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated
that inducing thought suppression in a normal student group directly resulted
in the faster retrieval of negative episodic ABMs, as well as reduced personal
semantic memory retrieval; which are recall patterns also observed in
individuals suffering from PTSD. Therefore, it is possible that a suppressive
coping style may be one of the factors that influence whether or not an
individual develops the cognitive symptoms of PTSD following the exposure
of a traumatic event. A large-scale longitudinal study would be needed in
order to test this hypothesis; however, the potential benefits of the results are
considerable. If it is found that individuals with a higher tendency to engage in
thought suppression are more likely to develop some of the cognitive
symptoms of PTSD, then individuals at high risk of trauma exposure, such as
firemen, police officers and soldiers could be screened for levels of thought
suppression and be instructed in the benefits of using other, approach based
coping mechanisms instead before deployment.
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7.6.2 Thought Suppression, ABM Retrieval and Self-Harm
A final clinical implication of this present program of research
revolves around the role of thought suppression in the ABM patterns seen in
individuals who self-harm. If the act of deliberate self-harm is a viewed as an
avoidant coping mechanism in itself (Chapman, Gratz & Brown, 2006) then a
possible model for explaining the inter-relationship between ABM retrieval,
thought suppression and self-harm is that both thought suppression and self-
harm may occur in order to cope with unwanted negative thoughts and
memories. Seeing that childhood trauma is a common predecessor of
deliberate self-harm, potential self-harmers often have extremely negative
experiences in their pasts. The results of the present program of research
suggest that self-harmers are high trait thought suppressors (Chapter 4),
which implies that as an initial attempt to cope with these unwanted
memories potential self-harmers may engage in thought suppression.
However, this engagement is likely to lead not only to the suppressed thought
being more accessible (paradoxical effect of thought suppression), but also to
increased retrieval of other negative memories and fewer personal semantic
memories (Chapter 4). The increased negative memory retrieval would be a
considerable strain on the working self. These negative memories would
either have to be suppressed further, or become assimilated into the
autobiographical memory knowledge base, which requires the adjustment of
the goals of the working self. The reduced personal semantic memory
retrieval may imply a less stable concept of the self, which is more vulnerable
to changes. If thought suppression continues to fail, the individual may turn
to other, more extreme coping mechanisms, such as self-harm. Self-harm may
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become more acceptable to the Self-Memory System if the goals of the
working self and the self-concept become too negatively biased. In short, the
present theory holds that thought suppression may lead to ABM retrieval
patterns that together with the failed suppression attempts may create a
vicious loop in which deliberate self-harm becomes more likely. Naturally,
more research is needed in order to evaluate this theoretical model of thought
suppression, ABM retrieval and self-harm. However, if this is found to be the
case then addressing a suppressive coping style in self-harmers in therapeutic
settings could prove to be particularly effective in the treatment of self-
harming behaviours.
7.7 Methodological Limitations of this Program of Research
Those methodological limitations that were relevant only to individual
studies have already been addressed in the discussions of the respective
chapter. Therefore, the present section only discusses limitations that need to
be considered for this program of research as a whole.
7.7.1 Sample Selection
There are two primary concerns about the sample selection in this
program of research, both of which restrict the generalisability of the results
to the wider population. The first limitation is that except for the clinical
study (Chapter 6), all participants were undergraduate university students.
Therefore, the participants were predominantly young, intelligent adults from
a white European background, and the findings can not readily be generalised
to the wider population. A further unfortunate consequence of the fact that
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this program of research relied predominantly on undergraduate students is
that there was very little variability in overgeneral ABM retrieval (Chapter 3
and Chapter 4), as this is generally a feature of clinical populations (Section
1.4). For future studies, it may prove more fruitful to sample larger number of
undergraduate students in order to specifically select high and low specific
individuals before attempting to investigate the role of thought suppression
(e.g. Raes, Hermans, Williams & Eelen, 2006). It is possible that greater
variability in ABM retrieval patterns with the sample would have highlighted
the role of thought suppression in the retrieval of overgeneral ABMs more
clearly.
The second problem with the samples used in the present program of
research is that they are all highly skewed for gender, with the majority of
participants in each study being female. This is an important consideration as
gender differences in ABM retrieval have been documented (Davis, 1999). In
particular, previous research has demonstrated that females tend to retrieve
more emotional ABMs from childhood than males, and are also faster in their
retrieval of episodic ABMs. Again, this may imply that the results of the
present program of research apply predominantly to females, and cannot
readily be generalised to males.
7.7.2 Measurement Issues
A number of measurement issues about this program of research also
need to be considered. The primary concern here is that the White Bear
Suppression Inventory (WBSI – Wegner & Zanakos, 1996) was used to
measure thought suppression. This measure was used in the present program
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of research as it is the most widely used instrument to assess thought
suppression, and means that this present work can be easily compared to
prior research. However, the factor structure of the WBSI remains ambiguous
and the WBSI may not only measure thought suppression, but may also
measure the tendency to experience intrusive thoughts (see Section 2.5). For
this reason a sub-scale of the items which previous research has shown to be a
more discriminant and effective measure of thought suppression (Palm &
Strong, 2007) was used in the research presented here to capture thought
suppression. However, the WBSI remains a problematic measure in itself,
because is not necessarily a pure measure of a suppressive coping style.
However, with no feasible alternative to measure cognitive suppression, it was
the only suitable measure that could be used in the present program of
research. An important future objective should be to develop a more “pure”
measure of a suppressive coping style, which is vital to research such as this
which attempts to isolate a tendency to engage in thought suppression as a
way of coping with unwanted thoughts and memories.
A second measurement issue that needs to be considered is that the
measures of ABM retrieval varied across the studies. The cue words used on
the AMT were different across all studies. The first study (Chapter 3) used 10
words which were deemed too emotional and of too high a frequency,
thereby resulting in a ceiling effect for specific memories. Therefore, a
different set of cue words was used in the clinical study (Chapter 6). And
finally, two versions of the AMT were needed in the suppression
manipulation study (Chapter 4) in order to obtain baseline and post-
manipulation measures of ABM retrieval, which meant that yet another two
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sets of different cue words had to be used. Similarly, for different measures
had to be used for assessing personal semantic memory retrieval in the clinical
and non-clinical studies, because the ages of the participants differed and
memory for appropriate lifetime periods had to be assessed.
These variations between the measures of ABM retrieval between the
studies mean that the results cannot necessarily be directly compared. On the
other hand, however, this also means that the results are unlikely to be a result
of possible idiosyncrasies in the measures used.
A further measurement issue of the present program of research is
that clinical symptoms were assessed only by written self-report measures,
with the exception of the Suicidal Ideation Interview (K-SADS-PL) used with
the self-harmers in Chapter 6. This measurement issue is problematic because
clinical symptoms are frequently over-reported by participants when using
self-report measures (e.g. Frueh, Hamner, Cahill, Gold & Hamlin, 2000).
While it was never attempted to make a diagnosis of any disorder based on
these self-report measures in the present program of research, it is
nevertheless likely that symptoms of depression and PTSD considered in the
present work were somewhat exaggerated.
The final methodological limitation of this program of research is that
the possibility of the participants suffering from Borderline Personality
Disorder (BPD) was never assessed. The clinical symptoms of depression,
PTSD, and self-harming behaviours in the case of the clinical study (Chapter
6) may all be indicative of the respective disorders. However, all of these
symptoms can also occur as part of a Borderline Personality (APA, DSM-IV).
This is particularly important because even though ABM differences are
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consistently observed in depression, PTSD, and self-harm when compared to
control participants, no such differences are reliably observed between
individuals with BPD and controls (Section 1.4). However, the assessment of
BPD is extensive, and in the nonclinical student samples used in the present
studies it is unlikely that there were many participants who may have suffered
from the disorder. The clinical study (Chapter 6) used adolescent participants,
where because the personalities are still developing, a diagnosis of a
Personality Disorders should only be made with great care and if symptoms
are very severe and persistent. The DSM-IV warns that transient symptoms
that may resemble those of Borderline Personality Disorder may be present in
adolescents without indicating the presence of the disorder itself (APA, 1994).
7.8 Concluding Comments
As stated in the introduction of this program of research, a key
motivation for investigating ABM retrieval is because of its relevance to the
emotional disorders, including the development and treatment of certain
disorders (Section 1.3). However, after more than two decades of research
revolving around establishing the ABM retrieval patterns in certain disorders,
simply establishing that ABM retrieval is affected is no longer sufficient. While
this knowledge is very important, it alone does not allow for the development
of new methods of prevention, early intervention, and treatment of the very
disorders in which ABM retrieval is altered. In order to advance this field of
research, studies must turn to investigating how ABM patterns are altered. By
understanding the mechanisms that underlie these altered ABM patterns,
intervention strategies for addressing these mechanisms in therapeutic settings
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can be developed. The present thesis has added to the advancing field of
research by focussing on thought suppression and establishing that this
coping mechanism plays an important role in the retrieval of both episodic
and personal semantic ABMs.
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A.1.1 Ratings of the Emotional Cue Words:
27 undergraduate students were asked to rate each AMT cue word used in this research
program for imageability, concreteness and how readily the word would elicit a specific
memory. Ratings were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). The means and
standard deviations are reported in the table below:
Cue Word Imageability Concreteness
Elicits Specific
Memory
Happy 7.41 (1.60) 6.93 (1.73) 7.67 (1.78)
Lonely 4.93 (2.29) 5.77 (2.37) 6.22 (2.15)
Safe 4.93 (2.15) 5.26 (2.33) 6.12 (2.37)
Hurt 5.67 (2.04) 6.33 (2.17) 6.59 (2.15)
Interested 4.88 (2.32) 4.78 (2.42) 5.85 (2.23)
Clumsy 5.70 (2.46) 5.58 (2.40) 5.63 (2.60)
Successful 6.11 (2.39) 4.81 (2.32) 6.59 (2.45)
Angry 7.48 (1.76) 7.04 (1.89) 7.22 (1.74)
Surprised 7.15 (1.49) 6.15 (1.79) 6.59 (1.74)
Sorry 4.96 (2.23) 4.52 (2.36) 6.15 (1.94)
Proud 5.63 (2.11) 4.59 (2.42) 6.74 (1.85)
Guilty 4.89 (2.33) 4.70 (1.88) 5.96 (1.89)
Amazed 5.37 (2.22) 5.26 (2.09) 5.22 (2.58)
Weak 4.01 (1.91) 3.44 (2.08) 4.33 (2.42)
Lively 6.04 (2.01) 5.63 (2.11) 4.74 (2.38)
Bored 6.44 (1.78) 5.56 (2.06) 5.04 (2.16)
Eager 5.15 (2.33) 4.50 (2.20) 4.58 (2.32)
Helpless 5.07 (2.11) 4.67 (1.73) 4.88 (2.44)
Excited 6.37 (2.13) 6.33 (2.00) 7.04 (1.51)
Upset 6.07 (1.59) 5.67 (1.92) 7.00 (1.52)
Friendly 5.70 (2.28) 5.74 (2.18) 5.46 (2.42)
Rejected 5.04 (2.03) 4.56 (2.26) 5.42 (2.45)
Faithful 4.00 (2.37) 3.81 (2.37) 4.62 (2.48)
Bad 4.67 (2.45) 4.78 (2.71) 5.46 (2.52)
Calm 6.22 (2.19) 5.70 (1.92) 4.54 (2.02)
Awful 3.96 (2.33) 3.96 (2.14) 4.38 (2.30)
Pleased 5.93 (2.09) 4.96 (1.99) 5.50 (2.28)
Ashamed 4.89 (2.14) 4.89 (1.63) 5.32 (1.93)
Hopeful 5.00 (1.96) 4.70 (2.09) 4.92 (2.45)
Miserable 5.93 (2.13) 6.00 (1.90) 5.62 (2.37)
Lucky 4.41 (2.32) 5.59 (1.67) 5.31 (2.07)
Relieved 6.19 (1.84) 5.26 (1.99) 5.69 (2.17)
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One-sample t-tests were conducted to compare positive and negative cue words on each
dimension for each AMT used in the present research program. The results, presented in the
table below, indicate that positive and negative cue words did not differ significantly for any
version of the AMT on any of the dimensions:
Dimension AMT Positive Negative t(26) p
Imageability 1 (Chapter 3) 30.30 (6.88) 28.74 (6.53) 1.141 0.26
2a (Chapter 4) 28.56 (8.02) 26.89 (5.87) 1.243 0.23
2b (Chapter 4) 26.85 (8.34) 24.48 (7.69) 1.639 0.11
3 (Chapter 6) 25.85 (8.12) 28.00 (4.99) -1.488 0.15
Concreteness 1 27.93 (6.82) 28.81 (8.11) -0.840 0.41
2a 26.15 (7.29) 24.04 (6.19) 1.493 0.15
2b 24.93 (7.71) 24.19 (7.03) 0.526 0.60
3 25.48 (7.13) 27.81 (6.55) -1.721 0.10
Specific 1 32.59 (7.34) 31.81 (7.01) 0.615 0.54
Memory 2a 27.89 (7.77) 26.59 (7.05) 0.908 0.37
2b 24.11 (9.96) 25.22 (9.30) -0.691 0.50
3 29.07 (8.29) 30.37 (6.55) -1.112 0.28
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A.1.2 Student’s Autobiographical Memory Interview (S-AMI)
Section A: Childhood
1. Prior to School Age:
1.1 Participant’s address before going to school (2 points)
Street and Number: (½ point each)
Town: (1 point)
1.2 Names of three friends or neighbours from the time before the participant
went to school: (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.1 Recall of an incident before the participant went to school
(3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
2. First School (~ 5-11 years):
2.1 Name of the first school the participant attended (1 point)
Name: (1 point)
2.2 Location of this school (1 point)
Location: (1 point)
2.3 Participant’s age when starting this school (1 point)
Age: (1 point)
2.4 Participant’s address when starting this school (2 points)
Street and Number: (½ point each)
Town: (1 point)
2.5 Names of three teachers from this school (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.2 Recall of an incident from the period at primary school (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
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3. First/Earliest Birthday:
3.1 First birthday the participant can remember (1 point)
Age: (1 point)
3.2 What the participant did for that birthday (1 point)
Activity: (1 point)
3.3 What the participant was wearing (1 point)
Clothes: (1 point)
3.4 The participant’s favourite present from that birthday (1 point)
Present: (1 point)
3.5 Person who gave the favourite present (1 point)
Person: (1 point)
3.6 Names of three friends who came to that birthday (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.3 Recall of an incident that happened on that birthday (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
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Section B: Adolescence
4. Main Secondary or High School (~ 11-18 years):
4.1 Name of the secondary/high school (1 point)
Name: (1 point)
4.2 Location of this school (1 point)
Town: (1 point)
4.3 Year of graduation from secondary school (1 point)
Year: (1 point)
4.4 Participant’s address when starting this school (2 points)
Street and Number: (½ point each)
Town: (1 point)
4.5 Names of three teachers or friends from this school (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
4.6 Three subjects the participant took in their last year (3 points)
Subject: (1 point)
Subject: (1 point)
Subject: (1 point)
E.4.1 Recall of the first day at secondary/high school (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
E.4.2 Recall of an incident from the period at this school (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
5. Extracurricular Activities in Secondary/High School:
5.1 Extracurricular Activities (e.g. sports, music) (1 point)
Activity: (1 point)
5.2 Location where this activity was carried out (1 point)
Town: (1 point)
5.3 Participant’s age at the time (1 point)
Age: (1 point)
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5.4 Name of the teacher/coach/leader of that activity (1 point)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
5.5 Name of a friend from that activity (1 point)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.5 Recall of an incident from the extracurricular activity (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
6. Friends from adolescence:
6.1 Name of two friends from adolescence (2 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
6.2 Two places where they spent time together (not school) (2 points)
Place: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
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Section C: Recent Events
7. Last Christmas:
7.1 Place where the participant spent the last Christmas (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
7.2 Name of one person they spent Christmas with (1 point)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
8. Last Vacation:
8.1 Where the participant went for the last holiday (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
8.2 When the participant went on that holiday (1 point)
Month and Year: (1 point)
8.3 Who the participant went with (1 point)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.8 Recall of an incident from that holiday (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
9. Last Birthday:
9.1 What the participant did for that birthday (1 point)
Activity: (1 point)
9.2 The participant’s favourite present from that birthday (1 point)
Present: (1 point)
9.3 Person who gave the favourite present (1 point)
Person: (1 point)
9.4 Names of three friends who came to that birthday (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.9 Recall of an incident that happened on that birthday (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
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10. University/College
10.1 Name of the first University the participant attended (1 point)
Name: (1 point)
10.2 Location of this University (1 point)
Town: (1 point)
10.3 Three courses the participant took in their first semester (3 points)
Course: (1 point)
Course: (1 point)
Course: (1 point)
10.4 Names of two teachers from the first semester (2 points)
Title: Family Name: (½ point each)
Title: Family Name: (½ point each)
10.5 Names of three friends from the first semester (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
11. Yesterday:
E.11 Recall of an incident that happened yesterday (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
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Scoring of the S-AMI:
Section A Personal Semantic Episodic
1. Prior to School Age (max. = 5) (max. = 3)
2. First School (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
3. Earliest Birthday (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Total (max. = 21) (max. = 9)
Section B Personal Semantic Episodic
4. Secondary School (max. = 12) (max. = 6)
5. Extracurricular Act. (max. = 5) (max. = 3)
6. Friends (max. = 4) -------------
Total (max. = 21) (max. = 9)
Section C Personal Semantic Episodic
7. Last Christmas (max. = 2) -------------
8. Last Vacation (max. = 3) (max. = 3)
9. Last Birthday (max. = 6) (max. = 3)
10. University/College (max. = 10) -------------
11. Yesterday ------------- (max. = 3)
Total (max. = 21) (max. = 9)
Cumulative Totals:
Total Score Summary Personal Semantic Episodic
A. Childhood (max. = 21) (max. = 9)
B. Adolescence (max. = 21) (max. = 9)
C. Recent Life (max. = 21) (max. = 9)
Total (max. = 63) (max. = 27)
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A.1.3 Trauma Questionnaire (Chapter 3)
INSTRUCTIONS:
I would now like you to think about what you consider to be your most traumatic
experience. This can be something that actually happened to you (such as an accident or
assault), or something that happened to someone else (such as death or illness of a loved one).
Please indicate below which of these items best describes your most traumatic experience (if
you have experienced more than one of the traumatic events listed below, please tick the one
experience that you consider to be the most traumatic!)
_____Accident (such as a Car Accident) _____Divorce of Parents
_____Serious Medical Condition/Injury _____Death of a Loved One
_____Medical Treatment/Procedure _____Illness of a Loved One
_____Sexual Assault/Abuse _____Other
_____Physical Assault/Abuse
How old were you when this happened? _____ years
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A.1.4 Trauma Questionnaire (Chapter 6)
INSTRUCTIONS:
Many people have experienced or witnessed stressful and traumatic events in their lives.
Please indicate on the list below which of these events have happened to you. Please tick all
applicable items.
_____Accident (such as a Car Accident) _____Divorce of Parents
_____Serious Medical Condition/Injury _____Death of a Loved One
_____Medical Treatment/Procedure _____Illness of a Loved One
_____Sexual Assault/Abuse _____Other
_____Physical Assault/Abuse
If you marked “Other”, please name the traumatic event below:
__________________________________________________
I would now like you to think about what you consider to be your most traumatic
experience. Please indicate below which of these items best describes your most traumatic
experience (if you have experienced more than one of the traumatic events listed below, please
tick the one experience that you consider to be the most traumatic!)
_____Accident (such as a Car Accident) _____Divorce of Parents
_____Serious Medical Condition/Injury _____Death of a Loved One
_____Medical Treatment/Procedure _____Illness of a Loved One
_____Sexual Assault/Abuse _____Other
_____Physical Assault/Abuse
How old were you when this happened? _____ years old
How long did the traumatic event last? ________________
- 201 -
A.1.5 When Bad Things Happen Scale (PTSD items)
The questions on the next pages will ask you about your most traumatic experience (= “the
bad thing”). Your answers will help us understand how you feel about what happened.
There are no right or wrong answers. Answer the questions by putting an X under
NEVER, SOME, or LOTS. Be sure to answer every question.
Never Some Lots
1. Was the bad thing scary?
2. Did you think you might get hurt?
3. Were you afraid you might die?
4. Did you think someone else might get hurt?
5. Do you think about the bad thing now even when you do not want to?
6. Do thoughts of the bad thing just pop into your head? Things like
pictures or sounds or smells from the bad thing?
7. Is there anything about the bad thing that you keep thinking about?
Even when you do not want to?
8. Do you have bad dreams or nightmares about the bad thing?
9. Do you dream about scary things at night?
10. Since the bad thing happened, do you dream at night that you die?
11. Since the bad thing, do you have bad dreams, that later you can not
remember what they were about?
12. Do you daydream about the bad thing?
13. Do pictures of what happened run over and over again in your head
like a movie?
14. Do you ever feel like the bad thing is still happening?
15. Do you ever act like the bad thing is still happening?
16. Does it bother you when things make you think of the bad thing?
17. Does it bother you when you see someone who reminds you of the bad
thing? Or when you go somewhere that reminds you?
18. Does it bother you when it gets to be the same time as when the bad
thing happened?
19. Do you try to forget all about the bad thing?
20. Do you try not to feel anything about the bad thing? Like you are a
robot or machine, without any feelings?
21. Do you ever feel like what happened was a bad dream and not real?
Like it never happened?
22. Do you wish you could turn off feelings that remind you of what
happened?
23. Do you try to push away thoughts about the bad thing and think about
other things?
24. Is it easy to be around people who make you think about the bad thing?
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Never Some Lots
25. Is it hard to do things that make you think of the bad thing?
26. Do you stay away from places or things that make you think of the bad
thing?
27. Do you forget parts of what happened?
28. Do you remember everything that happened?
29. Since the bad thing happened, do you do things that you used to think
you were too old for?
30. Are there games you used to play before the bad thing that you do not
like to play now?
31. Do you feel like you do not want to play with other kids since the bad
thing happened?
32. Do you feel different from other kids since the bad thing happened?
33. Do you feel more alone since the bad thing happened?
34. Do you sometimes feel like you cannot feel anything? Like you are
made of stone?
35. Are you good at hiding your feelings since the bad thing happened?
36. Do you think you will live to be as old as most people get to be?
37. Do you think you will get married when you grow up?
38. Do you think you will have kids of your own when you grow up?
39. Do you think you will grow up and have a job of your own?
40. Is it hard for you to plan ahead for anything? Even for holidays or
parties or special events?
41. Do you try to live just one day at a time?
42. Is it easy for you to sleep at night?
43. Is it easy for you to go back to sleep if you wake up in the middle of the
night?
44. Do you get really mad about things since the bad thing happened?
45. Do you get so mad that you really blow your top? Or you feel like
hitting or kicking something?
46. Do you lose your temper more now than you did before the bad thing
happened?
47. Is it easy for you to pay attention to things that you have to do at home
of school?
48. Is it easy for you to finish things you start? Like games or homework or
TV shows?
49. Is it easy for you to keep your mind on school work these days?
50. Is it easy for you to remember things since the bad thing happened?
51. Do you ever feel jumpy or nervous for no reason you can think of?
52. Is it easy for you to sit still when you have to at school or home?
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Never Some Lots
53. Do you keep your eyes open for trouble these days?
54. Are you on the look out for something bad to happen?
55. Do things ever catch you by surprise and make you jump these days?
56. Do you jump when you hear a sudden noise?
57. Does it make you feel sick in some way when you are reminded of the
bad thing?
58. Do you feel sicker these days then you did before the bad thing?
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A.1.6 Participant Information Sheet (Pilot Study)
Dear participant,
Thank you for taking an interest in the current research.
We are interested in the emotional content of two short video clips. The video clips
differ greatly in their content.
You will be asked to watch one video at a time, and then rate the content on a short
questionnaire.
Please note that one of the clips is potentially quite gory and may be found
unpleasant. However, if at any point during any stage of the experiment you wish to
withdraw, you may do so with no explanation necessary.
The experiment will take about 15 minutes to complete and you will be paid £1 for
your participation. All information will be kept strictly confidential, the data will be stored in a
secure (locked) location and we are the only people who have access to it. Further to this,
your name or any other means of identification will NOT be on any of the forms you
complete.
Please ask any questions you have regarding the study at any time, and your
participation in this study is greatly appreciated.
Thank you very much,
Julia Neufeind
School of Psychology
University of St Andrews
Fife, KY16 9JU
Email: jn20@st-and.ac.uk
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A.1.7 Participant Debriefing Form (Pilot Study)
Dear Participant,
Thank you very much for your participation in the current study. I appreciate
your time and contribution to the present research into the emotional content of these two
video clips.
We are hoping to use these two video clips in a manipulation experiment, which
requires establishing the emotional content of each video. For the main study we require
one positive and one negative video clip. This study was to ascertain that the videos are
suitable for the above purpose.
Thank you very much for your participation in the study and please do not
hesitate to contact us with any questions.
Yours sincerely
Julia Neufeind
School of Psychology
University of St Andrews
Fife, KY16 9JU
Email: jn20@st-and.ac.uk
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Appendix 2: Appendix to Chapter 3 (Study 1)
A.2.1 Participant Information Sheets
A.2.2 Participant Consent Forms
A.2.3 Participant Debriefing Forms
A.2.4 Further Statistical Analyses: Complete Multiple Regression Models
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A.2.1 Participant Information Sheets (Study 1)
Dear Participant,
Thank you for your interest in my research. The purpose of this form is to explain
the entire study to you, and you can then decide whether or not you want to participate.
I am interested in the effects of traumatic life experiences on our normal memory
function. We know that the experience of a traumatic life event has the potential for changing
the way we retrieve normal memories, even if they have nothing to do with the event itself.
The purpose of this study is to examine this link further in a typical student population.
The truth is that almost everybody has experienced a potentially traumatic life event.
This could have been an accident, a painful medical procedure, a personal illness, as well as
the death or illness of a loved one. This is why I feel that everybody can participate in this
study.
However, two people who have suffered the exact same event may afterwards end
up feeling very differently about it. We think that this may be due to the ways in which
different people attempt to deal with distressing experiences and thoughts.
This study will include two general memory interviews, in which you will be asked to
retrieve a memory relating to a word, such as “friendly”. In addition you will be asked to tell
me facts about your life, such as whether or not you can remember the names of your
teachers in primary school.
After this part, I will give you a number of questionnaires to complete. These will be
mostly concerned with what strategies you employ when dealing with unwanted memories
and what you do when you feel sad. I will be in the room while you complete the
questionnaires, in case you have any questions about them.
I want you to be aware that one of the questionnaires will ask you to think about
what you consider to be your most traumatic experience, defining which broad category it
belongs to (such as accident, illness, etc.) as well as asking you to answer a number of
questions on what effect memories of that event have on you. I will not require you to
identify any details about that event.
The entire experiment will take about 45 minutes to complete, and you will be paid
£4 for your participation. All information will be kept strictly confidential, the data will be
kept in a secure (locked) place and I will be the only one who has access to it. Furthermore,
your name or any other identification will NOT be on any of the forms you complete.
Please feel free to ask me any questions. I would greatly appreciate your
contribution to this study.
Thank you very much,
Julia Neufeind
School of Psychology
University of St. Andrews
Fife, KY16 9JU
e-mail: jn20@st-and.ac.uk
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A.2.2 Participant Consent Forms (Study 1)
To be completed by the participant:
Please answer the following questions by circling the relevant answer:
I have read and understood the information sheet: Yes No
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about
this study, and know that I can do so at any time. Yes No
I understand that I can withdraw from the study
at any time (without needing to give reason). Yes No
I……………………………..…………….. (print name) give my consent to take part in this
study.
Signed:…………………………………………… Date:……………….…
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A.2.3 Participant Debriefing Form (Study 1)
Dear Participant,
Thank you for your participation in my study. I appreciate your contribution to my
research very much.
As already explained in the Information Sheet, the purpose of this research was to
examine the potential effects that traumatic life experiences can have on our autobiographical
memory (that is a person’s memory of their own life/experiences). We think that our coping
strategies might be an important factor that could help us explain which people will show a
certain memory pattern after experiencing a traumatic event while others do not.
I am aware that you may have potentially suffered a distressing life experience, and
that this may be hard to talk about. However, if you do find that you want to talk about it, the
University’s Student Support Counselling Service is a professional, free and confidential
service for students. The service is located on the first floor of the Student’s Association:
Students' Association,
9 St Mary's Place,
St Andrews,
Fife KY16 9UZ
Monday to Friday 09:00 – 17:00:
Tel: 01334 462720
:
Out of Hour Service (24/7)
Tel: 01334 476161
You can make appointments to be seen by a professional counsellor during the
daytime hours. In urgent cases, if you feel very upset right now, they will see you right away.
Again, thank you very much for your participation, and please feel free to contact
me with any questions.
Yours sincerely,
Julia Neufeind
School of Psychology
University of St. Andrews
Fife, KY16 9JU
e-mail: jn20@st-and.ac.uk
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A.2.4 Complete Multiple Regression Models (Study 1)
Below are the complete multiple regression models for the 5 dimensions of ABM
retrieval investigated in Chapter 3 of this program of research.
Dependent Variable: AMT Total Latency r = .348, p = 0.446
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error β t p
(CONSTANT) 142.575 23.377 6.099 0.000
WBSI- E - 2.538 1.391 - 0.328 - 1.825 0.075
IES-I - 0.177 1.085 - 0.052 - 0.163 0.871
IES-A - 0.100 1.055 - 0.027 - 0.095 0.925
IES-H 0.718 0.946 0.186 0.758 0.452
HADS-D - 2..236 2.599 - 0.176 - 0.861 0.394
HADS-A 1.485 1.888 0.165 0.786 0.436
Dependent Variable: AMT Positive Latency r = .215, p = 0.907
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error β t p
(CONSTANT) 63.301 16.811 3.765 0.000
WBSI- E - 0.647 1.000 - 0.121 - 0.647 0.521
IES-I - 0.494 0.781 - 0.209 - 0.633 0.530
IES-A 0.357 0.759 0.139 0.470 0.641
IES-H 0.670 0.681 0.251 0.985 0.330
HADS-D - 0.747 1.869 - 0.085 - 0.400 0.691
HADS-A - 0.058 1.358 - 0.009 - 0.042 0.966
Dependent Variable: AMT Negative Latency r = .428, p = 0.169
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error β t p
(CONSTANT) 78.081 13.706 5.697 0.000
WBSI- E - 1.793 0.815 - 0.381 - 2.199 0.033
IES-I 0.353 0.636 0.169 0.555 0.582
IES-A - 0.437 0.619 - 0.194 - 0.707 0.483
IES-H 0.003 0.555 0.001 0.005 0.996
HADS-D - 1.464 1.524 - 0.189 - 0.961 0.342
HADS-A 1.437 1.107 0.263 1.298 0.201
Dependent Variable: S-AMI Personal Semantic Recall r = .493, p = 0.052
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error β t p
(CONSTANT) 66.706 2.121 31.453 0.000
WBSI- E - 0.347 0.126 - 0.460 - 2.753 0.009
IES-I - 0.160 0.098 - 0.477 - 1.625 0.111
IES-A 0.067 0.096 0.184 0.697 0.490
IES-H 0.141 0.086 0.374 1.646 0.107
HADS-D 0.249 0.236 0.200 1.058 0.296
HADS-A - 0.090 0.171 - 0.103 - 0.525 0.602
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Dependent Variable: S-AMI Episodic Memory Recall r = .296, p = 0.661
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error β t p
(CONSTANT) 27.318 1.792 15.243 0.000
WBSI- E - 0.159 0.107 - 0.274 - 1.494 0.142
IES-I - 0.020 0.083 - 0.078 - 0.243 0.809
IES-A 0.094 0.081 0.336 1.160 0.253
IES-H - 0.069 0.073 - 0.239 - 0.957 0.344
HADS-D 0.096 0.199 0.100 0.482 0.632
HADS-A - 0.014 0.145 - 0.020 - 0.094 0.925
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Appendix 3: Appendix to Chapter 4 (Study 2)
A.3.1 Participant Information Sheets
A.3.2 Participant Consent Forms
A.3.3.Participant Debriefing Forms
A.3.4 Student’s AMI – Version A
A.3.5 Student’s AMI – Version B
A.3.6 Memory for the Video Questionnaire
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A.3.1 Participant Information Sheets (Study2)
Dear Participant,
Thank you for your interest in my research. The purpose of this form is to explain
the present study to you, and you can then decide whether or not you want to participate.
I am interested in memory recall. By that I mean both personal memories, as well as
new memories for events.
In this study, I will first give you some memory interviews. For one of them you will
be asked to retrieve a memory relating to a word that I give you, such as “friendly”. In the
second interview I will ask you to recall facts from your life, such as names of your
neighbours when you were a child. Another memory task involves you recalling as many
things as you can that fit a certain category.
After this part, I will show you a video of a grizzly bear attack. I must let you know
that the video is realistic and quite “gory”.
After that video, I will give you a set of similar memory tasks that you have done
before watching the video. I will also give you a questionnaire to complete, which will ask you
about the video, and a general questionnaire about how you deal with unpleasant thoughts.
The entire experiment will take about one hour to complete, and you will be paid £4
for your participation. All information will be kept strictly confidential, the data will be kept
in a secure (locked) place and I will be the only one who has access to it. Furthermore, your
name or any other identification will NOT be on any of the forms you complete.
Please feel free to ask me any questions. I would greatly appreciate your
contribution to this study.
Thank you very much,
Julia Neufeind
School of Psychology
University of St. Andrews
Fife, KY16 9JU
e-mail: jn20@st-and.ac.uk
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A.3.2 Participant Consent Forms (Study 2)
To be completed by the participant:
Please answer the following questions by circling the relevant answer:
I have read and understood the information sheet: Yes No
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about
this study, and know that I can do so at any time. Yes No
I understand that I can withdraw from the study
at any time (without needing to give reason). Yes No
I……………………………..…………….. (print name) give my consent to take part in this
study.
Signed:…………………………………………… Date:……………….…
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A.3.3 Participant Debriefing Forms (Study 2)
Dear Participant,
Thank you for your participation in my study. I appreciate your contribution to my
research very much.
As already explained in the Information Sheet, the purpose of this research was to
examine personal memory recall.
Past research has shown that thought suppression is related to personal memory
recall. However, this relationship is not yet clearly understood. In this experiment you were
either asked to suppress the information for the video straight away, or you were free to think
about anything. This way we manipulated thought suppression, as we believe that it
influences the way you recall personal memories afterwards compared to beforehand.
Furthermore, as part of my research, I am interested in how people deal with
traumatic experiences. Before watching the video, you were either told to empathise with the
people in the video, or you were not. The purpose of the empathy condition is to make the
video more “trauma-like”, i.e. as if it actually happened to you, rather than just watching a
video. We believe that this variable can also influence how you recall memories afterwards.
Again, thank you very much for your participation, and please feel free to contact
me with any questions.
Yours sincerely,
Julia Neufeind
School of Psychology
University of St. Andrews
Fife, KY16 9JU
e-mail: jn20@st-and.ac.
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A.3.4 Student’s AMI – Version A (Study 2)
Section A: Childhood
1. First School (~ 5-11 years):
1.1 Name of the first school the participant attended (1 point)
Name: (1 point)
1.2 Location of this school (1 point)
Location: (1 point)
1.3 Participant’s age when starting this school (1 point)
Age: (1 point)
1.4 Participant’s address when starting this school (2 points)
Street and Number: (½ point each)
Town: (1 point)
1.5 Names of three teachers from this school (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.1 Recall of an incident from the period at primary school (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
Section B: Adolescence
2. Extracurricular Activities in Secondary/High School:
2.1 Extracurricular Activities (e.g. sports, music) (1 point)
Activity: (1 point)
2.2 Location where this activity was carried out (1 point)
Town: (1 point)
2.3 Participant’s age at the time (1 point)
Age: (1 point)
2.4 Name of the teacher/coach/leader of that activity (1 point)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.2 Recall of an incident from the extracurricular activity (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
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3. Friends from adolescence:
3.1 Name of two friends from adolescence (2 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
3.2 Two places where they spent time together (not school) (2 points)
Place: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Section C: Recent Events
4. Last Christmas:
4.1 Place where the participant spent the last Christmas (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
4.2 Name of one person they spent Christmas with (1 point)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
5. Last Birthday:
5.1 What the participant did for that birthday (1 point)
Activity: (1 point)
5.2 The participant’s favourite present from that birthday (1 point)
Present: (1 point)
5.3 Person who gave the favourite present (1 point)
Person: (1 point)
5.4 Names of three friends who came to that birthday (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.5 Recall of an incident that happened on that birthday (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
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Scoring of the S-AMI Version A:
Section A Personal Semantic Episodic
1. First School (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Total (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Section B Personal Semantic Episodic
2. Extracurricular Act. (max. = 4) (max. = 3)
3. Friends (max. = 4) -------------
Total (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Section C Personal Semantic Episodic
4. Last Christmas (max. = 2) -------------
5. Last Birthday (max. = 6) (max. = 3)
Total (max. = 8) (max. =3)
Cumulative Totals:
Total Score Summary Personal Semantic Episodic
A. Childhood (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
B. Adolescence (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
C. Recent Life (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Total (max. = 24) (max. = 9)
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A.3.5 Student’s AMI – Version B (Study 2)
Section A: Childhood
3. First/Earliest Birthday:
1.1 First birthday the participant can remember (1 point)
Age: (1 point)
1.2 What the participant did for that birthday (1 point)
Activity: (1 point)
1.3 What the participant was wearing (1 point)
Clothes: (1 point)
1.4 The participant’s favourite present from that birthday (1 point)
Present: (1 point)
1.5 Person who gave the favourite present (1 point)
Person: (1 point)
1.6 Names of three friends who came to that birthday (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.1 Recall of an incident that happened on that birthday (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
Section B: Adolescence
2. Main Secondary or High School (~ 11-18 years):
2.1 Name of the secondary/high school (1 point)
Name: (1 point)
2.2 Location of this school (1 point)
Town: (1 point)
2.3 Year of graduation from secondary school (1 point)
Year: (1 point)
2.4 Participant’s address when starting this school (2 points)
Street and Number: (½ point each)
Town: (1 point)
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4.5 Names of three teachers or friends from this school (3 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
E.4 Recall of the first day at secondary/high school (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
Section C: Recent Events
3. University/College
3.1 Name of the first University the participant attended (1 point)
Name: (1 point)
3.2 Location of this University (1 point)
Town: (1 point)
3.3 Two courses the participant took in their first semester (2 points)
Course: (1 point)
Course: (1 point)
3.4 Names of two teachers from the first semester (2 points)
Title: Family Name: (½ point each)
Title: Family Name: (½ point each)
3.5 Names of two friends from the first semester (2 points)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
First Name: Family Name: (½ point each)
4. Yesterday:
E.4 Recall of an incident that happened yesterday (3 points)
Specific Incident: (1 point)
Place: (1 point)
Time: (1 point)
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Scoring of the S-AMI Version B:
Section A Personal Semantic Episodic
1. Earliest Birthday (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Total (max. = 8) (max. =3)
Section B Personal Semantic Episodic
2. Secondary School (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Total (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Section C Personal Semantic Episodic
3. University/College (max. = 8) -------------
4. Yesterday ------------- (max. = 3)
Total (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Cumulative Totals:
Total Score Summary Personal Semantic Episodic
A. Childhood (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
B. Adolescence (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
C. Recent Life (max. = 8) (max. = 3)
Total (max. = 24) (max. = 9)
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A.3.6 Memory for the Video Questionnaire (Study 2)
Please answer all of the following questions. For sections 1 and 2, dissect the line with a
vertical dash to reflect your answer.
Section 1:
1. How vivid is your memory for the film?
Not at all Verymuch
2. My memory for the place where the event took place is:
Vague Clear
3. I find the story:
Very
unlikely
Very
likely
Section 2:
1. Do your memories of the film look more like snapshots, or a rolling film?
Snapshots RollingFilm
2. When you think about the film, do you see brief flashes of a scene of a whole
scene played out?
Brief
Flashes
Whole
Scene
3. When recollecting the film, do you see still images of the film or progressing and
moving images?
Still
Images
Moving
Images
4. Are your memories of the film frozen frames of the film or advancing frames of
the film?
Frozen Advancing
5. Are your memories of the film broken into segments or do they run together?
Segments Coherent
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Section 3:
1. Why does the narrator leave for the mountains?
2. Does he provide this reason at the end or at the beginning of the clip?
3. Why, according to the narrator, do the tourists visit the mountains?
4. Does the first shot of the landscape contain mountains in the background?
5. Which of the following shots appears first: that of the landscape or that of the
deer?
6. Which animal appears first, the deer or the bear?
7. Does the bear walk from left to right or vice versa through the screen?
8. Does the deer have horns?
9. Is the first shot of the bear taken while standing or driving?
10. Is the first shot taken by the narrator or the tourist?
11. Which animal is the bear eating: a deer or another animal?
12. Whose voice do you hear first: the man’s or the woman’s?
13. How many pieces of bread does the woman throw at the bear?
14. Does she do this with her left or right hand?
15. In which hand does the man hold his camera initially?
16. Does the man walk in front or behind his car?
17. How many cars are there in the clip?
18. What colours are the cars?
19. How often does the woman warn her husband to keep away from the bear?
20. Which words does she initially use: “watch out, Bob”, or “… hunny”?
21. Which trees appear most in the clip: leaf or needle trees?
22. Who waves at the bear: the man or the woman?
23. When lying on the ground, is the man before or behind a tree?
24. What colour is the man’s shirt?
25. What colour is the woman’s sweater?
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26. The narrator wonders whether men in general are as wise as we think. Does he
wonder about this before or after than man has been attacked?
27. Why does the bear attack, according to the narrator: hunger or anxiety?
28. Is this reason provided before or after the man has been attacked?
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Appendix 4: Appendix to Chapter 5 (Study 3)
A.4.1 Participant Information Sheets
A.4.2 Participant Consent Forms
A.4.3 Participant Debriefing Forms
A.4.4 Complete Statistical Analyses (n = 64)
A.4.5 Complete Statistical Analyses (n = 61)
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A.4.1 Participant Information Sheet (Study 3)
Dear Participant,
Thank you for taking an interest in the current research. The purpose of this form is
to explain the study to you and allow you to decide whether or not you would like to
participate in the experiment.
The study will involve completing a mood questionnaire prior to viewing a short
video clip. This video clip potentially contains material that is quite ‘gory’ and may be found
unpleasant. The video clip runs for only a few minutes; however, if at any point during any
stage of the experiment you wish to withdraw, you may do so with no explanation necessary.
Following the short video clips we will ask you to complete a second set of
questionnaires.
The experiment will take about 30 minutes to complete and you will be paid £2 for
your participation. All information will be kept strictly confidential, the data will be stored in a
secure (locked) location and we are the only people who have access to it. Further to this,
your name or any other means of identification will NOT be on any of the forms you
complete.
Please ask any questions you have regarding the study at any time, and your
participation in this study is greatly appreciated.
Thank you very much,
Julia Neufeind
School of Psychology
University of St Andrews
Fife, KY16 9JU
Email: jn20@st-and.ac.uk
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A.4.2 Participant Consent Form (Study 3)
To be completed by the participant:
Please answer the following questions by circling the relevant answer:
I have read and understood the information sheet: Yes No
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about
this study, and know that I can do so at any time. Yes No
I understand that I can withdraw from the study
at any time (without needing to give reason). Yes No
I……………………………..…………….. (print name) give my consent to take part in this
study.
Signed:…………………………………………… Date:……………….…
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A.4.3 Participant Debriefing Form (Study 3)
Dear Participant,
Thank you very much for your participation in the current study. I appreciate your
time and contribution to the present research into thought suppression and mood.
Previous studies have shown that thought suppression is related to personal
memory recall. The purpose of the current investigation is to establish whether suppression
of negative material has a direct effect on mood, and may therefore affect the recall of personal
memories.
Thank you very much for your participation in the study and please do not hesitate
to contact us with any questions.
Yours sincerely,
Julia Neufeind
School of Psychology
University of St Andrews
Fife, KY16 9JU
Email: jn20@st-and.ac.uk
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A.4.4 Complete Statistical Analyses (n = 64) (Study 3)
The tables below summarise the complete 2 (time: baseline and post manipulation) x 2
(condition: suppression vs. no suppression) x 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) three way
mixed ANOVA models used to investigate the effects of thought suppression on mood (see
Section 5.3.3). Condition and Valence were the between subjects factors and time was the
within subjects factor. The dependent variables were the mood states as measured by the
Profile of Mood States (POMS), and separate models were calculated for the 6 subscales of
tension, depression, anger, vigour, fatigue and confusion, as well as the total mood
disturbance (TMD).
a) TMD
Source SS df MS F p
Time 3.781 1 3.781 0.032 0.859
Time * Valence 450.00 1 450.00 3.782 0.057
Time * Suppression 32.00 1 32.00 0.269 0.606
Time * Valence * Suppression 318.781 1 318.781 2.679 0.107
Error (within) 7139.437 60 118.991
Valence 351.125 1 351.125 0.210 0.649
Suppression 136.125 1 136.125 0.081 0.777
Valence * Suppression 9.031 1 9.031 0.005 0.942
Error (between) 100455.188 60 1674.253
b) Tension
Source SS df MS F p
Time 66.125 1 66.125 5.354 0.024
Time * Valence 7.031 1 7.031 0.569 0.453
Time * Suppression 8.000 1 8.000 0.648 0.424
Time * Valence * Suppression 22.781 1 22.781 1.844 0.180
Error (within) 741.062 60 12.351
Valence 0.500 1 0.500 0.010 0.920
Suppression 38.281 1 38.281 0.788 0.378
Valence * Suppression 4.500 1 4.500 0.93 0.762
Error (between) 2913.437 60 48.557
c) Depression
Source SS df MS F p
Time 20.320 1 20.320 2.088 0.154
Time * Valence 8.508 1 8.508 0.874 0.354
Time * Suppression 3.445 1 3.445 0.354 0.554
Time * Valence * Suppression 17.258 1 17.258 1.773 0.188
Error (within) 583.969 60 9.733
Valence 291.008 1 291.008 1.749 0.191
Suppression 106.945 1 106.945 0.643 0.426
Valence * Suppression 11.883 1 11.883 0.071 0.790
Error (between) 9983.469 60 166.391
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d) Anger
Source SS df MS F p
Time 11.281 1 11.281 2.766 0.101
Time * Valence 0.125 1 0.125 0.031 0.862
Time * Suppression 13.781 1 13.781 3.379 0.071
Time * Valence * Suppression 10.125 1 10.125 2.483 0.120
Error (within) 244.688 60 4.078
Valence 112.500 1 112.500 1.859 0.178
Suppression 22.781 1 22.781 0.376 0.542
Valence * Suppression 288.000 1 288.000 4.759 0.033
Error (between) 3630.937 60 60.516
e) Vigour
Source SS df MS F p
Time 220.500 1 220.500 21.107 0.000
Time * Valence 26.281 1 26.281 2.516 0.118
Time * Suppression 10.125 1 10.125 0.969 0.329
Time * Valence * Suppression 5.281 1 5.281 0.506 0.480
Error (within) 626.812 60 10.447
Valence 91.125 1 91.125 1.384 0.244
Suppression 205.031 1 205.031 3.113 0.083
Valence * Suppression 21.125 1 21.125 0.321 0.573
Error (between) 3951.687 60 65.861
f) Fatigue
Source SS df MS F p
Time 4.133 1 4.133 0.785 0.379
Time * Valence 23.633 1 23.633 4.488 0.038
Time * Suppression 3.445 1 3.445 0.654 0.422
Time * Valence * Suppression 1.320 1 1.320 0.251 0.618
Error (within) 315.969 60 5.266
Valence 20.320 1 20.320 0.249 0.620
Suppression 2.258 1 2.258 0.028 0.869
Valence * Suppression 122.070 1 122.070 1.494 0.226
Error (between) 4903.844 60 81.731
g) Confusion
Source SS df MS F p
Time 1.531 1 1.531 0.314 0.577
Time * Valence 36.125 1 36.125 7.409 0.008
Time * Suppression 4.500 1 4.500 0.923 0.341
Time * Valence * Suppression 5.281 1 5.281 1.083 0.302
Error (within) 292.563 60 4.876
Valence 34.031 1 34.031 1.172 0.283
Suppression 38.281 1 38.281 1.318 0.255
Valence * Suppression 0.125 1 0.125 0.004 0.948
Error (between) 1742.437 60 29.041
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A.4.5 Complete Statistical Analyses (n = 61) (Study 3)
Because the exploratory data analysis using boxplots revealed three outlying scores
total mood disturbance (TMD) on the Profile of Mood States (POMS) at baseline, the entire
data analysis for Study 3 (Chapter 5) was repeated with these three participants removed to
ensure that these outlying scores did not have a significantly altering impact on the data set
(see Section 5.3.3). This repeated data analysis is reported below, and most importantly the
results and conclusions do not differ from those reported in Chapter 5.
A.4.5.1 Participant Characteristics:
The participants’ gender ratio, age, and trait suppression scores (as measured by the
WBSI) are summarised in the table below:
Participant Characteristics: gender ration, mean age (s.d.), and mean trait suppression (s.d.)
per condition
Positive
No Suppression
Negative
No Suppression
Positive
Suppression
Negative
Suppression
Gender (f:m) 12:4 10:6 11:4 9:5
Age 19.88 (3.14) 20.50 (3.92) 20.93 (3.13) 20.86 (4.07)
WBSI total 50.31 (11.95) 47.75 (9.09) 51.87 (6.51) 50.14 (10.70)
WBSI effective 19.50 (5.17) 19.06 (4.95) 21.00 (3.02) 20.21 (5.03)
There was no significant difference in the gender ratio between the four conditions
(Fisher’s exact p > 0.6, two-tailed). A 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (condition:
suppression vs. no suppression) between subjects ANOVA was calculated on age, and
revealed that there were no significant differences in the ages of the participants between the
groups (F(1,60) < 1).
Two further 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (condition: suppression vs. no
suppression) between subjects ANOVAs were calculated to assess the participants’ trait
suppression, as measured by the WBSI scores (F(1,60) < 1) as well as scores from “effective”
WBSI items (F(1,60) < 1). This suggests that there were no differences in levels of trait
suppression between the participants in the four conditions.
A.4.5.2 Suppression Manipulation:
The means (and standard deviations) for levels of thought suppression and number
of intrusions reported by the participants (as measured by the number of mouse button
presses) during the thought monitoring task are summarized in the table below:
Mean level of thought suppression (and standard deviations) and intrusions (s.d.) reported by
the participants during the thought monitoring task
Positive
No Suppression
Negative
No Suppression
Positive
Suppression
Negative
Suppression
Suppression 52.31 (29.29) 69.03 (22.65)
Suppression 59.00 (23.80) 45.63 (33.33) 66.27 (28.23) 72.00 (15.11)
Intrusions 12.44 (6.23) 11.81 (8.40) 8.27 (6.79) 13.71 (9.47)
In order to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, a 2 (valence: positive vs.
negative) x 2 (condition: suppression vs. no suppression) between subjects ANOVA was
calculated on the self-reported levels of thought suppression. This revealed a main effect of
condition (F(1,60) = 6.24, p < 0.05), but no significant main effect of valence (F(1,60) < 1) or
interaction (F(1,60) = 2.01, p = 0.16). A subsequent independent-samples t-test showed that
those participants who were instructed to suppress reported significantly higher levels of
thought suppression than those in the control condition (t(62) = -2.48, p < 0.05), indicating
that the experimental instructions were adhered to.
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A similar 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (condition: suppression vs. no
suppression) between subjects ANOVA was calculated to examine any differences in the
number of video-related intrusions reported during the thought monitoring task, but revealed
no main effects of valence (F(1,60) = 1.46, p = 0.23), condition (F(1,60) < 1), and no significant
interaction (F(1,60) = 2.32, p = 0.13).
A.4.5.3 Effects of Thought Suppression on Mood:
The POMS scores for the four between subjects conditions at baseline and post-
manipulation are summarized in table the table below.
Means (and standard deviations) for total mood disturbance (TMD) and each of the POMS
subscales for all condition, excluding outliers (n = 61)
Baseline Post-Manipulation
No Suppression Suppression No Suppression Suppression
Video Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
(n) n = 16 n = 16 n = 15 n = 14 n = 16 n = 16 n = 15 n = 14
TMD 60.69
(23.39)
57.31
(26.32)
59.47
(26.52)
47.36
(13.42)
60.75
(25.49)
58.56
(20.27)
51.93
(22.51)
52.79
(19.13)
Tension 15.31
(5.49)
15.44
(5.25)
15.20
(4.65)
13.93
(3.99)
13.75
(4.14)
13.13
(2.96)
12.93
(3.39)
14.14
(4.85)
Depression 21.38
(5.81)
19.19
(6.35)
21.87
(7.90)
16.93
(2.23)
21.13
(8.28)
18.50
(5.25)
19.67
(6.47)
17.07
(3.08)
Anger 14.50
(2.99)
16.25
(5.86)
17.73
(5.60)
13.29
(1.77)
15.19
(4.58)
15.69
(4.69)
16.00
(4.66)
12.64
(1.01)
Vigour 22.00
(6.25)
21.63
(5.61)
25.07
(7.41)
24.64
(4.89)
19.31
(5.44)
17.94
(5.59)
24.07
(5.61)
21.14
(6.06)
Fatigue 16.06
(7.08)
14.25
(5.51)
13.73
(6.56)
14.86
(6.06)
15.38
(7.91)
14.88
(6.46)
12.40
(5.58)
15.29
(5.85)
Confusion 15.54
(4.27)
13.81
(2.23)
16.00
(3.55)
13.00
(3.28)
14.63
(3.48)
14.31
(3.00)
15.00
(3.46)
14.79
(4.51)
In order to investigate the effects of thought suppression on mood, a series of 2
(time: baseline and post-manipulation) x 2 (condition: suppression vs. no suppression) x 2
(valence: positive vs. negative) mixed model ANOVAs were calculated for TMD as well as
the 6 POMS subscales, with time as the repeated measures factor. For TMD, no significant
main effects of time (F(1,60) < 1), valence (F(1,60) < 1) or suppression condition (F(1,60) = 1.40, p
= 0.24) were found, and there was no significant interaction occurred for time x condition x
valence (F(1,60) = 2.14, p = 0.15). Thus, suppression of negative material did not lead to
significant changes in mood.
Similar patterns emerged for each of the POMS subscales. Critically, no significant
3-way interaction between time, condition, and valence were found on any of the POMS
subscales: tension (F(1,60) = 1.53, p = 0.22); depression (F(1,60) = 1.51, p = 0.22); anger (F(1,60) =
2.56, p = 0.12); vigour (F(1,60) < 1); fatigue (F(1,60) < 1); and confusion (F(1,60) < 1).
The tables below summarise the complete 2 (time: baseline and post manipulation) x
2 (condition: suppression vs. no suppression) x 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) three way
mixed ANOVA models used to investigate the effects of thought suppression on mood (see
Section 5.3.3). Condition and Valence were the between subjects factors and time was the
within subjects factor. The dependent variables were the mood states as measured by the
Profile of Mood States (POMS), and separate models were calculated for the 6 subscales of
tension, depression, anger, vigour, fatigue and confusion, as well as the total mood
disturbance (TMD).
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a) TMD
Source SS df MS F p
Time 1.193 1 1.193 0.010 0.922
Time * Valence 380.481 1 380.481 3.089 0.084
Time * Suppression 22.193 1 22.193 0.180 0.673
Time * Valence * Suppression 263.472 1 263.472 2.139 0.149
Error (within) 7020.550 57 123.168
Valence 537.639 1 537.639 0.595 0.444
Suppression 1262.042 1 1262.042 1.396 0.242
Valence * Suppression 61.630 1 61.630 0.068 0.795
Error (between) 51525.501 57 903.956
b) Tension
Source SS df MS F p
Time 66.770 1 66.770 5.162 0.027
Time * Valence 5.694 1 5.694 0.440 0.510
Time * Suppression 6.313 1 6.313 0.488 0.488
Time * Valence * Suppression 19.839 1 19.839 1.534 0.221
Error (within) 737.333 57 12.936
Valence 0.600 1 0.600 0.023 0.880
Suppression 3.833 1 3.833 0.146 0.703
Valence * Suppression 0.365 1 0.365 0.014 0.906
Error (between) 1492.768 57 26.189
c) Depression
Source SS df MS F p
Time 17.043 1 17.043 1.749 0.191
Time * Valence 6.899 1 6.899 0.708 0.404
Time * Suppression 2.382 1 2.382 0.245 0.623
Time * Valence * Suppression 14.691 1 14.691 1.508 0.224
Error (within) 555.276 57 9.742
Valence 289.666 1 289.666 4.532 0.038
Suppression 41.166 1 41.166 0.644 0.426
Valence * Suppression 14.069 1 14.069 0.220 0.641
Error (between) 3643.585 57 63.923
d) Anger
Source SS df MS F p
Time 9.631 1 9.631 2.369 0.129
Time * Valence 0.048 1 0.048 0.012 0.914
Time * Suppression 11.889 1 11.889 2.924 0.093
Time * Valence * Suppression 10.410 1 10.410 2.560 0.115
Error (within) 231.761 57 4.066
Valence 58.639 1 58.639 1.799 0.185
Suppression 7.324 1 7.324 0.225 0.637
Valence * Suppression 192.132 1 192.132 5.894 0.018
Error (between) 1858.118 57 32.599
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e) Vigour
Source SS df MS F p
Time 224.758 1 224.758 20.724 0.000
Time * Valence 23.281 1 23.281 2.147 0.148
Time * Suppression 6.681 1 6.681 0.616 0.436
Time * Valence * Suppression 4.276 1 4.276 0.394 0.533
Error (within) 618.187 57 10.845
Valence 49.385 1 49.385 0.840 0.363
Suppression 374.836 1 374.836 6.376 0.014
Valence * Suppression 4.851 1 4.851 0.083 0.775
Error (between) 3350.733 57 58.785
f) Fatigue
Source SS df MS F p
Time 1.778 1 1.778 0.345 0.559
Time * Valence 17.963 1 17.963 3.483 0.067
Time * Suppression 1.348 1 1.348 0.261 0.611
Time * Valence * Suppression 0.348 1 1.348 0.261 0.611
Error (within) 293.975 57 5.157
Valence 5.473 1 5.473 0.070 0.792
Suppression 34.916 1 34.916 0.448 0.506
Valence * Suppression 75.957 1 75.957 0.975 0.328
Error (between) 4438.568 57 77.870
g) Confusion
Source SS df MS F p
Time 0.426 1 0.426 0.085 0.772
Time * Valence 31.919 1 31.919 6.375 0.014
Time * Suppression 2.292 1 2.292 0.458 0.501
Time * Valence * Suppression 4.125 1 4.125 0.824 0.368
Error (within) 285.397 57 5.007
Valence 50.440 1 50.440 2.548 0.116
Suppression 0.680 1 0.680 0.034 0.854
Valence * Suppression 3.098 1 3.098 0.156 0.694
Error (between) 1128.522 57 19.799
A.4.5.4 Power Analyses:
In order to further validate the non-significant findings obtained in the three way
interactions and to ensure that these results were not due to an inadequate sample size an a
priori power analysis was performed. The effect size for the time X valence X condition
interaction for TMD was relatively small (effect size = 0.193) and based on this effect size a
sample of 351 participants would be required to obtain a significant three way interaction at p
< 0.05.
However, the 64 participants in the pervious study (Chapter 4) only viewed the
negative and not the positive video clip, and therefore the power analysis was repeated for
those 32 participants in the present study who viewed the negative video. The size of this
effect was 0.163 and the a priori power analyses revealed that a sample of 492 participants
would be needed to observe a significant change in TMD (at p < 0.05) as a result of the time
X condition interaction. It therefore remains unlikely that the effects of thought suppression
on ABM recall observed in Chapter 4 occurred as a result of changed in mood.
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Appendix 5: Appendix to Chapter 6 (Study 4)
A.5.1 Participant Information Sheets (Clinical)
A.5.2 Participant Information Sheets (Control)
A.5.3 Parent Information Sheets (Clinical)
A.5.4 Parent Information Sheets (Control)
A.5.5 Participant Consent Forms (over 16 years)
A.5.6 Participant/Parent Consent Forms (under 16 years)
A.5.7 Suicide Ideation Interview (K-SADS-PL)
A.5.8 Further Statistical Analyses: Complete Multiple Regression Models
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A.5.1 Participant Information Sheet (Clinical)
Personal Memory, Problem Solving Skills and Stress Reactions
in Young People who Self-Harm.
Hello,
My name is Julia Neufeind, and I am a researcher at the University of St. Andrews. I am
interested in people’s personal memories. I hope that you would like to take part in my
research project. However, before you decide, it is important that you understand what I will
ask of you, and what I want you to do. It is completely up to you to decide whether or not
you want to take part in my research, and even if you agree now, you can still decide at any
point that you don’t want to continue, without having to tell me why. Please ask me about
anything that you don’t understand or are not sure about.
What will happen during the session?
First of all, this is not a test, and there are no right or wrong answers. If you want to
participate, then I want you to just give me the answers that are right for you.
Chris Ward will help me with this study. I will do most of the interviews and questionnaires
with you, but in the end Chris Ward will also ask you a few questions and give you two
questionnaires.
At the start of the session you will be given a number that is on all the questionnaires instead
of your name, so that nobody can tell who gave these answers and recognise you from them.
I will start out by asking you to recall memories from your childhood, such as people you
went to school with and events that happened when you were with these people. I will also
ask you to recall memories that come to mind when I say a certain word.
I will then show you some pictures and ask you which one best describes a word that I say.
After that I will give you a problem solving test, in which I make up some possible problems
that you may be faced with, and ask you to tell me how you would solve them. In between
those tasks I will give you a short questionnaire about unwanted thoughts.
Finally, Chris will ask you a few questions about your self-harming behaviours and intentions
in the past. Also, he will give you two more questionnaires to answer for me, and these
questionnaires are about how you’ve felt over the past two weeks, and also about bad things
that may have happened to you in your past.
What will happen next?
If you decide to take part in this study, and your parent(s)/guardian(s) agree that it is OK for
you to take part, you will be given a consent form to sign.
Remember that it is up to you to decide whether or not you want to participate.
After the testing, I will give you £6 for your participation.
Please ask me any questions about this that you may have about this research!
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A.5.2 Participant Information Sheet (Control)
Personal Memory and Problem Solving Skills in Young People
Hello,
My name is Julia Neufeind, and I am a researcher at the University of St. Andrews. I am
interested in people’s personal memories. I hope that you would like to take part in my
research project. However, before you decide, it is important that you understand what I will
ask of you, and what I want you to do. It is completely up to you to decide whether or not
you want to take part in my research, and even if you agree now, you can still decide at any
point that you don’t want to continue, without having to tell me why. Please ask me about
anything that you don’t understand or are not sure about.
What will happen during the session?
First of all, this is not a test, and there are no right or wrong answers. If you want to
participate, then I want you to just give me the answers that are right for you.
Either Abigail Stephenson or I will do all of the interviews and questionnaires with you in this
study, and only the two of us and my supervisor will have access to the answers that you are
giving in the study.
At the start of the session you will be given a number that is on all the questionnaires instead
of your name, so that nobody can tell who gave these answers and recognise you from them.
I will start out by showing you some pictures and ask you which one best describes a word
that I say to you. This will take about 15 minutes. After that we’ll decide together if you want
to continue and we will arrange another session.
In the next session, I will be asking you to recall memories from your childhood, such as
people you went to school with and events that happened when you were with these people. I
will also ask you to recall memories that come to mind when I say a certain word. After that I
will give you a problem solving test, in which I make up some possible problems that you
may be faced with, and ask you to tell me how you would solve them.
Finally, I will give you three questionnaires to answer for me, and these questionnaires are
about unwanted thoughts, how you’ve felt over the past two weeks, and also about bad things
that may have happened to you in your past.
If there are any questions that you don’t want to answer then it’s okay to leave them out.
What will happen next?
If you decide to take part in this study, and your parent(s)/guardian(s) agree that it is OK for
you to take part, you will be given a consent form to sign.
Remember that it is up to you to decide whether or not you want to participate.
Please ask me any questions about this that you may have about this research!
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A.5.3 Parent Information Sheet (Clinical)
Personal Memory, Problem Solving Skills and Stress Reactions
in Young People who Self-Harm.
Dear Parent/Guardian,
Please consider allowing your son/daughter to participate in this research study. However,
before you decide, it is important that you understand why this research is carried out and
what it involves. Please read the following information carefully, and don’t hesitate to ask any
questions about it.
Who is carrying out this study, and what is it about?
My name is Julia Neufeind, and I am a researcher based at the University of St. Andrews. I
am interested primarily in researching personal memories. I will conduct most of the
interviews with your son/daughter, and will also give him/her a questionnaire to complete.
Chris Ward will also ask your son/daughter a few questions, and will give him/her two
questionnaires.
What does this study involve?
I will ask your son/daughter to recall general memories from his/her childhood, such as
people from their pasts (e.g. friends, teachers) and events throughout his/her childhood (e.g.
the first day at school). I will also ask him/her to recall memories of events from his/her past
that come to mind when I say a particular word. Together, these two tasks will take about 30
minutes.
Additionally, I will also give your son/daughter a standard measure of verbal fluency and a
problem solving task, in which your child will be given four problem situation scenarios that I
will ask them to solve. Together, these tasks should take another 30 minutes. In between
those tasks I will give your child a very short questionnaire about unwanted thoughts.
As part of this research, Chris Ward will ask your son/daughter a few questions to assess
previous self-harming and suicidal acts and intentions. Additionally, Chris Ward will also give
your son/daughter two questionnaires to complete. The questionnaires inquire about your
son’s/daughter’s mood over the past 14 days, and a survey of negative events that may have
happened to him/her.
What will happen next?
It is entirely up to you and your son/daughter to decide whether or not you are happy to let
him/her participate in this research. If you do decide to agree to your son/daughter
participating, you will be asked to sign a consent form. Even if you do decide that your
son/daughter may participate in this study, you can withdraw him/her, or he/she can
withdraw him/herself from the study at any point without needing to give reason. Any
material gathered is kept confidential, and all forms, questionnaires and tapes of the interview
will only be identified by a number, and hence your son/daughter can not be recognised from
it. Finally, this is not a test and there are no right or wrong answers on any of these tasks.
Whatever answer is given is the correct one for your son/daughter.
Your son/daughter will be paid £6 for his/her participation in this study, which is the
standard rate of pay for participants in research projects employed by the University of St.
Andrews.
If you require further information, please contact:
Miss Julia Neufeind, BA, School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews, KY16 9JU
jn20@st-andrews.ac.uk
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A.5.4 Parent Information Sheet (Control)
Personal Memory and Problem Solving Skills in Young People
Dear Parent/Guardian,
Please consider allowing your son/daughter to participate in this research study. However,
before you decide, it is important that you understand why this research is carried out and
what it involves. Please read the following information carefully, and don’t hesitate to ask any
questions about it.
Who is carrying out this study, and what is it about?
My name is Julia Neufeind, and I am a researcher based at the University of St. Andrews. I
am interested primarily in researching personal memories. Either Abigail Stephenson or I will
conduct all of the interviews with your son/daughter, and will also give him/her a few
questionnaires to complete. Abigail Stephenson will help me with this research. Both of us
have gone through the Enhanced Disclosure Scotland procedure to be able to carry out this
project. Only Dr. Barbara Dritschel, my project supervisor, Abigail Stephenson and myself
will have access to the information collected. Approval for this research has been obtained
from Inverkeithing High School, the Local Education Authority and the Ethics Committee of
the School of Psychology at the University of St Andrews. At no point will any information
be written or published that could identify your child.
What does this study involve?
I will first give your son/daughter a standard measure of verbal fluency, which will take about
15 minutes to complete. This will conclude the first session. If we find that based on age,
gender and verbal fluency your child is suitable for this study, we will ask him/her to return
for another session.
In the second session I will ask your son/daughter to recall general memories from his/her
childhood, such as people from their pasts (e.g. friends, teachers) and events throughout
his/her childhood (e.g. the first day at school). I will also ask him/her to recall memories of
events from his/her past that come to mind when I say a particular word. Additionally, I will
also give your son/daughter a problem solving task, in which your child will be given four
problem situation scenarios that I will ask them to solve.
Finally, I will ask him/her to complete three questionnaires about unwanted thoughts,
his/her mood over the past 14 days, and a survey of negative events that may have happened
to him/her. Overall the second session will take about 40 minutes to complete.
What will happen next?
It is entirely up to you and your son/daughter to decide whether or not you are happy to let
him/her participate in this research. If you do decide to agree to your son/daughter
participating, could you please sign the attached consent form and have your child return it to
their school. Even if you do decide that your son/daughter may participate in this study, you
can withdraw him/her, or he/she can withdraw him/herself from the study at any point
without needing to give reason. Finally, this is not a test and there are no right or wrong
answers on any of these tasks. Whatever answer is given is the correct one for your
son/daughter.
If you require further information, please contact:
Miss Julia Neufeind, BA, School of Psychology, University of St. Andrews, KY16 9JU
jn20@st-andrews.ac.uk
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A.5.5 Participant Consent Form (over 16 years)
Title of Project: Personal Memory and Problem Solving Skills in Young People
Researcher: Julia Neufeind
Section for the participant:
 I have read and understood the information sheet provided for the above study.
 I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about this research, and know
that I can do so at any time.
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any time.
 I agree to take part in this study.
----------------------------------- ------------------------------------- -----------------
SIGNATURE NAME DATE
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A.5.6 Participant/Parent Consent Form (under 16 years)
Title of Project: Personal Memory and Problem Solving Skills in Young People
Researcher: Julia Neufeind
Section for the participant:
 I have read and understood the information sheet provided for the above study.
 I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about this research, and know
that I can do so at any time.
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any time.
 I agree to take part in this study.
----------------------------------- ------------------------------------- -----------------
SIGNATURE NAME DATE
Section for the parent/guardian:
 I have read and understood the information sheet provided for the above study.
 I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about this research, and know
that I can do so at any time.
 I understand that my child’s participation is voluntary and that I am free to
withdraw my child, and that he’s she is free to withdraw at any time without giving
any reason.
 I agree to ……………………………………………………taking part in this
study.
----------------------------------- ------------------------------------- -----------------
SIGNATURE NAME DATE
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A.5.7 Suicide Ideation Interview (K-SADS-PL)
Recurrent Thoughts of Death
“Sometimes children who get upset or feel bad, wish they were dead or feel they’d be better off
dead.”
Have you ever had these type of thoughts? When?
Do you feel that way now?
Was there ever another time you felt that way?
0 No Information
1 Not present
2 Subthreshold: Transient thoughts of death
3 Threshold: Recurrent thoughts of death, “I would be better off dead”
or “I wish I were dead”
Suicidal Ideation
(This includes preoccupation with thoughts of death or suicide and auditory
command hallucinations where the child hears a voice telling him to kill
himself or even suggesting a method. Do not include mere fears of dying.)
“Sometimes children who get upset or feel bad think about dying or even killing themselves.”
Have you ever had such thoughts? How would you do it?
Did you have a plan?
0 No Information
1 Not at all
2 Subthreshold: Occasional thoughts of suicide but has not thought of a
specific method
3 Threshold: Often thinks of suicide and had thought of a specific
method
Suicidal Acts – Seriousness
(Judge the seriousness of suicidal intent as expressed in his suicidal act like:
Likelihood of being rescued; precautions against discovery; actions to gain
help during or after attempt; degree of planning; apparent purpose of the
attempt; manipulative or truly suicidal intent)
Have you ever actually tried to kill yourself? When?
What did you do? Any other things?
Did you really want to die? How close did you come to doing it?
Was anybody in the room? In the apartment?
Did you tell them in advance? How were you found?
Did you ask for any help after you did it?
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0 No Information
1 No attempt or gesture with no intent to die
2 Subthreshold: Present, but very ambivalent
3 Threshold: Definite suicidal intent
Suicidal Acts – Medical Lethality
(Actual medical threat to life or physical condition following the most serious
suicidal act. Take into account the method, impaired consciousness at time of
being rescued, seriousness of physical injury, toxicity of ingested material,
reversibility, amount of time needed for complete recovery and how much
medical treatment needed.)
How close were you to dying after your most serious suicidal act?
What did you do when you tried to kill yourself?
What happened to you after you tried to kill yourself?
0 No Information
1 No attempt or gesture with no intent to die
2 Subthreshold: e.g. mild gastritis
3 Threshold: e.g. brief unconsciousness
Non-Suicidal Physical Self-Damaging Acts
(Refers to self-mutilation, or other acts done without intent of killing
himself)
Did you ever try to hurt yourself?
Have you ever burned yourself with matches/candles?
Or scratched yourself with needles/ a knife? Yournails?
Or put hot pennies on your skin? Anything else?
Why did you do it?
How often?
Do you have many accidents?
What kind?
How often?
Some kids do these type of things because they want to kill themselves, and other kids do
them because it makes them feel a little bit better afterwards. Why do you do these things?
0 No Information
1 Not present.
2 Subthreshold: infrequent (1-3 times a year). Has never caused serious
injury to self
3 Threshold: frequent (more than 4 times a year) or has caused serious
injury to self
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A.5.8 Complete Multiple Regression Models (Study 4)
Below are the complete multiple regression models for the 8 dimensions of ABM
retrieval investigated in Chapter 6 of this program of research.
Dependent Variable: Total latency (AMT): r = 0.365, p = 0.166
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error Β t p
(CONSTANT) 202.422 42.674 4.743 0.000
WBTHS - 0.963 0.476 - 0.396 - 1.291 0.205
CDI 0.910 1.242 0.181 0.733 0.468
WBSI-E - 1.781 2.441 - 0.149 - 0.729 0.471
After stepwise multiple regression only PTSD symptoms (WBTHS) remained to
significantly predict variability in the overall latency to retrieve episodic ABMs, r = -0.32, p <
0.05.
Dependent Variable: Positive Latency (AMT): r = 0.247, p = 0.526
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error Β t p
(CONSTANT) 70.163 27.009 2.598 0.014
WBTHS - 0.535 0.472 - 0.337 - 1.133 0.265
CDI 1.179 0.786 0.387 1.501 0.142
WBSI-E 0.212 1.545 0.029 0.137 0.892
After stepwise multiple regression none of the variables remained to significantly
predict variability in the positive latency.
Dependent Variable: Negative Latency (AMT): r = 0.495, p = 0.019
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error Β t p
(CONSTANT) 130.303 26.757 4.870 0.000
WBTHS - 0.444 0.468 - 0.253 - 0.949 0.349
CDI - 0.249 0.778 - 0.074 - 0.320 0.751
WBSI-E - 1.893 1.531 - 0.235 - 1.237 0.224
After stepwise multiple regression only thought suppression (WBSI) remained to
significantly predict variability in the latency to retrieve episodic ABMs to negative cue words,
r = -0.46, p < 0.01.
Dependent Variable: Total specific memories on first recall (AMT): r = 0.116, p = 0.923
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error Β t p
(CONSTANT) 8.400 0.34 10.077 0.000
WBTHS -0.006 0.015 -0.121 -0.398 0.693
CDI 0.012 0.024 0.131 0.495 0.624
WBSI-E 0.022 0.048 0.098 0.452 0.654
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After stepwise multiple regression none of the variables remained to significantly
predict variability in the number of specific memories recalled as first responses to all cue
words.
Dependent Variable: Specific memories on first recall on positive cues (AMT):
r = 0.284, p = 0.393
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error Β t p
(CONSTANT) 4.356 0.454 9.598 0.000
WBTHS 0.009 0.008 0.336 1.140 0.262
CDI -0.023 0.013 -0.442 -1.735 0.092
WBSI-E 0.003 0.026 0.023 0.111 0.913
After stepwise multiple regression none of the variables remained to significantly
predict variability in the number of specific memories recalled as first responses to positive
cue words.
Dependent Variable: Specific memories on first recall on negative cues (AMT):
r = 0.326, p = 0.262
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error Β t p
(CONSTANT) 4.045 0.605 6.691 0.000
WBTHS -0.015 0.011 -0.408 -1.404 0.169
CDI 0.035 0.018 0.499 1.985 0.055
WBSI-E 0.019 0.035 0.112 0.541 0.592
After stepwise multiple regression none of the variables remained to significantly
predict variability in the number of specific memories recalled as first responses to negative
cue words.
Dependent Variable: Personal Semantic Memory Retrieval (CAMI): r = 0.362, p = 0.172
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error Β t p
(CONSTANT) 69.487 4.127 16.836 0.000
WBTHS -0.028 0.072 -0.112 -0.392 0.698
CDI 0.074 0.120 0.152 0.614 0.543
WBSI-E -0.400 0.236 -0.346 -1.696 0.099
After stepwise multiple regression only thought suppression (WBSI-effective)
remained to significantly predict variability in personal semantic memory retrieval, r = -0.35, p
< 0.05.
Dependent Variable: Episodic Memory Retrieval (CAMI): r = 0.284, p = 0.392
Unstandardised
Coefficients
Standardised
Coefficients
B Standard Error Β t p
(CONSTANT) 40.846 4.282 9.539 0.000
WBTHS 0.044 0.075 0.174 0.592 0.558
CDI -0.054 0.125 -0.109 -0.430 0.670
WBSI-E -0.384 0.245 -0.329 -1.568 0.126
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After stepwise multiple regression none of the variables remained to significantly
predict variability in the episodic memory retrieval on the CAMI.
